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Research Declaration
This ‘Inauguraldissertation’ is being submitted in form of a cumulative
dissertation. It consists of three scientific papers. The first is titled ‘The
Economics of Cultural Formation of Preferences’ and has been published as
IMW Working Paper 431 in April 2010 (Pichler [49]). The second is titled
‘Cultural Formation of Preferences and Assimilation of Cultural Groups’,
published as IMW Working paper 438 in August 2010 (Pichler [48]). The
third one is part of a larger joint research project with Berno Bu¨chel from
Saarland University and Tim Hellmann from Bielefeld University. It is ti-
tled ‘The Evolution of Continuous Cultural Traits in Social Networks’, and
unpublished to date. These three scientific papers are organized as the three
main parts of the present work.
The three individual scientific papers are related in an exceedingly nat-
ural way, since they share a uniform phenomenological umbrella. This is
constituted by the question of the inter–generational formation and evolu-
tion of continuous cultural traits. These refer to those types of traits that
(a) are subject to formation in the socialization process, and (b) can reflect
different intensities, located in a convex subset of the real line.
In particular, the first scientific paper introduces a generalized represen-
tation of the formation of continuous cultural traits. Thereby, the intensity
of the continuous cultural trait that a child adopts is being formed as the
collective outcome of all role models for trait intensities that it socially learns
from. These role models are constituted by the observable socioeconomic
action patterns of adults. It is shown how the adopted trait intensities in-
duce preference relations over socioeconomic action patterns. Finally, this
cultural formation of preferences process is endogenized as resulting out of
optimal parental socialization decisions. Thus, an endogenous determina-
tion of the intergenerational evolution of trait intensities and the induced
preferences over socioeconomic action patterns is obtained.
Based on this framework, the second scientific paper analyzes the evo-
lution of trait intensities and behavior in a two cultural groups setting.
It is shown that the dynamic properties depend crucially on what parents
perceive as the optimal trait intensities for their children to adopt. Un-
der inter–temporarily fixed (and distinct) optimal trait intensities, the trait
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intensities of the cultural groups will always stay distinct. If the optimal
trait intensities coincide with those derived from the representative group
behavior, then a multitude of convergence path types can realize. These
contain an inter–generational assimilation process toward the same trait in-
tensity point; an initial but incomplete assimilation, with steady state trait
intensities that are less distinct than initially; as well as inter–generational
dissimilation with steady state trait intensities that are more distinct than
initially. Which of those patterns will realize depends (among others) on
the initial distance of the trait intensities. Notably, these theoretical in-
sights can add to the understanding of empirically observable processes of
the integration and assimilation of cultural groups.
It shall also be noted, that the representations of the first two scientific
papers are embedded in a continuum of agents framework. The third scien-
tific paper replaces this with a finite population setting. More importantly,
it incorporates a social network structure into the cultural formation of con-
tinuous cultural traits framework. The theoretical focus is then on analyzing
the static and dynamic properties of the model when parents perceive their
adopted intensity of the continuous trait as the ‘socialization target’, and
when they are free to choose their behavior subject to an inter–generationally
fixed social network. This model constitutes a significant generalization of
the DeGroot [18] model, first since it is subject to any arbitrary continuous
trait intensity type (including that of continuous opinions), and second in
terms of the induced evolution of the continuous trait intensities.A particular
condition on the social network structure is derived that ensures convergence
such that all adopted trait intensities of the dynasties of a connected subset
are identical (‘consensus’).
Scientific Work Share The first two scientific papers constitute my ex-
clusive own work. As has been mentioned above, the third scientific paper
is part of a larger scientific project with Berno Bu¨chel and Tim Hellmann.
To be precise, it constitutes the first of two main parts of the larger research
project with equal overall contributions of all authors. However, for the first
main part, as manifested in this dissertation thesis, my scientific work share
well exceeded one third.
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Part 1
The Economics of Cultural
Formation of Preferences
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The concept of preferences is one of the most important cornerstones of
economic theory, since preferences provide economic agents with the nec-
essary means to choose between different possible socio–economic actions.
The question of how preferences are being formed is thus of central inter-
est to economic theory. The aim of the present paper is to contribute to
the resolution of this question in a two–step approach. In a first step, it
provides a general framework that represents the formation of continuous
cultural traits in the socialization period of individuals. In a second step, it
shows how these can be interpreted such as to induce preference relations
over the choice of socio–economic action patterns in the adult life period of
the indivuals.
With continuous cultural traits, we mean those types of traits that (a)
are subject to formation in the socialization process, and (b) can reflect
different intensities (or magnitudes, valuations, strengths, importances. . . ),
located in a convex subset of the real line. Notably, this characterization is
not particularly restrictive since most types of traits can be (re–)interpreted
in a continuous way (e.g. instead of asking whether a person has a ‘status
preference’, one can ask how important status is for the person). Specifi-
cally, it contains concepts that are in standard use in economic theory, like
the degree of altruism, the intensity of preferences for leisure or for social
status, the patience of a person, etc.; but notably, it also contains (sociologi-
cal) concepts like the values, attitudes, (strength of) norms and ‘continuous
opinions’ that a person adopts.
Contributions and Results A natural question that arises in the con-
text of this characterization of continuous cultural traits is then which of
the possible intensities a person adopts, and how a process that determines
this can be described in formal terms. Our approach will be to let the trait
intensities be formed in the socialization period of a person, out of social
2
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learning from role models for trait intensities.1 These role–models corre-
spond to the observable socio–economic action patterns of the adults of the
society.
Upon observation of the socio–economic action pattern of an adult, chil-
dren also receive a cognitive impulse. The latter can be understood as the
signal on the valuation (or importance, magnitude, etc.) of the continuous
cultural trait that is embodied in the choice of the particular socio–economic
action pattern over the other available choices. We even endow these sorts
of cognitive impulses with a cardinal meaning and call them displayed trait
intensities.
In the next step we then introduce the representation of the socializa-
tion process that leads to the children’s adoption of a specific trait intensity.
This is embedded in a framework of socialization inside the family and by
the general adult social environment, or ‘direct vertical and oblique social-
ization’.2 Specifically, we let the children’s adopted trait intensities result
as a weighted average between the displayed trait intensity that is chosen
by its family, and the representative displayed trait intensity that the child
observes in its general adult social environment.
Given the trait intensity that a person has adopted at the beginning
of its adult period, we show how this can be interpreted such as to induce
preference relations over the choices over the role models for trait intensities,
i.e. the socio–economic action patterns. The central importance of this
step is that it closes the circle between the socio–economic action patterns
taken by one adult generation and the preferences over these patterns by
the succeeding adult generation. We thus obtain a fully consistent and
closed representation of the evolution of the trait intensities and the induced
preferences of a sequence of generations.
It follows that any model framework that determines the adult choices
of socio–economic action patterns (i.e. also the choices of displayed trait
intensities), together with the families’ socialization weights, equally endo-
genizes the process of formation of trait intensities. In the present paper,
we will introduce one possible approach to achieve this, based on purposeful
socialization decisions of the family. Notably, we restrict the latter to consist
of a single parent only (through the assumption of asexual reproduction).
1Our viewpoint will be primarily that of an economist, with references to findings in
the socio–psychological literature on child socialization whenever needed. A thorough
placement of the present paper within this literature is though far beyond scope. See e.g.
Grusec and Hastings [31] and Grusec and Kuczynski [32] for related book long treatments.
2This terminology stems from Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [16] and is distinguished from
‘horizontal socialization’, i.e. socialization by members of the same generation.
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That parents are willing to engage into costs associated with active so-
cialization stems from the fact that they obtain an inter–generational utility
component. Thereby, we let this utility be negatively related to the distance
between the adopted trait intensity of their adult children and a parentally
perceived optimal trait intensity.
The parental decision problem is it then to choose their weight in the
child’s socialization process and their displayed trait intensity. These choices
are subject to the perceived optimal trait intensity of the parents and the
representative displayed trait intensity of the general social environment.
Since the latter results from the individual parents’ choices, this introduces
strategic interaction.
The corresponding parental best reply choices have the following central
characteristics. First, consider the case where the representative displayed
trait intensity of the general social environment deviates from the parentally
perceived optimal trait intensity. Then, generically, parents countervail this
suboptimal socialization influence on their children by choosing strictly posi-
tive socialization instruments. This means on the one hand that they choose
a displayed trait intensity that deviates from their (utility maximal) adopted
trait intensity. Specifically, this deviation is into the opposite direction as
the deviation of the representative displayed trait intensity from the optimal
trait intensity. On the other hand, this behavioral countervailing is coupled
with a strictly positive choice of their socialization weight.
Furthermore, we could show that under certain conditions, parents use
their investments into their socialization instruments and the representa-
tive displayed trait intensity of the general social environment as cultural
substitutes. This means that if the representative displayed trait intensity
becomes more favorable (i.e. its distance to the optimal trait intensity be-
comes smaller), then parents would reduce investments into both socializa-
tion instruments.
In the final step of the model, we then show that a Nash equilibrium
(of the ‘socialization game’) in pure strategies exists under weak conditions.
These equilibrium choices govern the inter–generational evolution of the trait
intensities (and with it the preferences over socio–economic action patterns)
of the society. However, to derive substantial qualitative properties of these
dynamics, the model has to be specified.
We introduce one such specification, based on the assumptions that all
parents have ‘imperfect empathy’ (this concept is due to Bisin and Verdier
[7] and is shortly discussed in chapter 1). The central feature is that under
a certain condition, the trait intensities of the sequence of adult generations
converge to a homogeneous steady state (where the trait intensities of all
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adults are identical). This ‘melting pot’ property is global since it holds for
any initial distribution of the trait intensities.
Related Literature By basing the formation of trait intensities and pref-
erences process on the children’s social learning, the approach of the present
paper stands in a natural relation to the literature on the economics of
cultural transmission.3 This literature has been established by Bisin and
Verdier [7, 8, 9] and Bisin et al. [6], and is based on the work of Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [15, 16] and Boyd and Richerson [12] in evolutionary
anthropology. It studies the population dynamics of the distribution of a
discrete set of cultural traits under an endogenous intergenerational cultural
transmission mechanism.
The endogeneity stems from the purposeful parental choice of socializa-
tion intensity, which effectively determines the probability that the child
will directly adopt the trait(s) of the parents. Parents engage into the cost
of purposeful socialization in order to avoid (decrease the probability) that
their child will not adopt their trait(s) — in which case parents encounter
subjective utility losses.
The properties of the model framework have been applied in several dif-
ferent contexts, such as e.g. preferences for social status (Bisin and Verdier
[7]), voting and political ideology (Bisin and Verdier [8]), corruption (Hauk
and Sa´ez-Mart´ı [34]), hold up problems (Olcina and Penarrubia [45]), gender
discrimination (Escriche et al. [21]), etc. For an exhaustive overview of the
literature on cultural transmission see Bisin and Verdier [10].
Related to this strand of literature are the contributions of Cox and
Stark [17] and Stark [60]. They argue that parents might choose altruistic
behavior in front of their children even though they are themselves not
altruistic. This comes in an attempt to instrument the ‘demonstration (or
preference shaping) effect’, which means an increase of the probability that
the child becomes altruistic. In this case, the parents benefit from their
child’s future care taking.
3As Bisin and Verdier [7, p. 299] point out, this approach is thus distinct from those
based on evolutionary selection mechanisms (where preferences/traits are either geneti-
cally inherited or imitated, with the reproductive/‘imitative’ success being increasing in
the material payoff of the different preferences/traits), like in Rogers [54], Bester and
Gu¨th [4], Fershtman and Weiss [22], Kockesen et al. [37], [27], and from those based on
the agents’ introspective self selection of preferences, as in e.g. Becker [2] and Becker and
Mulligan [3].
Alternative approaches that deal with preference endogeneity in ‘non–purposeful–
socialization’ frameworks are based on e.g. ‘bandwagon’ or ‘snob’ effects (Leibenstein
[39]), ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ (Duesenberry [20]), ‘emulation effects’ (Veblen [61])
or ‘interdependent preferences’ (Pollak [51]).
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However, the theories mentioned consider the probabilistic transmission
of traits and do not approach the issue of formation of the latter. This
restricts their applicability mainly to discrete (sets of) cultural traits. So far,
little has been contributed to resolve the question of the cultural formation
of continuous cultural traits. Important early treatments of the topic are
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [16] in a theoretical, and Otto et al. [46] in an
empirical context.
More recently Bisin and Topa [5] proposed a representation of the forma-
tion of the intensities of continuous cultural traits, while Panebianco [47] did
so for the case of inter–ethnic attitudes. In the terminology of the present
paper, both represented the adopted intensity of the cultural trait (attitude)
as a weighted average between the displayed trait intensity of the family and
the (weighted) average of the intensities of the cultural traits (attitudes) that
the society has adopted.
In this respect, the major limitation of both contributions is, however,
that they do consider only a degenerate behavioral choice. In particular,
Bisin and Topa [5] assume that parents always choose socio–economic ac-
tion patterns the displayed trait intensity of which exactly accords with their
‘target intensity’ (i.e. the optimal trait intensity in the terminology of the
present paper); and Panebianco [47] assumes that the parents set a displayed
trait intensity that exactly accords with their inter–ethnic attitudes. Given
this degenerate view on the family’s behavioral choices, its socialization de-
cision is then restricted to choosing its weight in the formation of the trait
intensity of their child.
Outline The further outline of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 in-
troduces the general representation of the cultural formation of preferences
process, while as chapter 3 delivers a framework for its endogeneization. The
proofs of the propositions in the latter chapter can be found in Appendix
A 1. Chapter 4 discusses additional aspects that show routes how to apply
the model, and chapter 5 concludes.
CHAPTER 2
Cultural Formation of Preferences
. . . or: We are all the sum total of our experiences.
In this chapter, we will show how children adopt intensities of any type of
continuous cultural trait through social learning from role models for trait
intensities, and how the adopted trait intensities induce preference relations
over choices of the role models in the adult life period. This kind of closed
circle is the motivation to label the representation of the socialization process
that this paper proposes as cultural formation of preferences.
Consider an overlapping generations society populated by a continuum
of adults,1 a ∈ A = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ, and their
children. For simplicity, we will assume that reproduction is asexual and
every adult has one offspring, so that we can denote with a˜ ∈ A˜ the children
of the parents a ∈ A.
Let us assume that all adults have available the same non–empty set of
socio–economic action patterns, X. This set is endowed with a complete and
transitive binary relation T . Thereby, for all x, x′ ∈ X, xT x′ means that
the socio–economic action pattern x is (weakly) ‘more characteristic’ for the
continuous trait type under scrutiny than socio–economic action pattern x′.2
This general formulation is owed to the fact that we consider any type of
continuous cultural trait. Which socio–economic action patterns would be
considered as ‘more/less characteristic’ in a particular case depends on the
(formulation of) the continuous cultural trait under scrutiny.3 In case of
e.g. ‘importance of religion’, ‘more or less characteristic’ would correspond
to more or less religious behavior patterns (since they reflect a higher or
lower importance of religion). Given transitivity and completeness, we can
1The logic of the cultural formation of preferences process that is presented in the present
paper would be preserved in the case where the set of adults is finite.
2Given the abstract set of socio–economic action patterns X, we could equally endow it
with a full set Ti, i = 1, . . . , n of binary relations, each of which would correspond to one
of n different continuous cultural traits. The rest of the exposition in this paper would
then generalize analogously.
3Considering ‘classes’ of continuous cultural traits, in case of attitudes or opinions, ‘more
characteristic’ would sensibly be replaced by ‘more positive’; in case of values, ‘more
characteristic’ would sensibly be replaced by ‘higher’; etc.
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represent the ordinal relation T by a cardinal function
φd : X 7→ R .4
Thus, to any socio–economic action pattern x ∈ X, φd assigns a number
with cardinal meaning, φd(x). We will call this the displayed trait intensity
(DTI) embodied in the choice of socio–economic action pattern x.5 Thus,
φd(X) is the set of possible DTIs.
Now, the role models of the children’s social learning of trait intensities
are the observable socio–economic action patterns x ∈ X taken by the adults
a ∈ A; and we assume that the cognitive impulse that any of the children
obtains through such an observation is the corresponding DTI, φd(x). The
exposition so far makes clear that in the present work we treat the func-
tion φd as an ‘objective entity’ in the sense that the cognitive processing of
observed socio–economic action patterns of all children is in terms of this
function (and also all adults assign to any socio–economic action pattern
the same DTI).6
To simplify the subsequent exposition, we will denote the DTI of the
socio–economic action pattern of adult a ∈ A, xa ∈ X, as φ
d
a := φ
d(xa).
Example 1.1 (Patience). For illustration, let us consider the formation
of ‘patience’ in a very stylized way. Assume that the socio–economic action
pattern for the social learning of patience is the share of adult period income
that is saved for pension period consumption. Denoting as ya ∈ R++ the
adult period income, and as sa ∈ [0, ya] the savings of adult a ∈ A (there is
no lending), we thus have that xa :≡
sa
ya
∈ [0, 1] ≡: X. Naturally, we want
φd to be strictly increasing in the present case, so that we can simply choose
φd(x) = x and then φd(X) = [0, 1].
We will now introduce the representation of the socialization process
that this paper proposes. This will be established on grounds of the tabula
rasa assumption, which means in the present context that children are born
with unformed trait intensity (TI), and equally, with unformed preferences
(a corresponding assumption is also taken in the literature on the economics
of cultural transmission, see e.g. Bisin and Verdier [9]). This assumption
4Thus, the relation T and φd ∼ b+ dφd together define an equivalence class with respect
to ∼ on the set of real valued (cardinal) functions.
5This can be understood in the way that any adult who observes another adult a ∈ A
taking socio–economic action pattern x ∈ X could reflect upon this observation by the
statement that ‘adult a behaves as if she would have a trait intensity of φd(x)’.
6Indeed, there is room here for a generalization. In particular, the way how the children’s
cognitive processing of observed socio–economic patterns takes place could also be treated
as being subject to an individual social learning process (thus, children would adopt
individual functions φda˜, which they would eventually internalize and keep in their adult
life–period).
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implies that we restrict the analysis of the determination, respectively for-
mation, of traits to cultural factors (‘nurture’), while as the issue of the
contribution of genetic inheritance (‘nature’) is left aside.7
On this basis, we then let the formation of the TI that a child adopts re-
sult out of social learning from the socio–economic action patterns of adults
(only) that it is confronted with. Specifically, this is being embedded in a
framework of socialization inside the family and by the general adult social
environment, or ‘direct vertical and oblique socialization’. In this context,
we will let the TI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts be formed according to a weighted
average between the representative DTIs of both socialization sources (i.e.
as a weighted average of all cognitive impulses obtained in the socialization
process). In the case of the child’s family, this coincides with the DTI of
its single parent a ∈ A, φda ∈ φ
d(X). The representative DTI of the child’s
general social environment, Aa := A\{a}, will be denoted φ
d
Aa
. These result
out of the children’s social learning from the observed DTIs of (eventually)
different subsets of adults that they are confronted with.
More precisely, we assume that there is a measurable partition of the
adult set, {AJ}
K
J=1,
8 and that the children obtain as cognitive impulses the
average DTIs of these subsets, φdAJ :=
1
λ(AJ )
∫
AJ
φda′ dλ (a
′) ∈ con φd(X),
∀J = 1, . . . ,K.9 Specifically, for every child a˜ ∈ A˜ there are oblique social-
ization weights, σa˜J , J = 1, . . . ,K, that represent the relative cognitive im-
pacts of the child’s social learning from the various subsets of adults. These
weights satisfy σa˜J ∈ [0, 1] and
∑K
J=1 σa˜J = 1, ∀a˜ ∈ A˜, ∀J = 1, . . . ,K. They
can, among others, result from the population shares of the subsets, or else
from a local structure that determines the social(ization) interaction times
with the members of the subsets, or from differing pre–dispositions for social
learning from different groups (the members of which e.g. share the same
7An introduction to the cross–disciplinary ‘nature–nurture’ debate can be found in Rogers
[54]; Sacerdote [55, 56, 57] provides for empirical investigations of the relative importances
of both influences.
8In this paper, this partition is assumed to be exogenously given. It can, however, be moti-
vated to result from a local structure (i.e. where the adults reside), or from a classification
of the adults in different social and economic categories.
9We refrain here from a further generalization through distinguishing the children’s social
learning from all individual adults a′ ∈ Aa. In this case, the Nash equilibrium existence
result in Proposition 1.3 could not be maintained.
To see that the average choice of a continuum of players endowed with Lebesgue measure
and with identical choice set (a subset of Rn) is indeed located in the convex hull of the
choice set, confer e.g. Rath [53, p. 430].
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social and economic characteristics).10 We obtain, ∀a˜ ∈ A˜,
φdAa :=
K∑
J=1
σa˜Jφ
d
AJ
∈ con φd(X).
The weight that the DTI of the parent of a child a˜ ∈ A˜ has in the
socialization process of the child will be called the parental socialization
success share, σˆa ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to the cognitive impact of the
parental DTI relative to the cognitive impact of the representative DTI of
the child’s general social environment. Factors that would determine this
relative cognitive impact would include the social(ization) interaction time
of the parent with its child, as well as the effort and devotion that the parent
spends to socialize its child to the chosen DTI.11 We thus assume that the
parental socialization success share can be chosen by the parents (and in
chapter 3, we will endogenize this choice).12
We now obtain the formation of the TI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts through
the ‘direct vertical and oblique socialization’ process, φa˜, as
φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
Aa
. (1.1)
We will call this the parental socialization technique. It is a generalization of
the representation of the formation of continuous cultural traits, respectively
inter–ethnic attitudes, in Bisin and Topa [5] and Panebianco [47]. Equation
(1.1) embodies the view that the parents set a TI benchmark, φda ∈ φ
d(X),
and can invest into their parental socialization success share, σˆa ∈ [0, 1],
to countervail the socialization influence that the child is exposed to in its
general social environment, φdAa .
13 Thus, for any φdAa ∈ con φ
d(X), the
parents could fully determine the adopted TIs of their children (whether
or not they also have an incentive to do so will concern us in chapter 3).
Hence the set of possible TIs that a child can adopt always coincides with
the convex hull of the set of possible DTIs, con φd(X) ⊆ R (a convex subset
of the real line).
Example 1.2 (Discrete Choice Sets). To illustrate the last point consider
any discrete choice set of socio–economic action patterns, and let us take
the simplest (non–degenerate) example where X = {0, 1}, e.g. not buying or
10In this respect, Panebianco [47] considers the effect that different schemes of oblique
socialization weights have on the formation of inter–ethnic attitudes.
11See e.g. Grusec [30] for an introductory overview of theories on determinants of parental
socialization success.
12That parents can choose their socialization success shares within the whole unit inter-
val is a non–trivial assumption (which is though also taken in Bisin and Topa [5] and
Panebianco [47]).
13This context can be interpreted as the generalized and continuous equivalent to the
‘preference shaping demonstration effect’ of Cox and Stark [17] and Stark [60].
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buying a status good. Let again φd(x) = x, so that φd(X) = {0, 1}. However,
under the formation of TIs (1.1), we have that the set of possible TIs is
con φd(X) = [0, 1]. Thus, although adults can only display through their
socio–economic action patterns that they either disfavor/not have (x = 0)
or favor/have (x = 1) a certain trait (e.g. ‘status’), the children can adopt
also any intermediate TI through the socialization process.
We will assume that the TI that a child adopts through the socialization
process is being internalized and kept in its adult life–period. Notably, the
concept of an adopted TI of an adult corresponds to a cognitive element in
the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger [23] — and so does the con-
cept of a DTI. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, people dislike
dissonance between cognitive elements, the strength of which depends on
the degree of the dissonance. In the present context, it is immediate that
this degree of dissonance could be described by the (Euclidean) distance
between a DTI and the adopted TI. Thus, adults can compare and rank
different DTIs based on their distance to the adopted TI. Obviously then,
since socio–economic action patterns are pre–images of DTIs, the adopted
TI of an adult does also constitute a ‘filter’ under which adults can evaluate
different choices of socio–economic action patterns.
Assumption 1.1 (Preferences). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) the adopted TI, φa ∈ con φ
d(X), induces a complete and transitive pref-
erence relation ≻φa over DTIs φda ∈ con φ
d(X),14 and
(b) the preferences ≻φa are single–peaked with peak φa. This means that
∀φda, φ
′d
a ∈ con φ
d(X), φda ≻
φa φ′da ⇐ φ
′d
a <> φ
d
a ≤≥ φa.
Given their basic properties, we will represent the preferences ≻φa by single–
peaked utility functions with peak φa
u (· |φa ) : con φ
d(X) 7→ R
which are strictly increasing/decreasing at all φda ∈ con φ
d(X) such that
φda < / > φa.
15
Example 1.3 (‘Displayed Patience’ Utility). Continuing the first exam-
ple, assume that adults earn interest on their savings and, thus, their pension
period consumption is (1+ r)sa, r ∈ R+ (prices are constant and there is no
other pension period income and also no bequests).
14Equally, thus, φa ∈ con φ
d(X), induces a complete and transitive preference relation
≻φa over socio–economic action patterns xa ∈ X, where ∀xa, x
′
a ∈ X, xa ≻
φa x′a ⇔
φd (xa) ≻
φa φd (x′a).
15In an extension of the previous footnote, the induced preferencs over socio–economic
action patterns ≻φa can be represented by a utility function w (· |φa ) : X 7→ R, where
∀xa, x
′
a ∈ X w (xa |φa ) > w (x
′
a |φa )⇔ u
(
φd(xa) |φa
)
> u
(
φd (x′a) |φa
)
.
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Assuming Cobb–Douglas utility, the life–time utility out of the adult sav-
ings decision can be represented as u (sa |φa ) = (ya − sa)
1−φa ((1 + r)sa)
φa ,
i.e. consumptions in the first and second life period are weighted according
to the ‘impatience’ and ‘patience’ (intensities). Dividing and multiplying the
right hand side of the latter by ya, we obtain u
(
φda |φa
)
=
(
1− φda
)1−φa (φda)φa ·(
ya(1 + r)
φa
)
. Thus, we have transformed utility out of a socio–economic
choice into utility out of the choice of ‘displayed patience (intensity)’, φda.
It is immediate that
∂ u(φda|φa )
∂ φda
>=< 0 ∀φda ∈ [0, 1] such that φ
d
a <=> φa so
that the single peak property is satisfied naturally (furthermore, u (· |φa ) is
strictly concave).
CHAPTER 3
Endogenous Cultural Formation of Preferences
. . . or: How far does the apple fall from the tree?
In the previous chapter, we have introduced a representation of the inter–
generational formation of continuous cultural traits. One major innovation
that this approach embodies is that it interconnects the choices of socio–
economic action patterns (respectively of displayed trait intensities) of the
adult generation with the preferences over the available choices that the next
generation adults adopt. Thus, any model framework that determines the
adult choices of socio–economic action patterns, together with the parental
socialization success shares, equally endogenizes the cultural formation of
preferences process (see chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion).
In the present chapter, we will lay down one specific way of achieving
this endogeneization based on purposeful socialization decisions of parents.
Thereby, we notably restrict the latter to consist of their choice of a displayed
trait intensity (as determined through the choice of the underlying socio–
economic action patterns) and of their parental socialization success share.
This means that we leave the oblique socialization weights (that determine
the children’s relative social learning from the different adult subsets) ex-
ogenously fixed.
1. Motivation for Purposeful Socialization
In a first step, we have to clarify what motivation parents have to actively
engage in their children’s socialization process, i.e. what induces them to
purposefully employ their socialization technique (the functioning of which
we assume them to be fully aware of). Basically, we let this motivation stem
from the fact that parents also obtain an inter–generational utility compo-
nent. Thereby, this is either related to the adopted TI of their adult children
and/or to the DTI (respectively the underlying socio–economic action pat-
terns) that they expect their adult children to take.
As far as the latter expectations are concerned, we make here an as-
sumption on a specific form of parental myopia: Although parents obtain
an inter–generational utility component, which eventually induces them to
choose a DTI that does not coincide with their adopted TI (see below), we
13
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assume that they do not realize that this form of behavior changing im-
pact will also be present in their adult children’s decision problems. Thus,
any parent a ∈ A expects its adult child to choose a DTI that is in the
set of maximizers of its ‘own’ utility function, argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
u
(
φda˜ |φa˜
)
.
Under the following assumption, φd(X) is convex (and compact, which
will be needed in the propositions below), and thus φd(X) = con φd(X).
This then guarantees by the single–peakedness of the utility functions that
argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
u
(
φda˜ |φa˜
)
= φa˜, ∀a ∈ A. Hence, the parental expectations
of their adult children’s DTIs are uniquely determined.1
Assumption 1.2 (Convexity and Compactness). X is a convex and com-
pact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, and φd is continuous.
It follows that φd(X) is non–empty, convex and compact.
Given the parents’ myopic expectations, it is independent of whether the
inter–generational utility component of a parent is related to the adopted TI
or expected DTI of its adult child, since they coincide. Under this property,
we will now assume that any parent perceives an optimal trait intensity that
it wants its child to adopt (i.e. if the child would adopt this optimal TI,
then this would be strictly preferred by a parent over all other possible TIs
that the child could adopt). These parent–specific optimal TIs are subject
to what we call perception rules.
Thereby, the perception rule of the optimal TI of any parent is deter-
mined by two ‘ingredients’. The first one specifies a (set of) subset(s) of
adults, which can be understood as reference group(s). The second ingredi-
ent then specifies the construction of the optimal TI that a parent perceives
out of characteristics of the adults in these reference group(s) that are either
observable (notably the DTIs of adults) or known to an individual parent.
To formally introduce the concept of perception rules, it will be conve-
nient to define A as a σ–algebra generated by the finite partition {AJ}
K
J=1.
Definition 1.1 (Perception Rule). For every parent a ∈ A, the percep-
tion rule for the optimal trait intensity is a pair
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)
, where ∅ 6= Ra ∈
{a} ∪ A and where φˆa˜ : {a} ∪ A 7→ con φ
d(X), φˆa˜ (Ra) ∈ con φ
d(X).
To ease the interpretation of this conceptualization, we will briefly in-
troduce three sensible types of perception rules for optimal TIs. Note that
this list is not meant to be exhaustive (one could e.g. consider combinations
of the three types mentioned).
1That parents are not aware of the inter–generational utility of their children does also
have the simplifying consequence that they do not care about their whole dynasty (this
point has already been made by Bisin and Verdier [9, p. 305] in the context of cultural
transmission of preferences).
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PR 1 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to its adopted TI,
Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = φa ∈ con φ
d(X).
One justification to consider this perception rule is based on a
special form of parental altruism called ‘imperfect empathy’. This
concept has been introduced into the economics literature by Bisin and
Verdier [7]. Parents are altruistic and fully internalize the utility of
their adult child’s socio–economic action pattern (respectively DTI).
Nevertheless, parents can not perfectly empathize with their child and
can only evaluate their adult child’s utility under their own (not the
child’s) utility function — which attains its maximum at the adopted
TI of the parent.
PR 2 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to a parent–specific
(model–exogenous) TI, Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = ea ∈ con φ
d(X).
One motivation for this perception rule could be that the trait
under scrutiny is a ‘good preference’ where parents thus want to max-
imize the TI of their adult children. This would e.g. concern certain
characteristics (traits) that are favorable on the labor market. Hence,
higher intensities of such traits increase the future expected income of
the adult child, which the parents would aim to maximize if they are
altruistic (and if their own utility function is increasing in monetary
payoff).
PR 3 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to the average DTI of
a subset (with strictly positive measure) of the adults, Ra ⊆ A, and
φˆa˜ (Ra) =
1
λ(Ra)
∫
Ra
φda′ dλ (a
′) ∈ con φd(X).
One potential justification for this perception rule is the case of
‘endogenous behavioral norms’ that equate to the average DTI of the
respective subset of the adults. Norms are typically maintained by
members of a group (a subset of the adults) through a system of social
rewards and punishments (see e.g. Arnett [1]). In the present context,
these could be related to the parents’ success or failure to guarantee
that the child will behave according to the behavioral norm.
Given the perception rules and the resulting optimal TIs, we assume
further that parents perceive utility losses for deviations of the adopted TI
of their children from these optimal TIs (note the structural analogy to the
before introduced preferences and utility that are induced by adopted TIs).
Specifically, for any parent a ∈ A, we introduce the parameter ia ∈ R+ that
shall capture the strength of the perceived inter–generational utility losses.
We will call this the parent’s inter–generational trait intensity.
Notably, this latter type of TI could also be interpreted as being subject
to a cultural formation of preferences process. Nevertheless, we choose here
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for simplicity a degenerate representation of this process and assume that
the inter–generational TIs are invariably passed over from an adult to its
child, ia˜ = ia, ∀a ∈ A.
Assumption 1.3 (Inter–generational Utility). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) the perception rule and inter–generational trait intensity induce an inter–
generational utility function v
(
·
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) : con φd(X) 7→ R,
v
(
φa˜
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) ∈ R, where
(b) ∀ia ∈ R++, v
(
·
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) is single–peaked with peak φˆa˜ (Ra), thus
strictly increasing/decreasing at all φa˜ ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φa˜ < / >
φˆa˜.
2. Best Reply Problems
In the last step toward the construction of the parental best reply prob-
lems, let us finally discuss the cost associated with investments into con-
trolling the parental socialization success share. These would concern e.g.
the opportunity cost of the time parents spend for the active socialization
of a child, as well as the (psychological) cost of the effort and devotion in-
vested. We will represent these costs by an indirect cost function of choices
of socialization success shares, c : [0, 1] 7→ R+, c (σˆa) ∈ R+.
The parental (optimization) problem is it then to choose a DTI and its
socialization success share in a best reply to the child–specific representative
DTI of the general social environment such as to maximize utility net of the
cost of achieving the chosen socialization success share. We obtain, ∀a ∈ A,
max
(φda,σˆa)∈φd(X)×[0,1]
u
(
φda |φa
)
+ v
(
φa˜
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia)− c (σˆa) (1.2)
s.t. φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
Aa
.
The best reply problems of the parents hence basically consist of trading off
the cost and benefits of their socialization choices. The cost (and disutilities)
are constituted by ‘own’ utility losses that parents experience when choosing
a DTI that deviates from their adopted TI, together with the cost of a choice
of their socialization success share. The benefits accrue in form of resulting
inter–generational utility gains through reductions in the distance between
the child’s adopted TI and the optimal TI.
As mentioned above, the parents choose best reply pairs of a DTI and
a socialization success share against the representative DTI. But notably,
this choice is subject to the optimal TI, the adopted TI and the inter–
generational TI. Therefore, for any a ∈ A, we will denote any pair of best
reply choices as
(
φda
(
φdAa , φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia
)
, σˆa
(
φdAa , φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia
))
, which
2. BEST REPLY PROBLEMS 17
we will abbreviate subsequently as
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·)
)
. Furthermore, together
with the representative DTI of the general social environment, any of the
parental best replies also determines a best reply location of the adult child’s
adopted TI (through the formation of TIs (1.1)), φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
.
The following assumption specifies additional properties of the (inter–
generational) utility and cost functions. These will allow for a significant
characterization of the pairs of parental best reply choices, as well as of the
resulting best reply locations of the adopted TIs of the adult children.
Assumption 1.4 (Slope).
(a) u (· |e) and v (· |f, g ) are continuous, and differentiable at their peaks,
(b) c is continuous, and differentiable with respect to the first argument at
the origin, with zero slope, strictly increasing in the first argument on
(0, 1], and decreasing in the second argument.
Since both the utility and inter–generational utility function are single
peaked, it follows by Assumption 1.4 (a) that both functions have zero
slopes at their peaks. Thus, parents perceive zero (inter–generational) utility
losses for marginal deviations of their chosen DTI from their adopted TI,
respectively of their adult child’s adopted TI from the optimal TI.
For the following two propositions, we will assume that the perception
rules for the optimal TIs of all parents are as such that the individual parents’
decisions have (at most) a negligible impact on the location of their own
optimal TI.
Proposition 1.1 (Characterization of Best Replies). Let Assumptions
1.1–1.4 hold. Then, if
(a) φdAa 6= φˆa˜ (Ra), generically
2 sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= − sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) > 0, while always sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
=
sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
.
(b) φdAa = φˆa˜ (Ra), it holds that φ
d
a (·) − φa = 0 and σˆa (·) = 0, hence
φa˜
(
φa, 0, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra) = 0.
Proof. In Appendix A 1.1.
2There are two kinds of exceptions to the generic characterization. The first is that
if the deviation of the best reply DTI from the adopted TI into the characterized di-
rection is not possible, i.e. if the adopted TI of a parent coincides with (the relevant)
one of the boundaries of φd(X), then the best reply DTI will coincide with that bound-
ary (while still σˆa (·) > 0). The second is that in the cases where φˆa˜ (Ra) > φa and
φdAa ∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, respectively where φˆa˜ (Ra) < φa and φ
d
Aa
∈
(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
, it can
also hold that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= 0 and σˆa (·) = 0, hence φa˜
(
φa, 0, φ
d
Aa
)
= φdAa .
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The (generic) results of this proposition are illustrated in Figure 1.1. The
left pair of graphs stylizes case (a) of Proposition 1.1, and the right pair the
case (b). In both pairs of graphs, in the left interval (all intervals correspond
to the set of possible DTIs) the context of the adult’s decision problem is de-
picted. In the right interval a corresponding best reply choice is stylized. As
can be seen both from Proposition 1.1 directly, as well as from the graphical
illustration, the results feature two dominant characteristics.
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
φdAa
φda(·)
φa˜
(
φa, 0, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
φa φda(·)
φˆa˜ (Ra)
•
•
•
φdAa = φˆa˜ (Ra)
•
•
•
•
φa
σˆa(·) > 0
•
•
•
•
•
Figure 1.1. Characterization of Best Replies
The first concerns the generic location of the best reply choices. If the
representative DTI does not coincide with the optimal TI, then parents
countervail the respective socialization influence on their children by choos-
ing strictly positive socialization instruments. This means first that they
choose a DTI that deviates from their adopted TI. Notably, this deviation is
always into the opposite direction as the deviation of the representative DTI
from the optimal TI (if such a choice is available). Second, this behavioral
countervailing is coupled with a strictly positive choice of their parental so-
cialization success share (since otherwise, their chosen DTI would be fully
ineffective in the child’s socialization process).
This generic result means that parents choose strictly positive socializa-
tion instruments even for very small deviations of the representative DTI
from the optimal TI. That this holds is due to the fact that marginal in-
vestments into the socialization instruments are (utility) costless (while as
the resulting strictly positive decrease in the distance of the adult child’s
adopted TI from the optimal TI yields a strictly positive inter–generational
utility gain). Obviously, if the representative DTI exactly coincides with
the optimal TI, then parents have no incentives to actively employ their
socialization technique.
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The second dominant characteristic concerns the location of the adult
children’s adopted TIs that would result out of the parental best reply
choices. Despite the parental countervailing in the case of suboptimal so-
cialization influences of the general social environment, the investments into
their socialization instruments would never be intense enough such as to
guarantee that their adult children’s adopted TIs would exactly coincide
with the optimal TIs. Hence, there is always a strictly positive deviation of
the adopted TI of an adult child from the optimal TI. Thereby, the direc-
tion of this deviation always accords with the direction of deviation of the
representative DTI from the optimal DTI.
Again, this result holds for even very small deviations of the represen-
tative DTI from the optimal DTI. Analogously to before, this stems from
the fact that parents do not perceive inter–generational utility losses for an
only marginal deviation of the adult child’s adopted TI from the optimal
TI (while at any strictly positive choice of the socialization instruments,
the marginal cost of additional investments to further reduce the distance
between the adult child’s adopted TI and the optimal TI would be strictly
positive). Again obviously, in the case of an optimal representative DTI, the
adopted TI of an adult child will also coincide with the optimal TI.
The following list of assumptions will be prerequisite for a further charac-
terization of the parental best reply choices in terms of comparative statics.
Assumption 1.5 (Curvature). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) u(· |e) and v (· |f, g ) are C2 and strictly concave, c is C2 and convex, and
(b) sign (f − f ′) ∂
2 v(f ′|f,g )
∂ f ′ ∂ g
> 0, ∀ (f ′, g) ∈ conφd(X)× R++.
Assumption 1.5 (b) means that the marginal cost of a deviation of the
adopted TI of the adult child from the optimal TI is strictly increasing
in the inter–generational TI. Notably, this is only necessary for the results
related to the second column of the comparative statics matrix below to
hold.
Proposition 1.2 (Comparative Statics of Best Replies). Let Assump-
tions 1.1–1.5 be satisfied. Then, if φdAa 6= φˆa˜ (Ra) and the optimization
problem of parent a ∈ A is strictly concave at its best reply choice, and if
the two socialization instruments
∣∣φda (·)− φa∣∣ and σˆa (·) are ‘not too strong
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substitutes’, then3

∂|φda(φdAa ,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)−φa|
∂|φdAa−φˆa˜(Ra)|
∂|φda(φdAa ,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)−φa|
∂ ia
∂ σˆa(φdAa ,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)
∂|φdAa−φˆa˜(Ra)|
∂ σˆa(φdAa ,φˆa˜(Ra),φa,ia)
∂ ia

≫ 0.
Proof. In Appendix A 1.2.
The first column of the comparative statics matrix shows that (under
the relevant conditions), parents use their investments into their socialization
instruments and the representative DTI of the general social environment
as cultural substitutes. This means that if the representative DTI becomes
more favorable (i.e. its distance to the optimal TI becomes smaller), then
parents would reduce investments into both socialization instruments.
The second column sheds light on the role that the inter–generational TI
plays in determining the parental socialization decisions. Under the condi-
tions of Proposition 1.2, parents with a higher inter–generational TI would
choose more intense investments into their socialization instruments for any
given strictly positive distance between the representative DTI and the op-
timal TI. This follows since the socialization TI basically determines the
weight that parents put on their inter–generational utility. Thus, given a
higher inter–generational TI, parents are willing to engage more ‘own’ utility
losses and socialization success share cost such as to reduce their compara-
tively larger inter–generational utility losses.
3. Nash Equilibrium
In the previous section, we have characterized the individual best reply
choices of a displayed trait intensity and a parental socialization success
share. The next step is to discuss the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash
equilibrium of the game that is induced by the strategic interdependence of
the individual parental choices. To do this, it will be important to clarify
the nature of the possible forms of the strategic interdependences.
First of all, as has already been discussed, the net life–time utility of an
individual parent, i.e. the object of its optimization problem (1.2), depends
on the location of the representative DTI of the general social environment.
This is constructed out of the oblique socialization weights and the average
DTIs of the adult subsets. Second, the decisions of the other adults could
3A technical version of the latter condition can be found in the proof of this proposition.
Note that these comparative statics are subject to a fixed location of the parental TI.
Furthermore, we assume here that none of the constraints of the decision variables is
binding at the best reply choices. This assumption rules out both kinds of ‘non–generic’
cases in Proposition 1.1 (in case of the second kind, the lower bound for the parental
socialization success shares would be binding).
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influence the net life–time utility of an individual parent via the perception
rule for its optimal TI (as e.g. in the third type of perception rule introduced
in chapter 1). In this respect, for the Nash equilibrium existence result
below to hold, we will require the following additional normalization: If the
perception rule of a parent is based on the DTIs and/or socialization success
shares of other adults, then this may only be in terms of the average DTIs
or socialization success shares of the adult subsets {AJ}
K
J=1.
Let us now introduce a general representation that accounts for all of
these possible forms of strategic interdependences. This is based on rep-
resenting the payoff, i.e. the net expected life–time utility (this context
is explicitly addressed below), of all individual parents as being depen-
dent on the tuple of pairs of representative DTIs and average parental so-
cialization success shares,
{
φdAJ , σˆAJ
}K
J=1
, where ∀J = 1, . . . ,K, σˆAJ :=
1
λ(AJ )
∫
AJ
σˆa′ dλ (a
′).
More precisely, the payoff that any parent gains out of its own decision
pair and any given profile of pairs of average decisions of the subsets of
adults is determined by the parent’s adopted TI and inter–generational TI,
the perception rule for its optimal TI, as well as the child–specific oblique
socialization weights, {σa˜J}
K
J=1 =: σa˜. We will call these quadruples parent–
child profiles, Pa :=
(
φa, ia,
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)
, σa˜
)
, ∀a ∈ A. Given these, we will
denote the payoff function of an individual adult a ∈ A as P (·, · |Pa ) :(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)K+1
7→ R, where
P
((
φda, σˆa
)
,
{
φdAJ , σˆAJ
}K
J=1
|Pa
)
≡ u
(
φda |φa
)
+v
(
φa˜
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia)−c (σˆa)
and where φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
Aa
and φdAa :=
∑K
J=1 σa˜Jφ
d
AJ
.
We hence obtain a family of games, parametrized by the tuple of parent–
child profiles,
(ΓPa)a∈A =
(
A,
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)A
, {P (·, · |Pa )}a∈A
)
.4
The definition below follows Schmeidler [59] and Rath [53].
Definition 1.2 (Nash Equilibrium). Call a tuple
{
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
}
a∈A
a Nash
equilibrium of (ΓPa)a∈A, if for almost all a ∈ A, for all
(
φda, σˆa
)
∈ φd(X)×
[0, 1], P
((
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
)
,
{
φd
∗
AJ
, σˆ∗AJ
}K
J=1
|Pa
)
≥ P
((
φda, σˆa
)
,
{
φd
∗
AJ
, σˆ∗AJ
}K
J=1
|Pa
)
.
4Note here for clarification that the individual strategy sets could equally be defined as
X× [0, 1] since φda := φ
d(xa), xa ∈ X. But since the parental payoffs, i.e. utilities, depend
only on the own and observed (average) DTIs, we directly consider here the strategy sets
φd(X)× [0, 1].
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Proposition 1.3 (Nash Equilibrium Existence). If Assumptions 1.1—
1.3 hold and if the functions φˆa˜ are continuous for all a ∈ A, then a Nash
equilibrium exists for any parametrized game.
Proof. In Appendix A 1.3.
The existence result above means that in any given period, we can use
the Nash equilibrium choices for substitution in the formation of TIs equa-
tion (1.1). By doing so, we obtain an endogenous representation of the
inter–generational formation of TIs, i.e. we have endogenized the cultural
formation of preferences process.5
4. Evolution and Imperfect Empathy
In a dynamic context, the model framework of the present chapter de-
termines the evolution of all endogenous quantities. These contain the dis-
played trait intensities, respectively the underlying socio–economic choices,
the parental socialization success shares, as well as the the trait intensities
and the induced preferences of the society.
Notably, these dynamics will be subject to a specification of the (initial)
tuple of adult–child profiles. This means to specify (a) the initial tuple of
TIs, which are the state variables of the model, (b) the fixed tuple of inter–
generational TIs, (c) the tuple of perception rules for optimal TIs, and (d)
the exogenously fixed tuple of child–specific oblique socialization weights.
Lacking a theory of the formation of the perception rules, it is sensi-
ble to assume for simplicity that they are (like the inter–generational TIs)
invariantly passed over from a parent to its child, hence inter–temporarily
fixed. Furthermore, to impose a minimum level of structure on the analysis,
it would in any case be sensible to consider only assignments of equal types
of perception rules to all parents (e.g. one of the three types of perception
rules introduced in chapter 1).
A similar reasoning applies for the case of the child–specific oblique so-
cialization weights. Unless the model is extended such as to allow for their
endogenous determination, it is a sensible simplification to fix them inter–
temporarily. One approach could be to consider unbiased oblique social-
ization where the socialization weights coincide with the population shares
5It shall be noted that the generality of the model allows not only for the existence of
multiple Nash Equilibria in any given period, but also for the existence of Nash Equilibria
with qualitatively different properties. In deriving qualitative (static or dynamic) prop-
erties of (a specification of) the model, it will thus be of central importance to point out
whether these properties hold for all elements in the set of Nash Equilibria of a period,
or eventually only for a sensibly defined subset. The section below shows a global conver-
gence result which is indeed subject to all elements in the (evenutally non–singleton) sets
of Nash Equilibria. To the contrary, the second part of this thesis contains an example
where we considered only Nash Equilibria with particular properties.
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(which are inter–temporarily fixed in the present model) of the subsets.6
This approach would also have the consequence, that all children of the so-
ciety are confronted with the same representative DTI of the general social
environment. This then even coincides with the average DTI of the adults.
Notably, among the four types of (initial) adult–child profile tuples, it is
the specification of the tuple of perception rules and the oblique socializa-
tion weights that can be supposed to most centrally govern the qualitative
properties of the dynamics of any specified model.
Roughly spoken, the reasoning for this is as follows. The optimal TIs
determine the direction of the purposeful socialization efforts of the parents;
and the oblique socialization weights determine the intensities of ‘socializa-
tion exchange’ between the subsets of adults. Thus, the latter also determine
how much the directional socialization efforts of the members of the different
subsets impact the socialization decisions of the other parents. As a conse-
quence, these two types of ‘socialization effects’ also govern the directions
of the evolutions of the ‘contextual (‘own’ utility) effects’ that are induced
by the adopted TIs of the parents. Finally, in any given period, the fixed
inter–generational TIs determine the relative strength of the two types of
‘socialization effects’ versus the ‘contextual effects’.
Let us illustrate this ‘power’ of the tuple of perception rules and oblique
socialization weights by means of an example. We will show below the qual-
itative properties of the evolution of the TIs for the case where all parents
have ‘imperfect empathy’ (respectively the first type of perception rule in
chapter 1). This is coupled with the assumption that all oblique socialization
weights are identical for all children, which holds e.g. in the case of unbi-
ased oblique socialization. This example might be of special interest, since
it accords with standard assumptions in the literature on the economics of
cultural transmission of preferences.
Before showing the dynamic properties of this specification, let us first
introduce a collection of useful definitions.
Definition 1.3 (TI Assimilation, Symmetric TI Point, Steady State).
(a) Consider any two succeeding periods and let φm := maxa∈A φa, φm :=
mina∈A φa, and φ˜
m := maxa˜∈A˜ φa˜, φ˜m := mina˜∈A˜ φa˜. Then, we speak of
(weak) TI assimilation if φm ≤ φ˜m < φ˜
m < φm (or) and φm < φ˜m <
φ˜m ≤ φm.
(b) Call a tuple {φa}a∈A a symmetric TI point if for almost all a, a
′ ∈ A
φa = φa′ .
(c) Call a tuple {φa, φa˜}a∈A a steady state if for almost all a ∈ A φa˜ = φa.
6In the cultural transmission of preferences framework, Sa´ez-Mart´ı and Sjo¨gren [58] con-
sider different forms of biases in the determination of oblique socialization weights.
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Finally, let
{
φ0a
}
a∈A
denote the tuple of initial TIs of the adults.
Proposition 1.4 (Evolution under Imperfect Empathy). Let Assump-
tions 1.1—1.4 hold and let Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = φa hold in any period,
for every a ∈ A. Consider any
{
φ0a, ia
}
a∈A
∈
(
con φd(X)× R+
)A
.
(a) Then, if in any period {σa˜J}
K
J=1 is identical for all a˜ ∈ A˜, it holds that
1. for every two succeeding periods, the TIs weakly assimilate almost
surely, thus 2. the TIs converge to a symmetric TI point, and 3. any
symmetric TI point is a steady state.
(b) If additionally, σa˜J > 0, ∀J = 1, . . . ,K in any given period, then it even
holds that for every two succeeding periods, the TIs assimilate almost
surely (with the rest of the results unchanged).
Proof. In Appendix A 1.4.
There are two driving forces for the global ‘melting pot’ property of
Proposition 1.4 (the result is global also in the sense that it holds for any el-
ement in the possibly non–singleton set of Nash Equilibria of a period). The
first is that in the case where all children have identical oblique socialization
weights, they also face the same representative DTI of the general social
environment. This, by itself, induces a tendency toward inter–generational
TI homogenization. Even more, since all parents have imperfect empa-
thy, the Nash equilibrium representative DTI can not lie above/below the
boundaries that are constituted by the maximum/minimum TI of a given
adult generation. This follows since otherwise, by Proposition 1.1 (a), the
DTI best replies of all parents would be lower/larger than their adopted
TI. This would contradict the representative DTI being supported by Nash
equilibrium choices. This property strengthens the tendency toward inter–
generational TI homogenization such that even the TIs (weakly) assimilate
over generations (by Proposition 1.1 (a)).
Of course, even in the imperfect empathy case, there would be specifica-
tions of the tuple of oblique socialization weights where the global ‘melting
pot’ property would not hold generically. To see this easily, consider e.g.
the extreme case of two segregated subsets of adults and children (where
the ‘cross’ oblique socialization weights are zero). In this case, the tuple of
TIs of the two subsets would generically converge to different steady states.
Finally, it shall be noted that the dynamic properties of the model are
particularly easy to characterize under global imperfect empathy. This fol-
lows since in this case the adopted TI (‘contextual effect’) and optimal TI
(‘socialization effect’) coincide. This is not the case for all other possible
types of perception rules, which would make the task of characterizing the
dynamic properties more complex (in most of the cases).
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In any case, it shall have become clear from the above discussion that any
significant qualitative characterization of dynamic properties of the model
will have to be based on a sensible specification of the tuple of (initial)
adult–child profiles.
CHAPTER 4
Applications
In the preceding two sections, we have laid down a general framework
to determine the inter–generational formation of continuous cultural traits.
Given its generality, this framework can be specified for applications in a
large variety of different settings and socio–economic questions. In what fol-
lows, we will briefly outline four different dimensions along the lines of which
any application, respectively specification, of the model could be oriented.
Level of the Analysis Any analysis of the properties of a specified model
can be pursued on two different levels. The first, ‘meta–level analysis’, takes
place at the level of the intensities of the trait under scrutiny, and concerns
the evolution of the TIs and DTIs, as discussed already above. Interesting
issues in this context would then typically be to characterize the dynamics
of the model under different specifications of the tuple of (initial) adult–
child profiles. Specifically, it would be of interest to identify specifications
of tuples of perception rules and oblique socialization weights under which
(stable) heterogeneous and/or homogeneous steady state distributions of
the TIs exist. One specification, based on ‘imperfect empathy’, for global
convergence to a homogeneous (symmetric) steady state distribution has
already been shown in section 4 of chapter 3 above.
The second, ‘empirical analysis’, would take place at the level of the
observable socio–economic choices of the adults. For this end, it would be
necessary to clarify (a) which socio–economic choices are supposed to serve
as the role models for the social learning of the intensities of the trait under
scrutiny, and (b) how the relationship between the socio–economic choices
and the DTIs can be represented in terms of the DTI function. Given this,
the ‘meta–level analysis’ would additionally answer the question of the evo-
lution of the underlying socio–economic choices.
Complexity of the Adult Problem The purposeful socialization frame-
work of chapter 3 embeds parents with inter–generational concern in a strate-
gic socialization interaction environment, in which they choose optimal DTIs
and socialization success shares. This structure entails a certain degree of
complexity. This could, however, be decreased by employing alternative (less
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‘rich’) designs of the parental optimization problems. These would either
feature a lower dimensionality and/or would eliminate the strategic social-
ization interaction. Notably, it depends on the specific application, which
of these alternatives (as introduced below) would eventually be suitable.
One alternative that reduces the dimensionality of the parental optimiza-
tion problem would be to assign (strictly positive) exogenous socialization
success shares, but to leave endogenous the choices of DTIs. Even, by set-
ting the socialization success shares equal to one so that the children are
exclusively socialized by their parents, one could additionally eliminate the
strategic socialization interaction in the choices of DTIs. Still, one could
then introduce other forms of strategic interaction into the model (as e.g.
being induced by endowing the parents also with a utility component derived
from inter–adult social interactions).
Another alternative would obviously be to exogenously fix the chosen
DTIs of the parents while as the decision of their socialization success shares
is left endogenous (as in Bisin and Topa [5] and Panebianco [47]). This
approach would also additionally eliminate the strategic socialization inter-
action.
The double effect of reducing the dimensionality of the parents’ deci-
sion problems as well as doing away with the strategic socialization inter-
action could furthermore be achieved by considering a naive socialization
framework. This means that the adults (parents) fully neglect the children’s
preference formation process or are not aware of it — while this process is
still taking place. In such a setting, one would again have to assign (ex-
ogenous) parental socialization success shares.1 Notably, in the competitive
socio–economy version of such a model, all adults would always choose to
behave exactly in accordance with their adopted TI. This follows since the
parents would lack the behavior shifting incentives that would be created
by the presence of a (non–constantly zero) inter–generational utility compo-
nent. Thus, one would typically aim at giving additional substance to such
a framework, e.g. by introducing alternative forms of strategic interaction,
or by considering a social planner problem (as discussed below).
Finally, one could eliminate the strategic interaction in the decision prob-
lems by basing these on the parents’ expectations of the representative DTI of
the general social environment. These expectations would sensibly be based
on the representative DTI that the adults have observed in their own child
period. The drawback of this approach would be that one could not allow
1In the simplest possible way, one could even assign to the parental socialization success
shares the value zero so that effectively, there is oblique socialization only.
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for the alteration of the parents’ decisions upon observations of representa-
tive DTIs that do deviate from the expectations. Thus, on the transitory
path, parents would generically not choose best reply choices against the
true realized representative DTI of the general social environment.
Social Planner Problem The cultural formation of preferences frame-
works opens routes toward new kinds of social planner problems. These
routes basically follow the closed circle between the adopted TIs of the
adults, their chosen DTIs (and underlying socio–economic action patterns)
and the induced adopted TIs and preferences of the next adult generation.
In a first step, let us clarify possible ways how a social planner could
intervene in the cultural formation of preferences process. The first way
would be targeted directly at the ‘meta–level’ of the TIs, and would pri-
marily concern the social planner serving for an additional source of child
socialization. This could e.g. be in the form of the influence that the designs
of the legal system and the institutions (including schools and media) of a
society have in the socialization process of a child; see Bowles [11] for an
overview of related issues. Within the terminology of the present paper, the
social planner could thus effectively set a DTI coupled with (investments
into) its socialization success relative to the socialization successes of the
family and the general social environment.
The second possible way of social planner intervention is only indirectly
targeted at the level of the TIs. This would concern ‘standard’ socio–
economic incentive shifting policies, like e.g. a consumption tax or pension
schemes in the context of the first and third example in chapter 2. Since
these measures are designed such to influence the adults’ socio–economic
decisions, the same is being achieved in terms of the corresponding adults’
choices of DTIs. This then in turn influences the formation of the TIs of the
children.
Let us now discuss the possible motivations of a social planner to actively
employ its ‘socialization technique’. The first motivation can result out of
a benevolent social planner’s aim of maximizing the weighted sum of the
life–time utilities of a sequence of generations. Notably, since the social
planner would be assumed to be aware of the inter–temporal externalities
that are inherent in the cultural formation of preferences process, she has,
via her two ways of intervention, access to a new level of efficiency: She can
inter–connect the question of the optimal inter–generational distribution of
utilities with the question of the optimal inter–generational distribution of
utility functions (since they are determined by the cultural formation of
preferences process).
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The second motivation can be in terms of the social planner perceiv-
ing, respectively having information about, a socially optimal (distribution
of) the TIs and/or DTIs within the society, which it aims at instilling in a
paternalistic way; see e.g. Qizilbash [52] for a discussion of related issues.
The typical question would then be whether the social planner can design
a transitory policy regime such as to achieve this form of social optimum in
the steady state.
Structure of the (initial) Adult–Child Profiles In chapter 4, we have
already shortly discussed basic issues concerning potential ways of specifying
the tuple of (initial) adult–child profiles. Additionally to what has already
been said there, it could be of interest to characterize the properties of a
specified model for different degrees of symmetry embodied in the distribu-
tion of these profiles on the adult set. Obviously, the maximum symmetry
would be achieved in the case of a representative agent model, while as the
minimum symmetry would correspond to assigning any arbitrary distribu-
tion.
As an intermediate step, one could partition the adult set into (possibly
a continuum of) subsets of adults that have identical (initial) adult–child
profiles. Thus, one would obtain a set of adult types, which could be in-
terpreted as cultural groups. Under suitable conditions that guarantee the
inter–temporal TI symmetry of the members of the groups, one could then
answer the question of behavioral (DTI) and cultural (TI) assimilation of
the groups. Within the present continuous cultural traits framework, if the
set of adult types is discrete, this would constitute the analogue to the anal-
ysis on the dynamics of the population distribution of discrete traits in the
economics of cultural transmission of preferences literature.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
This paper has introduced a general representation of the formation of
continuous cultural traits. We showed in the first main part of this paper
(chapter 2) how children adopt trait intensities through social learning from
observed socio–economic action patterns of the adults. Upon such an ob-
servation, children receive a cognitive impulse, which we called a displayed
trait intensity. The trait intensity that a child adopts in the socialization
process (and keeps in its adult period) is then represented as a weighted
average between all such cognitive impulses obtained. We then showed how
to interpret the trait intensities that adults have adopted such as to con-
struct and characterize preferences over displayed trait intensities, thus also
the underlying socio–economic action patterns. The representation of the
socialization process that this paper proposes thus constitutes a consistent
and closed circle between the socio–economic action patterns taken by one
adult generation and the preferences over these patterns by the succeeding
adult generation.
In the second main part of the paper (chapter 3), we proposed one pos-
sible way to endogenize the cultural formation of preference process as re-
sulting out of purposeful parental socialization decisions. These are twofold.
One is the choice of a displayed trait intensity. The second consists of invest-
ments into the weight that this role model has in the socialization process of
the child, relative to the weight that the observed representative displayed
trait intensity of the general social environment has. Thus, basically, the
parents decision problem is to choose best replies against this representative
role model of the general social environment. Notably, this is subject to the
location of the optimal trait intensity that they would like their children to
adopt. We showed conditions under which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the induced ‘strategic socialization interaction game’ of the parents ex-
ists. These equilibrium choices govern the inter–generational evolution of
the trait intensities and the preferences of the society.
The strength of the framework presented in the present paper arguably
lies in its generality. This allows for a large number of possible forms of
adoptions and specifications such as to apply it to an accordingly large
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variety of different socio–economic questions. In chapter 4, we also outlined
lines along which any such application could be oriented.
Despite the generality of the model, there is however still considerable
room for further generalizations. Among other possible directions, this
would concern (a) considering an n–dimensional representation of the for-
mation of continuous cultural traits with an optional endogeneization of
the formation of the inter–generational trait intensities, (b) endogenously
determining the formation of the perception rules of parents, (c) endogeniz-
ing the determination of the oblique socialization weights (in the form of
parental decision problems), (d) consistently introducing ‘horizontal social-
ization’ and the socialization influence of institutions (like the legal system,
schools, media, etc.), (e) changing the population structure of the model
by dropping the assumption of asexual reproduction and potentially endo-
genizing the reproduction decision, and/or considering a finite population
setting, (f) allowing for a pro–active role of the children in the formation
process of their preferences, and (g) considering a representation of displayed
trait intensities subject to heterogeneous choice sets of socio–economic ac-
tion patterns.
Finally, remember that the subject of the present paper was the for-
mation of continuous cultural traits in the socialization period of a person.
However, socialization is without doubt a life–long process. It would there-
fore be of central interest to extend and suitably adopt the logic of the
processes described to the formation/adoption of continuous cultural traits
in the adult life period of individuals.1
1Existing related analyses contain, among others, Friedkin and Johnson [25], DeMarzo
et al. [19], Brueckner and Smirnov [13, 14] and Golub and Jackson [28, 29]. These contri-
butions are embedded in a social network structure.
Part 2
Cultural Formation of Preferences
and Assimilation of Cultural
Groups
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
When different cultural groups live together, then there is always cultural
exchange through the social(ization) interactions between the members of
the groups. While this can well concern the mutual dissemination of the
customs of the groups, it notably consists to a large extent of a mutual
(inter–generational) influencing of the preferences, values, norms, attitudes
and beliefs of the groups’ members.
This context raises interest both on empirical and theoretical grounds.
In the empirical context, the question of assimilation and integration of
immigrants with different cultural backgrounds into hosting societies has
attained increasing attention in recent years, both in media and on the po-
litical agenda. This calls for a framework that allows for a theoretical rep-
resentation and analysis, optimally leading into a leveraged understanding
of the empirical processes at work.
The present paper presents such a theoretical framework, based on a re-
cent theory of Pichler [49] on the inter–generational formation of continuous
cultural traits.1 We will show a static and dynamic analysis of the evolu-
tion of behavior and the trait intensities in a two cultural groups setting,
subject to one type of continuous cultural traits. Thereby, one of the focus
points will be to derive conclusions about the underlying assimilation pro-
cess between the two cultural groups, both in terms of their adopted trait
intensities, as well as in terms of their behavioral decisions.
Contributions and Results The first part of this paper is devoted to a
recapitulation of the cultural formation of preferences framework of Pichler
[49]. In doing so, we will show in a first step how children come to adopt
intensities of any arbitrary continuous cultural trait type. We let this be
based on the children’s social learning from the observed socio–economic ac-
tion patterns of the adults. Upon observation of the socio–economic action
pattern of an adult, children also receive a cognitive impulse. The latter can
be understood as the signal on the valuation (or importance, magnitude,
1The latter are meant to contain all types of traits that (a) are subject to formation in the
socialization process, and (b) can reflect different intensities, located in a convex subset
of the real line.
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etc.) of the continuous cultural trait that is embodied in the choice of the
particular socio–economic action pattern over the other available choices.
We even endow these sorts of cognitive impulses with a cardinal meaning
and call them displayed trait intensities. The final adopted trait intensity
of a child then results as a weighted average between the displayed trait
intensity that is chosen by its family, and the representative displayed trait
intensity that the child observes in its general adult social environment.
In a second step, we introduce one possible way to endogenize the cul-
tural formation of trait intensities process as resulting out of purposeful
parental socialization decisions. These are twofold. The first is the choice
of a displayed trait intensity. The second consists of investments into the
weight that this displayed trait intensity has in the socialization process of
the child relative to the weight that the observed representative displayed
trait intensity of the general social environment has. We will call this weight
the parental socialization success share. Thus, basically, the parental deci-
sion problem is to choose best replies against the representative displayed
trait intensity of the general social environment. Notably, this is subject to
the perception that the parents have of the optimal trait intensity for their
children to adopt (and different perceptions can have a remarkable impact
on the qualitative static and dynamic properties, as will be discussed below).
In the second and main part of this paper, we then embed the endogenous
cultural formation of trait intensities process in a society that is populated
by two distinct cultural groups. With these, we basically refer to a collection
of families, for which it holds that the parental (adult) members have iden-
tical adopted trait intensities and form identical perceptions of the optimal
trait intensities for their children. We introduce conditions under which all
parents choose the same behavior and socialization success share in a Nash
Equilibrium. Under such group–symmetric choices, all children of the same
cultural group do adopt the same trait intensities.
The central task pursued in this paper is the analysis of the group–
symmetric Nash equilibrium choices and the resulting dynamic evolution of
the adopted trait intensities under two different benchmark perception rules
for the optimal trait intensities. In the main part of the paper, we consider
first exogenously fixed (and distinct) optimal trait intensities, and second
the case where the parents of a group perceive the average displayed trait
intensity of their own group members as the reference value (‘endogenous
norms’). Finally, in Appendix B 2, we also discuss the case where all parents
have ‘imperfect empathy’.2
2The concept of ‘imperfect empathy’ has been introduced in the economics literature by
Bisin and Verdier [7]. It basically means in the present context that parents perceive
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Under any possible perception rule for optimal trait intensities, the di-
rection of the socialization efforts of the parents of both groups is always
toward the perceived optimum. In the case of exogenously fixed optimal trait
intensities, this leads to an inter–generational coordination toward a situa-
tion where the positions of the adopted trait intensities can be considered
‘consistent’ with the relative location of the fixed optimal trait intensities (if
this situation has not been given initially). With this we mean that (a) the
group with the strictly larger fixed optimal trait intensity does also have a
strictly larger adopted trait intensity, and (b) the trait intensities of both
groups do lie strictly between the two optima.
Within this ‘generic state space’, the socialization efforts of the mem-
bers of the two cultural groups are in the opposite directions. This yields
the result that the parents of both cultural groups dis–integrate behav-
iorally (i.e. the parents with the strictly larger/lower adopted trait intensity
choose to display a strictly larger/lower than adopted trait intensity) and
choose strictly positive parental socialization success shares. This has the
consequence that the relative positions of the two cultural groups are inter–
generationally preserved and the ‘generic state space’ can not be left.
Since we were not able to obtain analytic results on the dynamic prop-
erties of this model specification, we resorted to numerical methods. The
central outcome was that for any considered pair of initial trait intensities
(in the generic state space) we obtained convergence of the trait intensity
paths, subject to any combination of the strenghts of the groups’ norms on
behavior that we considered. Furthermore, if the norms were high enough
for both groups, then we obtained a unique globally asymptotically stable
steady state. However, if the norms were comparatively weak, then this gave
rise to the existence of multiple steady states, which typically featured only
very low distances between the two steady state trait intensities.
The qualitative (numerical) results of the fixed optimal trait intensity
case do thus feature the opposite extreme to the ‘imperfect empathy’ case:
While as in the latter case, the preferences of the cultural groups do always
converge to the same point, this will never happen under fixed optimal trait
intensities.
Compared to these sorts of uniqueness of the qualitative asymptotic
properties, the case of endogenous norms features a larger variety of possi-
ble convergence path types. First of all, we could show that generically, any
sequence of adopted trait intensities of the two groups converges to a steady
their own adopted trait intensity as optimal for their children. As has already been shown
by Pichler [49], this case features a global ‘melting pot’ property, i.e. the adopted trait
intensities of (almost) all dynasties converge to the same point.
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state. Even, there is a basin in terms of a maximum distance of the adopted
trait intensities, such that all pairs of adopted trait intensities that enter (or
start in) this basin converge to a point where all adults have the same trait
intensities. However, for a large enough initial trait intensity distance, it is
possible that the cultural groups dissimilate on the transitory path and a
steady state with a larger than initial trait intensity distance is reached.
Related Literature The present analysis stands in a close relation to
few existing contributions on the question of the cultural formation of con-
tinuous cultural traits. Important early treatments of the topic are Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [16] in a theoretical, and Otto et al. [46] in an empirical
context. More recently Bisin and Topa [5] proposed a representation of the
formation of the intensities of continuous cultural traits. In the terminology
of the present paper, they represented the adopted intensity of the cultural
trait as a weighted average between the displayed trait intensity of the fam-
ily and the (weighted) average of the intensities of the cultural traits that
the society has adopted.
The major limitation of this contribution is, however, that it features a
degenerate representation of the parental choices of socio–economic action
patterns, and the associated displayed trait intensities. In this respect, Bisin
and Topa [5] assume that parents always choose a socio–economic action
pattern that displays their ‘target intensity’ (i.e. the optimal trait intensity
in the terminology of the present paper). Given this restricted view on the
family’s behavioral choices, its socialization decision is then reduced to the
choice of its weight in the formation of the trait intensity of their child.3
A second, and well established, related strand is the literature on the
economics of cultural transmission. It has been introduced by Bisin and
Verdier [7, 8, 9] and Bisin et al. [6], and is based on the work of Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [15, 16] and Boyd and Richerson [12] in evolutionary
anthropology. The focus is on the analysis of the population dynamics of
the distribution of a discrete set of cultural traits under an endogenous
intergenerational cultural transmission mechanism.
The endogeneity stems from the purposeful parental choice of socializa-
tion intensity, which effectively determines the probability that the child
will directly adopt the trait(s) of the parents. Parents engage into the cost
of purposeful socialization in order to avoid (decrease the probability) that
their child will not adopt their trait(s) — in which case parents encounter
subjective utility losses. For an exhaustive overview of foundations of and
3The same sort of critique applies to the approach of Panebianco [47], who considers the
formation of inter–ethnic attitudes.
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contributions to this literature, see Bisin and Verdier [10].4
Outline The further setup of this paper is as follows. The succeeding
chapter 2 recapitulates the general framework on the (endogenous) cultural
formation of continuous cultural traits of Pichler [49]. This is followed by
the analysis of static and dynamic properties of the model in a two cultural
groups setting in chapter 3. We consider both fixed optimal trait intensi-
ties in section 1, as well as endogenous norms in section 2. The proofs of
the propositions of the latter two subsections can be found in Appendix B
1. Finally, Appendix B 2 contains a short treatment of the case where all
parents have ‘imperfect empathy’, and chapter 4 concludes.
4Related to this strand of literature are the contributions of Cox and Stark [17] and Stark
[60] on the ‘demonstration (or preference shaping) effect’ of parental altruism choices in
front of their children.
CHAPTER 2
Cultural Formation of Preferences
This chapter discusses a general model of the formation of continuous
cultural traits through the socialization process (in section 1). In section
2, we will also show how this cultural formation of preferences process can
be derived out of optimal parental socialization decisions. Notably, the
framework developed here constitutes a shortened representation of the one
introduced in Pichler [49]. For the details, please confer the original source
directly. The reader who is familiar with the latter can read the present
chapter as a refresher, but can well directly proceed to chapter 3.
1. Cultural Formation of Preferences
Consider an overlapping generations society. In the present and next
section, we will restrict our glance on the cultural formation of preferences
process between two succeeding generations. This makes it possible to drop
all time indexes (for ease of exposition).
In any given period, let our society be populated by a continuum of
adults, a ∈ A = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ, and their children.
For simplicity, we will assume that reproduction is asexual and every adult
has one offspring, so that we can denote with a˜ ∈ A˜ the children of the
parents a ∈ A (and the population size is constant).
Let us assume that all adults have available the same non–empty set of
socio–economic action patterns, X. This set is endowed with a complete
and transitive binary relation T . Thereby, for all x, x′ ∈ X, xT x′ means
that the socio–economic action pattern x is (weakly) ‘more characteristic’ for
the continuous trait type under scrutiny than socio–economic action pattern
x′. This general formulation is owed to the fact that we consider any type
of continuous cultural trait. Given transitivity and completeness, we can
represent the ordinal relation T by a cardinal function
φd : X 7→ R .
Thus, to any socio–economic action pattern x ∈ X, φd assigns a number
with cardinal meaning, φd(x). We will call this the displayed trait intensity
(DTI) embodied in the choice of socio–economic action pattern x. Thus,
φd(X) is the set of possible DTIs.
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Now, the role models of the children’s social learning of trait intensities
are the observable socio–economic action patterns x ∈ X taken by the adults
a ∈ A; and we assume that the cognitive impulse that any of the children
obtains through such an observation is the corresponding DTI, φd(x). To
simplify the subsequent exposition, we will denote the DTI of the socio–
economic action pattern of adult a ∈ A, xa ∈ X, as φ
d
a := φ
d(xa).
We will now introduce the representation of the socialization process
that this paper proposes. This will be established on grounds of the tabula
rasa assumption, which means in the present context that children are born
with unformed trait intensity (TI), and equally, with unformed preferences.
On this basis, we then let the formation of the TI that a child adopts result
out of social learning from the socio–economic action patterns of adults
(only) that it is confronted with. Specifically, this is being embedded in a
framework of socialization inside the family and by the general adult social
environment, or ‘direct vertical and oblique socialization’.
In this context, we will let the TI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts be formed
according to a weighted average between the representative DTIs of both
socialization sources (i.e. as a weighted average of all cognitive impulses
obtained in the socialization process). In the case of the child’s family,
this coincides with the DTI of its single parent a ∈ A, φda ∈ φ
d(X). The
representative DTI of the child’s general social environment, Aa := A\{a},
will be denoted φdAa . These result out of the children’s social learning from
the observed DTIs of (eventually) different subsets of adults that they are
confronted with.
More precisely, we assume that there is a measurable partition of the
adult set, {AJ}
K
J=1, and that the children obtain as cognitive impulses the
average DTIs of these subsets, φdAJ :=
1
λ(AJ )
∫
AJ
φda′ dλ (a
′) ∈ con φd(X),
∀J = 1, . . . ,K. Specifically, for every child a˜ ∈ A˜ there are oblique social-
ization weights, σa˜J , J = 1, . . . ,K, that represent the relative cognitive im-
pacts of the child’s social learning from the various subsets of adults. These
weights satisfy σa˜J ∈ [0, 1] and
∑K
J=1 σa˜J = 1, ∀a˜ ∈ A˜, ∀J = 1, . . . ,K. We
obtain, ∀a˜ ∈ A˜,
φdAa :=
K∑
J=1
σa˜Jφ
d
AJ
∈ con φd(X).
The weight that the DTI of the parent of a child a˜ ∈ A˜ has in the
socialization process of the child will be called the parental socialization
success share, σˆa ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to the cognitive impact of the
parental DTI relative to the cognitive impact of the representative DTI of
the child’s general social environment. Factors that would determine this
relative cognitive impact would include the social(ization) interaction time
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of the parent with its child, as well as the effort and devotion that the
parent spends to socialize its child to the chosen DTI. We thus assume that
the parental socialization success share can be chosen by the parents.
We now obtain the formation of the TI that a child a˜ ∈ A˜ adopts through
the ‘direct vertical and oblique socialization’ process, φa˜, as
φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
Aa
. (2.1)
We will call this the parental socialization technique. It embodies the view
that the parents set a TI benchmark, φda ∈ φ
d(X), and can invest into their
parental socialization success share, σˆa ∈ [0, 1], to countervail the socializa-
tion influence that the child is exposed to in its general social environment,
φdAa . Thus, for any φ
d
Aa
∈ con φd(X), the parents could fully determine the
adopted TIs of their children. Hence the set of possible TIs that a child
can adopt always coincides with the convex hull of the set of possible DTIs,
con φd(X) ⊆ R.
We assume next that, in their adult life period, all individuals keep the
TI that they have adopted in their childhood in an unchanged way. These
adopted TIs of the adults can be interpreted to induce ‘filters’ under which
adults can compare and rank different choices of socio–economic action pat-
terns. This form of evaluation takes place in terms of comparing the DTIs
of the socio–economic action patterns to the own adopted TIs.1 Specifically,
we assume that the adopted TIs induce complete and transitive preference
relations over choices of DTIs (respectively the underlying socio–economic
action patterns).
Assumption 2.1 (‘Own’ Utility). For every a ∈ A,
(a) the adopted trait intensity induces an ‘own’ utility function u (· |φa ) :
con φd(X) 7→ R, u
(
φda |φa
)
∈ R, where
(b) u (· |φa ) is single–peaked with peak φa, thus strictly increasing/decreasing
at all φda ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φda < / > φa.
Intuitively, the single–peakedness property means that we assume adults
to prefer choosing behaviors (DTIs) that are as close as possible in line with
their adopted TIs.
2. Endogenous Cultural Formation of Preferences
In the present chapter, we will lay down one specific way of achieving an
endogeneization of the cultural formation of preferences process. This will be
based on purposeful socialization decisions of parents. Thereby, we notably
restrict the latter to consist of their choice of a displayed trait intensity
1This is in line with the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger [23].
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(as determined through the choice of the underlying socio–economic action
patterns) and of their parental socialization success share. This means that
we leave the oblique socialization weights (that determine the children’s
relative social learning from the different adult subsets) exogenously fixed.
Motivation for Purposeful Socialization. In a first step, we have to clarify
what motivation parents have to actively engage in their children’s social-
ization process, i.e. what induces them to purposefully employ their so-
cialization technique (the functioning of which we assume them to be fully
aware of). Basically, we let this motivation stem from the fact that parents
also obtain an inter–generational utility component. Thereby, this is either
related to the adopted TI of their adult children and/or to the DTI (respec-
tively the underlying socio–economic action patterns) that they expect their
adult children to take.
As far as the latter expectations are concerned, we make here an as-
sumption on a specific form of parental myopia: Although parents obtain
an inter–generational utility component, which eventually induces them to
choose a DTI that does not coincide with their adopted TI (see below), we
assume that they do not realize that this form of behavior changing im-
pact will also be present in their adult children’s decision problems. Thus,
any parent a ∈ A expects its adult child to choose a DTI that is in the
set of maximizers of its ‘own’ utility function, argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
u
(
φda˜ |φa˜
)
.
Under the following assumption, φd(X) is convex (and compact, which
will be needed in the propositions below), and thus φd(X) = con φd(X).
This then guarantees by the single–peakedness of the utility functions that
argmaxφda˜∈φd(X)
u
(
φda˜ |φa˜
)
= φa˜, ∀a ∈ A. Hence, the parental expectations
of their adult children’s DTIs are uniquely determined.
Assumption 2.2 (Convexity and Compactness). X is a convex and com-
pact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, and φd is continuous.
It follows that φd(X) is non–empty, convex and compact.
Given the parents’ myopic expectations, it is independent of whether the
inter–generational utility component of a parent is related to the adopted TI
or expected DTI of its adult child, since they coincide. Under this property,
we will now assume that any parent perceives an optimal trait intensity that
it wants its child to adopt (i.e. if the child would adopt this optimal TI,
then this would be strictly preferred by a parent over all other possible TIs
that the child could adopt). These parent–specific optimal TIs are subject
to what we call perception rules.
Thereby, the perception rule of the optimal TI of any parent is deter-
mined by two ‘ingredients’. The first one specifies a (set of) subset(s) of
2. ENDOGENOUS CULTURAL FORMATION OF PREFERENCES 42
adults, which can be understood as reference group(s). The second ingredi-
ent then specifies the construction of the optimal TI that a parent perceives
out of characteristics of the adults in these reference group(s) that are either
observable (notably the DTIs of adults) or known to an individual parent.
To formally introduce the concept of perception rules, it will be conve-
nient to define A as a σ–algebra generated by the finite partition {AJ}
K
J=1.
Definition 2.1 (Perception Rule). For every parent a ∈ A, the percep-
tion rule for the optimal trait intensity is a pair
(
Ra, φˆa˜
)
, where ∅ 6= Ra ∈
{a} ∪ A and where φˆa˜ : {a} ∪ A 7→ con φ
d(X), φˆa˜ (Ra) ∈ con φ
d(X).
To ease the interpretation of this conceptualization, we will list here
three sensible types of perception rules for optimal TIs. In chapter 3, we will,
in a two cultural groups setting, be concerned with analyzing evolutionary
processes subject to the second and third type of perception rules mentioned
here.2 Note also that the list below is not meant to be exhaustive (one could
e.g. consider combinations of the three types mentioned).
PR 1 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to its adopted TI,
Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = φa ∈ con φ
d(X).
PR 2 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to a parent–specific
(model–exogenous) TI, Ra = {a} and φˆa˜ ({a}) = ea ∈ con φ
d(X).
PR 3 The optimal TI of a parent a ∈ A is identical to the average DTI of
one of the adult subsets, Ra = AM , M ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and φˆa˜ (AM ) =
φdAM ∈ con φ
d(X).
Given the perception rule rules and the resulting optimal TIs, we assume
further that parents perceive utility losses for deviations of the adopted TI
of their children from these optimal TIs. Specifically, for any parent a ∈ A,
we introduce the parameter ia ∈ R+ that shall capture the strength of the
perceived inter–generational utility losses. We will call this the parent’s
inter–generational trait intensity. For simplicity, we assume that these are
invariably passed over from an adult to its child, ia˜ = ia, ∀a ∈ A.
Assumption 2.3 (Inter–generational Utility). ∀a ∈ A,
(a) the perception rule and inter–generational trait intensity induce an inter–
generational utility function v
(
·
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) : con φd(X) 7→ R,
v
(
φa˜
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) ∈ R, where
(b) ∀ia ∈ R++, v
(
·
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia) is single–peaked with peak φˆa˜ (Ra), thus
strictly increasing/decreasing at all φa˜ ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φa˜ < / >
φˆa˜.
2The first, ‘imperfect empathy’, type has already been discussed in Pichler [49]. In Ap-
pendix B 2, the respective results for the two cultural groups setting are shortly discussed.
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Best Reply Problems. In the last step toward the construction of the
parental best reply problems, let us finally discuss the cost associated with
investments into controlling the parental socialization success share. These
would concern e.g. the opportunity cost of the time parents spend for the
active socialization of a child, as well as the (psychological) cost of the effort
and devotion invested. We will represent these cost by an indirect cost
function of choices of socialization success shares. This function is assumed
to be identical for all adults a ∈ A and will be denoted c : [0, 1] 7→ R+,
c (σˆa) ∈ R+.
For every a ∈ A, the parental best reply problem (against the represen-
tative DTI, and subject to the adopted TI, the perceived optimal TI and
the inter–generational TI) of a choice of its DTI and its socialization success
share is then represented by
max
(φda,σˆa)∈φd(X)×[0,1]
u
(
φda |φa
)
+ v
(
φa˜
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia)− c (σˆa) (2.2)
s.t. φa˜ = σˆaφ
d
a + (1− σˆa)φ
d
Aa
.
The best reply problems of the parents hence basically consist of trading off
the cost and benefits of their socialization choices. The cost (and disutilities)
are constituted by ‘own’ utility losses that parents experience when choosing
a DTI that deviates from their adopted TI, together with the cost of a choice
of their socialization success share. The benefits accrue in form of resulting
inter–generational utility gains through reductions in the distance between
the child’s adopted TI and the optimal TI. For a detailed discussion of the
properties of the best reply solutions, confer Pichler [49].
CHAPTER 3
Assimilation of Cultural Groups
In this chapter, we will embed the endogenous cultural formation of
preferences framework in an environment where the society is populated
by two distinct cultural groups. The focus of the subsequent subsections
will be on the analysis of the evolution of the adopted trait intensities and
induced preferences subject to the Nash equilibrium socialization decisions
of the parents of both cultural groups. This will be done by imposing two
distinct types of perception rules. In section 1 we will consider the second
type of perception rule discussed above, while as section 2 is based on the
third type. Finally, the results for the first, ‘imperfect empathy’, type of
perception rule in the present setting are shortly discussed in Appendix B
2.
Consider the case where the adult set is partitioned into two groups,
A = H∪L. Let us index the groups G ∈ {L,H}, and denote their population
shares qG := λ(G). In the present setting, it will be convenient to index
the members of the groups as g ∈ G, and to denote −G := A\{G}. We
will below introduce normalizations that will guarantee that the adult–child
profiles (i.e. all model–relevant variables and parameters) of all members of
a group are identical in any period. This will allow us to speak of {L,H}
as the cultural groups of the society.
First, we assume that in any period t ∈ N, all adult members of a group
have identical inter–generational TIs and identical perception rules for opti-
mal TIs. Assume that both are fixed inter–generationally and denote them
iG, respectively
(
RG, φˆG
)
. Second, we assume unbiased oblique socializa-
tion (with the adult subsets from which the children socially learn from
coinciding with the cultural groups), so that ∀t ∈ N, ∀a ∈ A, φdAa(t) =
φdA(t) :=
∫
a′∈A φ
d
a′(t) dλ(a
′) = φdL(t)(1 − qH) + φ
d
H(t)qH (remember that
φdG(t) :=
1
qG
∫
g∈G φ
d
g(t) dλ(g), G = L,H), i.e. the society’s average DTI. We
finally need to establish that also the adopted TIs of all members of a group
are identical in any period.
Assumption 2.4 (Compactness, Convexity, Concavity).
(a) X is compact and convex and φd is continuous. If n > 1 then φd is
additionally concave. Thus, φd(X) is compact and convex.
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(b) The target functions of the best reply problems (2.2) are continuous and
strictly concave.1
Subsequently, we will call a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) a Nash
equilibrium where all parents of the same cultural group choose identical
strategies.
Proposition 2.1 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium Path). Let Assumption
2.4 hold and let the adopted TIs be identical within groups in the initial
period. Then, a path of symmetric Nash equilibria exists.
Proof. In Appendix B 1.1.
The logic for the existence of a SNE path is straightforward. In the initial
period, since all parents of the same cultural group do have the same adopted
TI (and by the other symmetry assumptions), they do also have identical and
unique best reply pairs to a given average DTI. It is then straightforward to
see that the necessary conditions to apply Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem
hold, such that the existence of a SNE in the initial period is guaranteed.
Under SNE choices in the initial period, it further follows that all children
of the same cultural group adopt the same TI. Thus, in the second period,
all adults of the same cultural group have identical adopted TIs, and a SNE
must exist again, and so forth.
Within the set–up of the present chapter, the set of Symmetric Nash
Equilbiria of any period depends on the adopted and inter–generational
TIs, the perception rules, as well as on the population shares of the two
cultural groups, P (t) := {φL(t), φH(t), iL, iH ,
(
RL, φˆL
)
,
(
RH , φˆH
)
, qH} ∈
φd(X)2 ×R2+×
(
A× C0
)2
× [0, 1]. We will thus denote the set of SNEs of a
period E(P (t)) ⊆
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
, and their typical elements{
φd
∗
G (t), σˆ
∗
G (t)
}
G=L,H
∈ E(P (t)).
Using any of these for substitution in the parental socialization tech-
niques (2.1),2 we obtain the rule for the inter–generational evolution of the
1The latter assumption is stronger than it might appear on first glance. To see this note
that concavity of the own and inter–generational utility functions together with convex-
ity of the cost function is not in general sufficient to guarantee concavity of the target
functions of the optimization problems. This follows since the Hessian matrices of the
parental socialization techniques with respect to the two decision variables are indefinite
(the determinants of these Hessian matrices are −1). Thus the inter–generational utility
functions are not in general concave with respect to the two decision variables. To cure
this, it is thus necessary that the own utility functions together with the cost functions are
jointly concave and convex enough compared to the concavity of the inter–generational
utility functions.
2In the subsequent analyses, we will always point out, whether the derived properties hold
indeed for all ellements in the SNE–sets of a given period, or whether these are subject
to a particular selection.
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adopted TIs of the cultural groups G = L,H under SNE choices as
φG(t+ 1) = φ
d∗
G (t)−
(
φd
∗
G (t)− φ
d∗
−G(t)
)
(1− σˆ∗G(t)) (1− qG), (2.3)
where φG(t) obviously denotes the identical adopted TI of the adults of the
cultural group G = L,H of period t.
Integration and Assimilation The analysis in the succeeding two sub-
sections will always be initiated by a discussion of the SNE choices of any
given period under the different types of perception rules. In this context,
we will speak of behavioral dis–integration of the adult members of a cultural
group G ∈ {L,H} in period t whenever it holds that
∣∣φd∗G (t)− φd∗−G(t)∣∣ >∣∣φG(t)− φd∗−G(t)∣∣. This means that these adults choose a more ‘radical’ DTI
relative to the DTI of the other group’s adults than the choice of their
adopted TI would mean.
In an inter–temporal context, it will be crucial to determine the en-
dogenous evolution of the SNE choices — and with it the endogenous evo-
lution of the adopted TIs. Specifically, we will also want to answer the
question of the inter–temporal assimilation (or dissimilation) process be-
tween the two cultural groups. In a slight variation of the terminology
introduced in Pichler [49], we will speak of (TI) assimilation whenever the
TI–distance ∆φ(t) := |φL(t)− φH(t)| strictly declines over generations, i.e.
∆φ(t+ 1) < ∆φ(t). From equation (2.3), we obtain the TI–distances under
SNE choices as
∆φ(t+ 1) =
∣∣∣(φd∗L (t)− φd∗H (t))∣∣∣ (σˆ∗L(t)qH + σˆ∗H(t)(1− qH)) . (2.4)
Furthermore, if the assimilation is such that the adopted TIs of the members
of the cultural group with the contemporaneously smaller TI strictly increase
over generations, while the opposite holds vice verso, we will speak of strict
assimilation.
Finally, with behavioral assimilation, we will call a situation where the
absolute distance between the SNE choices of DTIs of the two groups strictly
declines between two generations.
1. Fixed Optimal Preference Intensities
In the present section, we consider a situation where the parents of
both cultural groups perceive (exogenously given) inter–generationally fixed
optimal trait intensities. Thus, in any given period and for both G ∈ {L,H},
φˆG (RG) = eG ∈ conφ
d(X). This structure corresponds to the second type
of perception rule. Without loss of generality, consider subsequently the
(non–degenerate) case where eH > eL.
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The following assumption will be prerequisite for a meaningful charac-
terization of the (set of) symmetric Nash equilibrium choices.
Assumption 2.5 (Slope).
(a) ub and vd (· |h) are differentiable at their peaks, and
(b) c is differentiable at the origin with slope zero, and strictly increasing in
the interval (0, 1].
Since both the utility and inter–generational utility function are single
peaked, it follows by Assumption 2.5 (a) that both functions have zero
slope at their peaks. Thus, parents perceive no (inter–generational) utility
losses for marginal deviations of their chosen DTI from their adopted TI,
respectively of their adult child’s adopted TI from the optimal TI.
In the rest of the analytical part of this section, we will be concerned
with characterizing the (set of) SNE choices of the parents as well as the
resulting evolutions of the TIs of the two cultural groups. To do this, we
will focus our attention on what we call the generic state space.
Proposition 2.2 (Generic State Space). Let Assumptions 2.1–2.5 hold.
Then, ∀P (0) ∈ φd(X)2 × R2++×
(
A× C0
)2
× (0, 1) such that φˆH (RH) =
eH > eL = φˆL (RL), ∃∞ > T (P (0)) ≥ 0 such that eH > φH(T (P (0))) >
φL(T (P (0))) > eL.
Proof. In Appendix B 1.2.
This latter proposition states the following. Independent of the initial
TIs of the two cultural groups (and subject to any of the elements in the sets
of SNEs of the periods), the TIs will enter a basin in the state space where
the positions of the two TIs can be considered ‘consistent’ with the relative
location of the fixed optimal TIs. With this we mean that (a) the group with
the strictly larger fixed optimal TI does also have a strictly larger adopted
TI, and (b) the TIs of both groups do lie in the interior of the ‘TI–space’
that is formed by the two fixed optimal TIs.
That any path that starts outside this generic state space must lead into
it is illustrated in the phase diagram 2.1. In any of the fields in this diagram,
the dotted lines indicate the boundaries of the range of the angles that the
phase vectors can take (notably, the boundaries themselves are not included
in this range) under any element in the set of SNEs of any period.3 Also, one
of these possible phase vectors is always depicted. Furthermore, the phase
vectors on the boundaries between the various fields share (the combination
of) the properties of those in their neighboring fields. This also implies that
all phase vectors on the boundary of the generic state space point into it.
3The phase vectors are (∆φL(t),∆φH(t)), where ∆φG(t) := φG(t+1)− φG(t), G = L,H.
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φHt
φLt
eH
eL
eL
eH
Figure 2.1. Phase Diagram (Non–generic State Space)
Let us briefly discuss the basic intuition to understand this phase di-
agram. We start with the two (‘non–generic’) fields in the upper triangle
of the state space where the TI of group L is smaller than optimal. This
implies that the direction of the socialization efforts of the members of this
group is ‘upwards’ (i.e. they tend to choose a DTI that is larger than their
adopted TI, jointly with a strictly positive parental socialization success
share). Since also both the adopted TI and the optimal TI of group H are
strictly larger than the adopted TI of group L, their chosen DTI tends to
be strictly larger than the adopted TI of group L. This combination leads
to a strict inter–generational increase of the adopted TI of group L under
SNE choices. The analogous logic shows that, within the fields in the upper
triangle of the state space where the TI of group H is larger than optimal,
the adopted TI of group H must strictly decrease.
Consider now the lower left triangle in the state space. In this, the TI
of group H is smaller than that of group L, and both are smaller than the
optimal TI of group L. In this case, the directional socialization efforts of
both groups are (strictly) ‘upwards’. This implies that at least the adopted
TI of group H must strictly increase inter–generationally. Again, the anal-
ogous logic shows that in the upper right triangle, the adopted TI of group
L must strictly decrease.
Finally, consider the lower right field in the state space. In this, the TI
of the members of cultural group L is larger than both their optimal TI and
the adopted TI of cultural group H. Furthermore, the latter is smaller than
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optimal. This implies that the directional socialization effort of the members
of group L is ‘downwards’ while that of group H is ‘upwards’. This combi-
nation then yields the effect that under SNE choices, the inter–generational
increase in the adopted TI of group H must be strictly larger (respectively
strictly less negative) than that of group L.
We will now turn to the characterization of SNE choices within the generic
state space. Note that the results below do again hold for all elements in
the sets of SNE choices of any period.
Proposition 2.3 (SNE Characterization). Let Assumptions 2.1–2.5 hold
and let eH > φH(t) > φL(t) > eH . Then, ∀{iL, iH , qH} ∈ R
2
++×(0, 1),
∀E(P (t)) ∋
{
φd
∗
G (t), σˆ
∗
G (t)
}
G=L,H
(a) φd
∗
H (t) > φH(t) > φL(t) > φ
d∗
L (t),
(b) σˆ∗G(t) ∈ (0, 1], ∀G ∈ {L,H},
(c) eH > φH(t+ 1) > φL(t+ 1) > eL.
Proof. In Appendix B 1.3.
Within the generic state space, the socialization efforts of the members of
the two cultural groups are in the opposite directions. This yields the result
that in any SNE, the parents of both cultural groups dis–integrate behav-
iorally and choose strictly positive socialization success shares. Nevertheless,
their socialization investments would never be intense enough such that the
next generation’s adopted TIs would exactly coincide with the optimal one
(the logic of this sort of result is being discussed in Pichler [49]). This means
that once the TIs of the two groups have entered the generic state space,
they will never leave it again. Thus, in an extension of Proposition 2.2, it
follows that for every t′ ≥ T (P (0)), eH > φH(t
′) > φL(t
′) > eL.
1.1. Numerical Dynamic Analysis. From the analysis above, it is
obvious that any steady state must be located within the generic state space.
However, we were neither able to analytically characterize the dynamic be-
havior of the model under fixed norms on behavior, nor the stability prop-
erties of the steady states. In short words, the central barriers for such an
analysis were (a) the high generality and nonlinearity of the model, and (b)
that no explicit solutions for the SNE choices can be obtained, so that all
convergence and stability criteria have to be calculated with results from the
Implicit Function Theorem (which necessites the inverse of the 4x4–matrix
of second partial derivatives of the parental best reply problems evaluated
at an ‘anonymous’ steady state). Thus, to illustrate the dynamic properties
of the model, we resorted to numerical simulation methods. Thereby, the
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following quadratic (dis–)utility and cost functions were used.
u (b |d) = −(b− d)2
v (e |f, h) = −h(e− f)2
c(j) = j2,
and we set (eL, eH) = (−1, 1), so that the generic state space corresponds
to the (interior of the) triangle (−1,−1)–(−1, 1)–(1, 1).4
In the numerical simulation, we then proceeded in the following way:
First, we fixed a value for qH . Second, we considered ten linearly spaced
values for iG, G = L,H, between 0.2 and 2.0 (thus, the resulting matrix of
combinations of iL and iH had 100 entries). Third, we considered 10 linearly
spaced points between −0.95 and 0.95 in both dimensions of the state space.
The combinations of these (that were contained in the generic state space)
yielded the initial TIs.5 For any of the combination of inter–generational
TIs, we then calculated the resulting path of TIs for any of the initial TIs.
The following summarizing statistics were collected (subject to a fixed qH):
(1) Did all paths of TIs converge?
(2) If yes, was there a unique steady state?
(3) Have all steady states attained been locally asymptotically stable?
These statistics were calculated for qH = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 (there is no need for
considering more values of qH , since already enough asymmetries are em-
bodied in the variations of the inter–generational TIs). These summarizing
statistics are collected in Table B.1 at the end of Appendix B 1.
As can be seen from this table, the question of convergence could be
globally answered with ‘Yes’. It can therefore be claimed that the existence
of cycles or chaotic behavior in the model under fixed norms on behavior is
at best highly nongeneric.
As far as the other criteria are concerned, note as a basic illustrating
rule that the intensities of socialization investments (i.e. choice of behav-
ioral (DTI) deviation and parental socialization success share) of the parents
of both groups tend to be decreasing in the direction ‘north–west’ (move-
ments in the generic state space with decreasing distance to the ‘optimum
point’ (eL, eH)); and they tend to be increasing/decreasing for group L/H
in the direction ‘north–east’ (movements in the generic state space that
preserve the TI–distance but decrease the distance to the point (eH , eH)).
4Note that all that counts here is the distance between the two norms, not their exact
location. However, in the graphical analysis below, the particular choice will simplify the
interpretation.
5Knowing that the boundaries of the state space are rejecting, we could well disregard
them with respect to initial TIs.
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The question of (local) stability of a steady state is thus the question of
whether these rules do hold locally around a steady state, and whether the
associated ‘socialization forces’ are not too unbalanced in magnitude for the
parents of both groups; and obviously, the question of uniqueness of a steady
state is that of whether the socialization forces exactly even out at only one
point. Now, as can be seen from Table B.1, neither of these questions can
be globally answered with ‘Yes’. But there are clear cut regularities in the
dynamical patterns that we will discuss next.
Let us consider first the case qH = 0.5, so that we can single out the
regularities related to the combinations of iL and iH . First, we can see
that if the socialization incentives embodied in the inter–generational TIs
are not too unbalanced, then the steady states are all locally (or globally)
asymptotically stable, which corresponds to the statements in the previous
paragraph (and in case that the socialization incentives are too unbalanced,
the steady states are typically not stable).
Even, if both inter–generational TIs are high relative to the size of the
generic state space (determined by the difference eH−eL),
6 then the parents
of both groups would choose comparatively intensive socialization invest-
ments for already comparatively low deviations of their children’s TIs from
the fixed norm on behavior — thus in a large area of the generic state space.
Remembering the variations of the socialization investment intensities into
the directions ‘north–west’ and ‘north–east’, this prevents the existence of
multiple steady states. Even, any of the unique steady states appeared to
be globally asymptotically stable (since they are subject to more or less
balanced socialization incentives). One such case of (assumingly) global as-
ymptotic stability is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, but notably for the case
of qH = 0.7.
7
Now, in the opposite case where both inter–generational TIs are low
compared to the size of the generic state space, the parents of both groups
choose small investments in their socialization instruments in a large area
of the generic state space. This implies that the groups tend to assimilate
inter–generationally, and that the TI–paths move into the direction of the
6The size of the generic state space determines the maximum deviation of the children’s
adopted TIs from the optimum. Thus, we always have to consider the strength of the
inter–generational TIs relative to this size (since they then determine the maximum inter–
generational disutilities that parents can encounter). As it turned out (and is discussed
below), the choice of eH − eL = 2 featured all possible variations of dynamical behavior
that we can expect the model to yield. Thus, it was not necessary to consider higher
maximum values of inter–generational TIs than that of 2 (where the inter–generational
‘concerns’ are twice as important than own utility concerns).
7‘Zooming’ into this phase diagram and considering a small area around the steady state
(−0.3273, 0.3884), the phase vectors did still all point toward the steady state, confirming
the asymptotic stability.
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Figure 2.2. Phase Diagram for qH = 0.7, eL = 1.2, eH = 1.6
main diagonal (at least after some periods), where the TIs of both groups are
identical. Along a path of decreasing TI–distance, it furthermore holds that
the DTI–choices of the parents of both groups tend to be closer, implying
that the parents of both groups do have to invest less into countervailing
the socialization influences of the other group’s members. This furthers
the assimilative tendencies. The combined result is the existence of multiple
equilibria that typically feature a very small (in fact even marginal) deviation
of the TIs with accordingly low steady state socialization investments of the
parents of both groups. One such case is illustrated in Figure 2.3, here for
the case qH = 0.9 (compare also the left graph of Figure 2.5).
8
Finally, there are also cases that feature a mixture between the two polar
cases discussed above. This concerns cases where there is one locally asymp-
totically stable steady state with a significant basin of attraction together
with finitely many (locally stable or unstable) steady states with marginal
8As can be seen in the third part of Table B.1, Figure 2.3 illustrates a case where all
steady states are locally asymptotically stable (all TI–paths associated to the different
initial TIs converged to different steady states, which were all located between (−0.7323−
ǫ,−0.7323 + ǫ) and (−0.0677 − ǫ,−0.0677 + ǫ)). This fact is hard to verify graphically
(even upon ‘zooming’ locally around a steady state), since the phase vectors on the main
diagonal feature de facto zero length.
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Figure 2.3. Phase Diagram for qH = 0.9, eL = 0.8, eH = 0.4
TI–deviation. This necessites inter–generational TIs that are strong enough
such as to induce comparatively high socialization investments in a large
area of the generic state space, but which are also weak enough such that
the groups assimilate if the (initial) TIs are close enough. This typically
corresponds to inter–generational TI–combinations that are neighboring the
‘upper right’ (unique and stable) areas in the three sub–tables of Table B.1.
One such case is illustrated in Figure 2.4 for the case qH = 0.7.
9
In the next step, let us discuss the role that the population shares of
the groups play for the dynamical behavior. As can be seen from the com-
parison of the three individual tables in the global Table B.1, an increasing
share qH in a sense shifts the ‘mass’ of the three types of statistics–triples
(YYY, YNY, YNN) counterclockwise with an outwards rotation. This can
be explained as follows. First, associated to an increasing population share
are less incentives of the individual parents to engage in active socialization
(given any inter–generational TI). This holds since parents of a group with
9The TI–paths converged to three different steady states. The ‘central’ one,
(−0.2733, 0.398) which is locally asymptotically stable, and two close to the main di-
agonal, (−0.3517 − ǫ,−0.3517 + ǫ) and (−0.1738 − ǫ,−0.1738 + ǫ), both of which are
unstable.
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Figure 2.4. Phase Diagram for qH = 0.7, eL = 1.2, eH = 0.8
a larger population share face a more favorable composition of the general
society in the sense that more other parents orient their DTI–choice into
the same direction (and all DTI–choices are even identical in a SNE). Thus,
ceteris paribus, parents of a group with higher population share tend to
choose less behavioral deviation and a smaller socialization success share.
Now, to maintain uniqueness and asymptotic stability, to even out the
more unbalanced socialization incentives (compared to the case qH = 0.5),
a higher inter–generational TI of group H and/or a lower inter–generational
TI of group L are required. This explains the counterclockwise outward
rotation in the ‘upper right’ (unique and stable) areas of the tables. In the
‘lower left’ (multiple and stable) areas, the explanation needs to be more
careful. Remember that the multiple steady states in these areas are such
that the parents of both groups do hardly invest into active socialization
at all. This stems from the fact that the inter–generational disutilities are
very low even for comparatively high deviations of the children’s adopted
TIs from the norm. As a result, the individual substition effects between
own socialization investements and those that are exerted on the children
by the other adult members of the group have a significantly lower mag-
nitude compared to the previous (‘upper right’ area) cases. Thus, in the
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present cases, the (ceteris paribus) effect of an increasing population share
is to increase the aggregate (population–share–weighted) socialization in-
vestments of a group. To even out the resulting inbalances, larger/lower
inter–generational TIs of the group with the decreasing/increasing popula-
tion share are required. This explains the counterclockwise outward rotation
in the ‘lower left’ areas of the tables.
SNE– and TI–Path Illustration We will close this section with an
illustration of two particular paths of SNEs and TIs that evolve if the initial
TIs of both groups coincide with their fixed norms on behavior. Notably,
we used here the same explicit functions, but chose eH − eL = 4 (so that,
compared to above, e.g. lower inter–generational TIs are sufficient to obtain
global asymptotic stability of a steady state). The lengths of the time–axes
below corresponds to 100 periods.
In both cases of Figure 2.5, group L is always the minority with a popu-
lation share of ten per cent. Such a constellation can e.g. be interpreted as
having resulted from immigration (of group L), where initially the hosting
and immigrant group have had adopted exactly their optimally perceived
TI. The latter could e.g. be constantly indoctrinated by two distinct reli-
gious institutions which the two different cultural groups adhere to — and
which thus constitute the respective norms on behavior of the two groups.
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Figure 2.5. Evolution under Fixed Optimal TIs
In the upper graph of each case, the solid and dotted lines represent
the DTIs and TIs of the two groups (and the dash–dotted line locates the
population–share weighted convex combination of the initial TIs; this would
equate to the steady state if parents of both cultural groups would not invest
into their socialization instruments). The paths of the socialization success
shares of the parents of group L are represented by the dotted lines in the
lower graph of each case.
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The left case of the figure stylizes immigration of a cultural group with
a comparatively weak norm on behavior into a hosting society for which this
also holds. To the contrary, the right case of the figure stylizes immigration
of a cultural group with a strong norm on behavior into a hosting society
with a comparatively weak norm.
Let us first collect the evolutionary regularities that can be seen in both
cases. First, the members of both cultural groups dis–integrate behaviorally
in every period. Second, there is an assimilative tendency until the steady
state has been reached. Notably, this TI–assimilation of the groups is also
accompanied by a behavioral assimilation.
Furthermore, in both cases the minority cultural group invests consider-
ably more into both socialization instruments. As has been discussed shortly
above, this is (partially) due to the fact that the minority group faces a much
more unfavorable composition of the general social(ization) environment (in
terms of the resulting location of the average DTI compared to the fixed
optimal TI). The individual parents of that group thus aim to compensate
this by increased investments into their socialization instruments. In the
right case, the minority group does additionally have a much stronger norm
on behavior, i.e. the social punishments from behavioral deviations from the
norm are accordingly more intense. This additionally induces the parents of
this group to invest more into socialization.
This latter effect has a remarkable impact on the dynamical evolution of
the endogenous variables. In the left case, the norms of both cultural groups
are low enough such as to allow for a substantial assimilation process. Even,
the TIs of the two groups do nearly converge to a symmetric steady state
(but stay distinct).10 Compared to this case, the increased socialization
investments of the minority group in the right case do trigger an according
reaction of the majority group. Thus, both groups invest more into both
socialization instruments. As a consequence, the TIs of the two groups are
held back from assimilation already after very small deviations from the
fixed optimal TIs. The resulting steady state TI–distance is accordingly
larger.
2. Endogenous Norms on Behavior
The present section will be based on the third type of perception rule
discussed in chapter 2. The latter lets all parents form their perception of the
optimal trait intensity based on a the average DTI of a subset of the adults.
In the present context, it is one immediate option to let the respective subsets
10We call a symmetric steady state a steady state where almost all adults have the same
adopted TI.
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coincide with the adult members of the own cultural group of a parent. We
will do so and thus consider the case where φˆG (G) = φ
d
G(t), ∀G = L,H,
∀t ∈ N (and all subsequent Propositions of the present section are subject
to this specification).
This structure opens routes to the existence of multiple, qualitatively
different, SNEs. However, we can show that in any given period, SNE
choices exist that preserve the relative positions of the adopted TIs of the
two groups. To require this property can be considered sensible, since it
assures a minimum sort of continuity of the inter–generational evolution of
the TIs.
Proposition 2.4 (Relative–Position–Preserving SNE). Let Assumption
2.1–2.5. Then ∀t ∈ N, ∀{iL, iH , qH} ∈ (R++ \{∞})
2× (0, 1), there exixsts a{
φd
∗
G (t), σˆ
∗
G (t)
}
G=L,H
∈ E(P (t)) with the following characteristics.
(a) Case φH(t) >< φL(t)
(a) φd
∗
H (t) >< φH(t) >< φL(t) >< φ
d∗
L (t),
11
(b) σˆ∗G(t) ∈ (0, 1), ∀G ∈ {L,H},
(c) φd
∗
H (t) >< φH(t+ 1) >< φL(t+ 1) >< φ
d∗
L (t).
(b) Case φH(t) = φL(t)
(a) φd
∗
G (t) = φG = φG(t+ 1), ∀G ∈ {L,H},
(b) σˆ∗G(t) = 0, ∀G ∈ {L,H}.
Proof. In Appendix B 1.4.
The key to understanding these properties is the following. Consider
a situation where the DTIs are such that both groups dis–integrate be-
haviorally. Then, the best reply directions of socialization efforts would
coincide with this constellation, i.e. there would be best reply behavioral
dis–integration of both groups. This is the basis for the existence of a SNE
as characterized in the first part of Proposition 2.4.
Since both cultural groups dis–integrate behaviorally, together with a
strictly positive socialization success share, it also follows that the relative
TI positions of the two groups are preserved over generations. However, the
parents of both cultural groups would never choose to exclusively socialize
their children (choose a parental socialization success share of one). This
follows since in this case, their adult children’s adopted TI would coincide
with the chosen DTI of the parents, thus with the optimal TI. This can
though never be subject to best reply choices (as discussed in detail in
Pichler [49]).
11The outer inequalities turn into equalities if the adopted TI of a cultural groups equals
the relevant one of the boundaries of the set of possible DTIs.
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Finally, in the case where the adopted TIs of both cultural groups are
identical, the situation where the parents of both cultural groups do not
actively socialize their children is possible under SNE choices. This is im-
mediate since such a choice–constellation yields maximum possible utility
for all parties involved. Notably, since the adopted TIs of all adult children
then coincide with the adopted TIs of the contemporaneous adult genera-
tion, any such case constitutes a steady state (which is additionally relative
position preserving).
Under these relative position preserving properties, it furthermore fol-
lows that no TI–trajectory that has its origin in the upper/lower triangle of
the state space can enter the lower/upper triangle. We will next turn to a
discussion of qualitative properties of the corresponding TI–dynamics.
Assumption 2.6 (Strict Concavity and Convexity). The functions u and
v are C2 and strictly concave, and the function c is C2 and strictly convex.
Proposition 2.5 (Basin of Attraction). Let Assumptions 2.1–2.6 be
satisfied, and consider only relative–position–preserving SNEs. Then, for
every (iL, iH , qH) ∈ R
2
+×(0, 1), ∃∆(iL, iH , qH) ∈
(
0, | conφd(X)|
]
such that
∀0 < ∆φ(t) < ∆(iL, iH , qH), ∆
φ(t+1) < ∆φ(t). This implies that ∀∆φ(0) <
∆(iL, iH , qH), limt→∞∆
φ(t,∆φ(0), iL, iH , qH) = 0.
Proof. In Appendix B 1.5.
Indeed, there is a basin in terms of a maximum TI–distance such that for
any pair of TIs that features a lower distance, the cultural groups assimilate
inter–generationally. To show this property, we employed the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem, and the logic for the results is the following: From Proposition
2.4, we know that at any steady state (φ, φ) ∈ φd(X)
2
, the parents of both
groups do not actively socialize their children (i.e. they choose DTIs that ac-
cord with their TIs and zero parental socialization success shares), since their
adopted TI coincides with the optimal TI. Now, for marginal displacements
from such a steady state, the adopted TIs of the children of both groups will
also only marginally deviate from the optimal TI (given the local continuity
of the SNE choices which follows since we can apply the Implicit Function
Theorem). But such a deviation yields no inter–generational disutility, so
that the parents will again not engage in active socialization. Thus, all chil-
dren of the society adopt the society’s average DTI, i.e. a(nother) steady
state is immediately reached. This establishes the existence of a basin of
attraction for the symmetric steady states.
Nevertheless, this basin of attraction does not in general coincide with
the whole state space. We will next be concerned with establishing con-
ditions that guarantee convergence to a steady state for any initial pair of
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TIs. Notably, the latter property could not be attained in the discrete time
OLG framework that we employed so far. Thus, we consider below a contin-
uous time approximation of the model.12 Notably, the general convergence
result that we obtain for the continuous time approximation implies that,
under the same conditions, we can expect the same convergence property to
generically hold in the discrete time OLG model.
Additional to the continuous time approximation, we will require the
following.
Assumption 2.7 (Symmetric Utility Functions). ∀b, b′ ∈ conφd(X),
u (j|b) = u (j′|b′) if b − j = b′ − j′. Similarly, for every d, d′ ∈ conφd(X),
and h ∈ R+, v (k|d, h) = v (k
′|d′, h) if d− k = d′ − k′.
This assumption states that all ‘own’ and inter–generational utility func-
tions yield identical felicity for identical ‘directional’ deviations from their
peaks. On the one hand, this assumption appears to be quite natural. On
the other hand, note that it implies that the dis–utilities that accrue due
to deviations from the utility peaks are independent of the positions of the
peaks relative to the boundaries of the set of possible DTIs (respectively
‘adoptable’ TIs).13
Proposition 2.6. Let Assumptions 2.1–2.5 and 2.7 be satisfied. Then
there is a SNE selection function such that ∀ (φL(0), φH(0)) ∈ conφ
d(X)2,
and ∀ (iL, iH , qH) ∈ R
2
+×(0, 1), the TIs converge to a steady state.
This proposition states that (under the conditions imposed) there exists
a SNE selection function such that even any initial pair of TIs that is lo-
cated outside the basin of attraction of the symmetric TI points converges.
Thereby, the relevant properties of the SNE selection function are achieved
throuh normalizations of the phase vectors to rule out the existence of circles
in the whole state space.
In very short words, these normalizations are such that the state space is
being composed of a continuum of connected line segments. These consist of
(a) a vertical line on which the lower/upper bound of the set of possible DTIs
is binding in the DTI choice of the parents of group L (in the upper/lower
12Like Bisin and Verdier [8, p. 303] we could derive the continuous time approximation
from an OLG society populated by “agents living ∆ units of time and have children 1−h
units of time after birth, by taking the limit for ∆, h→ 0, with h
∆
= 0.”
13To see that accounting for these relative positions might be sensible, consider a pair of
unequal adopted TIs. Then, any identical DTI deviation from these utility peaks in the
same direction would imply that always one chosen DTI can be considered more ‘radical’
relative to the maximum or minimum possible DTI. Thus, if one would e.g. like to account
for the adults’ eventual ‘preferences’ for moderate behavior, Assumption 2.7 would not be
appropriate. A similar line of thought applies in case that parents would e.g. prefer their
adult children having moderate adopted TIs (respectively choosing more moderate DTIs).
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triangle of the state space), and on which the TI–change of group H is
constant; (b) a 45 ◦–line on which the TI–changes of both groups are constant
(notably, these lines can ‘melt down’ to single points); and (c) a horizontal
line on which the upper/lower bound of the set of possible DTIs is binding
in the DTI choice of the parents of group H (in the upper/lower triangle of
the state space), and on which the TI–change of group L is constant.
Since the state space is thus constructed as a continuum of (connected)
line segments on which the TI–change(s) of group L and/or group H are
constant (notably, on the 45 ◦–lines, the TI–changes of group L are identical
to that of the connected vertical lines; and the TI–changes of group H are
identical to that of the connected horizontal lines), it follows that no circles
can exist. Thus, any path of TIs must converge to a steady state.
φHt
φLt
Figure 2.6. Phase Diagram (Upper Triangle of the State Space)
The results of Proposition 2.6 are illustrated in Figure 2.6, which stylizes
possible qualitative properties of the phase vectors in the upper triangle of
the state space (the phase diagram in the lower triangle would correspond
to the mirror image). This upper triangle is partitioned into four distinct
fields, indicated by the dotted lines. These stylize the regions where either
the lower/upper bound of the set of possible DTIs is binding for group L/H
(the leftmost/upper–rightmost triangle), respectively where both boundaries
are binding (the rectangle), or where both boundaries are unbinding (the
main triangle).
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The central characteristic of this phase diagram is that with increasing
TI–distance, the TI–assimilation of the cultural groups declines in mag-
nitude. Specifically, in a neighborhood around the main diagonal (which
consists of a continuum of steady states) the cultural groups do first strictly
assimilate, followed by a neighborhood in which assimilation takes place.
Furthermore, there is a 45 ◦–line in the main triangle where the TI–distance
stays constant (but not the TIs themselves in this case).
For any point in the main triangle that features a larger TI–distance,
the cultural groups do even (strictly) dissimilate. In the present illustra-
tion, where the socialization efforts of the parents of group H are always
dominating (which can be due to e.g. a larger strength of the behavioral
norm), this has the following consequence: Any TI–trajectory that starts in
the according area of the state space must lead into a field where (at least)
the upper bound of the set of possible DTIs is binding for group H.
In this field, there is then a separating vertical line with the following
properties. If a trajectory enters (or starts in) the field ‘to the left’ (i.e. at a
point with a lower adopted TI of group L) of this vertical line, then the TIs
will converge to the asymptotically stable steady state in the rectangle. In
the opposite case, the TIs will be subject to an assimilation process toward
a symmetric steady state. Finally, if the trajectory should enter the field
exactly at the vertical line (or starts thereon), then the depicted unstable
steady steady state would be reached.
SNE– and TI–Path Illustration We again conclude this section with a
numerical illustration of the evolutionary dynamics14. In both cases of Fig-
ure 2.7, group L is a again the minority with a population share of twenty
per cent. Furthermore, it has a slightly lower intensity of the endogenous
norm on behavior.
The only distinction between both cases is that the right case features a
twice as high initial TI–distance as the left case. As can be seen, this has a
crucial consequence on the evolutionary dynamics. The constellation in the
left case is such that the initial TIs are located in the basin of attraction
of the symmetric steady states. Even, both cultural groups do assimilate
throughout the convergence path. This process is again accompanied by an
assimilation of the chosen DTIs.
These results do not hold in the right case. To the contrary, the initial TI
distance is large enough such as that even an inter–generational dissimilation
14Compared to the previous section, the total length of all time–axes is reduced to 30
units.
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Figure 2.7. Evolution under Endogenous Behavioral Norms
process is triggered — both with respect to the TIs as well as to the chosen
DTIs.
CHAPTER 4
Conclusions
This paper extended and specified a recent theory of Pichler [49] on the
inter–generational formation of continuous cultural traits. Followed by a
recapitulation of the latter theory, we analyzed the dynamic evolution of
both the behavior and the intensities of the continuous cultural traits in a
society populated by two distinct cultural groups.
We showed that the qualitative dynamic properties depend crucially on
how parents form their perception of the optimal trait intensity that their
children should adopt. As has already been shown in Pichler [49], if all
parents have ‘imperfect empathy’, then the trait intensities of (almost) all
dynasties converge to the same point. To the contrary, if all parents of a
cultural group adhere to the same exogenously given and fixed optimal trait
intensity, then this can never happen. Rather, the two cultural groups stay
distinct forever.
The largest variety of possible qualitative properties of the convergence
paths is being featured when the optimal trait intensities of all parents of
a cultural group coincide with that derived from the average behavior of
the group members. Given this, it is well possible that the trait intensities
of (almost) all parents converge to the same point. However, it can occur
that the cultural groups initially assimilate, but stay distinct in the long run.
Even, an inter–generational dissimilation process that leads to a steady state
with larger than initial trait intensity distance can realize.
This sort of analysis can also yield additional insights into empirically
observable patterns of assimilation and integration of cultural groups. How-
ever, the present one–dimensional framework can only be considered the
first step in a longer road toward a holistic representation of these pro-
cesses. The next steps on this road could concern a general, n–dimensional
analysis, both with respect to the number of continuous cultural trait types,
as well as to the number of cultural groups. Furthermore, we considered
here only benchmark cases of perception rules for optimal trait intensities.
A more general approach would be sensible.
Note also that we restricted the parental decision problems to the so-
cialization side only — and left other behavioral determinants (like general
social interactions) unconsidered. Accounting for a richer ‘adult world’ could
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yield qualitatively different results. Finally, the role of the children in their
socialization process is so far that of passive receivers. Allowing for a pro–
active role of children in the adoption process of trait intensities could also
constitute a fruitful extension of the present baseline model (and that of
Pichler [49]).
Part 3
The Evolution of Continuous
Cultural Traits in Social Networks
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Recently, Pichler [49] introduced a framework that determines the inter–
generational formation and evolution of continuous cultural traits. These are
meant to contain all types of traits that (a) are subject to formation in the
socialization process, and (b) can reflect different intensities (or magnitudes,
valuations, strengths, importances. . . ), located in a convex subset of the
real line. Specifically, this class contains concepts that are in standard use
in economic theory, like the degree of altruism, the intensity of preferences
for leisure or for social status, the patience (intensity), etc. Moreover, it
also contains (sociological) concepts like the values, attitudes, (strength of)
norms and continuous opinions that a person adopts.
The formation of the trait intensities is based on the children’s social
learning from the observed behavior of the adults in their social environment.
In Pichler [49], this environment consists of a continuum of adults. To the
contrary, in the present paper we consider a finite population setting in
which the social learning of children takes place in a social network.
This change has remarkable consequences on the resulting evolution of
the continuous cultural traits/opinions. In particular, we obtain a behav-
iorally induced transformation, respectively generalization, of the dynamics
that would be obtained under the DeGroot model (see e.g. Jackson [36] for
an overview over the properties of this model).
Contributions and Results The first part of this paper is devoted to an
introduction of the cultural formation of continuous cultural traits frame-
work of Pichler [49], given our finite population setting. In doing so, we will
show in a first step how children come to adopt intensities of any arbitrary
continuous cultural trait type. We let this be based on the children’s social
learning from observed socio–economic action patterns of the adults in their
social environment. Upon observation of the socio–economic action pattern
of an adult, children also receive a cognitive impulse. The latter can be
understood as the signal on the valuation (or importance, magnitude, etc.)
of the continuous cultural trait that is embodied in the choice of the par-
ticular socio–economic action pattern over the other available choices. We
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even endow these sorts of cognitive impulses with a cardinal meaning and
call them displayed trait intensities.
The trait intensity that a child adopts then results as a convex combina-
tion of the displayed trait intensities of its (single) parent on one hand, and
the representative displayed trait intensity of the unrelated adults, on the
other hand.1 The latter is being determined by the relative social learning
weighted average of the displayed trait intensities of the unrelated adults.
The relative social learning weights can be interpreted as representing the
children’s social learning networks. Finally, the convex combination be-
tween both sources is then determined by the relative (overall) weight that
the parents have in the socialization process of their children.
We then show how to interpret the trait intensities that adults have
adopted such as to induce utility functions over the choice of displayed trait
intensities, respectively the underlying socio–economic action patterns. Be-
sides this utility component, parents do also obtain inter–generational util-
ity, which is related to the adopted trait intensities of their children. Specif-
ically, we assume that parents have a desire for their children to adopt the
same trait intensity as they (the parents) have.2 If the adopted trait inten-
sities of the children deviate from these socialization targets, then parents
perceive dis–utilities.
Given these two utility components, we then analyze static and dynamic
properties of the model when all parents optimally choose their behavior
(displayed trait intensities as determined by the socio–economic action pat-
terns) subject to fixed parental socialization weights and subject to a fixed
social learning network. The optimal choices of displayed trait intensities
thereby result as best replies to the representative displayed trait intensities
of the unrelated adults. These best replies are such that parents always coun-
tervail an eventually suboptimal representative displayed trait intensity of
the unrelated adults. This means that (whenever the parental socialization
weight is strictly positive and unequal one) parents do behaviorally deviate
from their adopted trait intensity into the opposite direction as the devi-
ation from the representative displayed trait intensity from their adopted
trait intensity — which equals their socialization target — is.
The main focus of our present work is then the analysis of the dynamic
evolution of the adopted trait intensities of the dynasties under Nash equi-
librium behavioral choices. We start this analysis with a classification of
possible steady states. These are such that in any steady state all adults
1We thus consider a framework of ‘vertical and oblique socialization’, the terminology of
which stems from Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [16].
2A more general representation of this context is introduced in Pichler [49].
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behave as they are, i.e. they choose a displayed trait intensity that coincides
with their adopted trait intensity. Moreover, the adopted trait intensities
of all dynasties in certain parts3 of the society must be identical. The cen-
tral question is then under which conditions the sequence of adopted trait
intensities converges to any such steady state.
To answer this, we introduce in a first step a representation of the non–
linear discrete time dynamics of our model as the left product accumulation
of matrices. Thereby, the respective matrix of any given period arises as a
behaviorally induced transformation of the underlying (inter–generationally
fixed) total social learning matrix. The latter is constituted by the parental
socialization weights on the diagonal, and the normalized relative social
learning weights of the unrelated adults as the off–diagonals. Thus, the
social learning matrix is row–stochastic. However, this property is not in
general sustained under the transformation which is induced by the (even-
tual) behavioral deviation of the adults from their adopted trait intensity.
Notably, if this behaviorally induced transformation would not be present,
our model would coincide with the DeGroot model. We thus obtain a trans-
formation, respectively generalization, of the DeGroot model.
Given our behaviorally transformed (social learning) matrices, to answer
the question of convergence would then coincide with deriving sufficient
conditions for the convergence of the left product sequence of general —
i.e. not necessarily (positive) row–stochastic — matrices. However, little
results that were useful in our context were available on this issue. To
the contrary, considerably more has been provided on conditions for the
left product convergence of row–stochastic matrices, in particular by Lorenz
[40, 41]. To apply these results, we thus had to guarantee in a first step that
in any given period, our transformed matrices are positive, respectively row–
stochastic. Applying a number of linear algebra results, we could then show
that indeed if the social learning matrix is a so called symmetric ultrametric
matrix, then the behaviorally transformed matrices of any given period are
row–stochastic.
In our context, the major properties of symmetric ultrametric matrices
are that (a) the social learning structure is symmetric, (b) parents are the
‘primary socialization sources’ of their children, i.e. no other adult has a
larger relative socialization weight, as well as (c) a condition that basically
guarantees that the socialization influence that any dynasty has on the other
dynasties is too dominant. Even more, these properties do additionally
guarantee that the conditions for convergence derived by Lorenz [40, 41] are
satisfied. The most central step toward satisfying these is that we obtain (a
3We will formally introduce such ‘communication classes’ later.
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special sort of) ‘type symmetry’ between the original social learning matrix
and the transformed matrices.
Thus, endowing the social learning matrix with sufficient structure, we
obtain convergence to a steady state as classified above. However, the ne-
cessity to guarantee that the transformed matrices are positive, thus row–
stochastic, in any given period, significantly reduces the types of possible
(convergence) paths that we can address. Basically, we have to restrict our
glance to dynamics that are analogous to that obtained in the DeGroot–
model. However, the structure of our model, as induced by the behaviorally
transformed matrices, is inherently more general. At the present point, we
are though unfortunately limited in addressing the more general dynamic
structure by non–existing results on the convergence of left–products of gen-
eral (non–positive) matrices.
To underline, however, that more general convergence results could be
obtainable, we introduce a specification of our general model based on ex-
plicit utility functions and unrestricted optimization. Most centrally, this
yields the result that the transformed matrices are identical in any given
period, so that we can then apply results on the convergence of the powers
of matrices. In particular, we can then show that (a) if the social learning
matrix is symmetric positive definite, or if (b) the ‘strength’ of the inter–
generational utility is ‘not too large’ compared to that of the displayed trait
intensity utility, then (in the first case generically) the sequence of the trans-
formed matrices converges.
Related Literature Our present work stands in close relation to two
distinct strands of literature. The first is the small existing literature on the
question of the cultural formation of continuous cultural traits.4 Important
early treatments of the topic are Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [16] in a theo-
retical, and Otto et al. [46] in an empirical context. More recently Bisin and
Topa [5] proposed a representation of the formation of the intensities of con-
tinuous cultural traits (or preferences). Their approach is though restricted
to the family’s choice of its weight in the child’s socialization process. The
issue of the behavioral choice is left unconsidered.5
As has been discussed above, Pichler [49] introduced a more general
approach to the cultural formation of continuous cultural traits. Applying
this model, Pichler [48] analyzes the evolution of continuous cultural traits
in a society which is populated by two distinct cultural groups. He shows
4Note that there exists a well established literature on the (probabilistic) transmission of
a discrete set of preferences. See Bisin and Verdier [10] for an exhaustive overview.
5The same is true for the approach of Panebianco [47], who considers the evolution of
inter–ethnic attitudes.
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that the qualitative dynamic properties depend crucially on which type of
socialization targets (called ‘perception rules’) the parents perceive. In par-
ticular, he contrasts the case of ‘imperfect empathy’ with the cases where
the parents perceive exogenously given norms on behavior, respectively en-
dogenously evolving norms on behavior.6
The second branch of literature related to our work is the literature on
the evolution of continuous opinions (in social networks) introduced by De-
Groot [18]. Here, the general assumption is that individuals do have an
opinion or belief (measured by a parameter in R) and update this opinion
by interaction with other individuals according to their trust to others and
self-trust. DeGroot [18] finds that if the interaction structure is strongly
connected and aperiodic then the whole society will end up having the same
opinion, i.e. the society reaches a consensus. A variation of this model is
introduced by DeMarzo et al. [19] where the individuals’ own beliefs can
vary over time. The convergence result is similar to that of DeGroot [18]
with additional assumptions on the self–trust weights. Moreover, DeMarzo
et al. [19] study the speed of convergence. In Lorenz [40] and Lorenz [41]
the whole interaction structure is allowed to change over time. Under some
conditions, i.e. type-symmetry (if i puts some weight on the opinion of j
the j also puts some weight on the opinion of i), positive self–belief, and
non-convergence to zero of the positive entries, convergence to a consensus
is obtained. Other studies on convergence of opinion dynamics include that
of Krause [38], Hegselmann and Krause [35], Weisbuch et al. [62], and Golub
and Jackson [29]. The additional objective of the latter paper is to show
conditions under which a noisy opinion profile can converge to its mean.
Outline The further setup of this paper is as follows. The succeeding
chapter 2 introduces the general framework on the cultural formation of
continuous cultural traits of Pichler [49] within our setting. This is followed
by the analysis of static and dynamic properties of the model when par-
ents choose their behavior in chapter 3. The proofs of the more extensive
propositions of the latter chapter can be found in the Appendix C. Finally,
chapter 4 concludes.
6This concept has been introduced into the economics literature by Bisin and Verdier
[7]. It basically implies that parents have a desire for the adopted trait intensity of their
children to be close to their own adopted trait intensities (as we assume in the present
paper).
CHAPTER 2
Cultural Formation of Preferences
Consider an overlapping generations society which is populated by the
adults of a finite set of dynasties, N = {1, . . . , n}. At the beginning of
any given period t ∈ N, adults reproduce asexually and have exactly one
offspring, thus the population size is constant.
We will now lay down the framework that determines the cultural for-
mation of one continuous trait type. Let us start with discussing how chil-
dren come to adopt a certain trait intensity (TI) of the continuous trait
type under scrutiny. To do so, let us assume that all adults have avail-
able the same non–empty set of socio–economic action patterns, X. This
set is endowed with a complete and transitive binary relation T . Thereby,
for all x, x′ ∈ X, xT x′ means that the socio–economic action pattern x is
(weakly) ‘more characteristic’ for the continuous trait type under scrutiny
than socio–economic action pattern x′. This general formulation is owed
to the fact that we consider any type of continuous cultural trait. Given
transitivity and completeness, we can represent the ordinal relation T by a
cardinal function
φd : X 7→ R .
Thus, to any socio–economic action pattern x ∈ X, φd assigns a number
with cardinal meaning, φd(x). We will call this the displayed trait intensity
(DTI) embodied in the choice of socio–economic action pattern x. Thus,
φd(X) is the set of possible DTIs.
Now, the role models of the children’s social learning of trait intensities
are the observable socio–economic action patterns x ∈ X taken by the adults
a ∈ A; and we assume that the cognitive impulse that any of the children
obtains through such an observation is the corresponding DTI, φd(x). To
simplify the subsequent exposition, we will denote the DTI of the socio–
economic actions of the t+ 1th generation adult member of dynasty i ∈ N ,
xi(t) ∈ X, as φ
d
i (t) := φ
d(xi(t)).
Example 3.1 (Articulated Opinions). Consider the formation of con-
tinuous opinions. In this case, the children’s social learning from role mod-
els can be interpreted as their listening to articulated opinions. The set
of socio–economic action patterns X would then directly correspond to the
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(one–dimensional) ‘set of possible articulable opinions’. Thus, in this set-
ting, it is sensible to specify φd as the identity map.
We will now introduce the representation of the socialization process
that this paper proposes. This will be established on grounds of the tabula
rasa assumption, which means in the present context that children are born
with unformed trait intensity (TI), and equally, with unformed preferences.
On this basis, we then let the formation of the TI that a child adopts result
out of social learning from the socio–economic action patterns of adults
(only) that it is confronted with. In this context, we will let the TI that
any child of i ∈ N adopts in any period t ∈ N be formed according to
a weighted average between the representative DTIs of both socialization
sources. In case of the child’s family, this coincides with the DTI of its
single parent, φdi (t) ∈ φ
d(X). The representative DTI of the child’s general
social environment, Ni := N\{i}, will be denoted φ
d
Ni
(t). This results out
of the child’s social learning from the observed DTIs of the adults that it is
confronted with.
Specifically, in any given period t ∈ N and for every child of i ∈ N there
are oblique socialization weights, σij(t), j ∈ Ni, that represent the relative
cognitive impacts of the child’s social learning from the different unrelated
adults. For every i ∈ N , these weights satisfy σij(t) ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ Ni, and∑
j∈Ni
σij(t) = 1. In general, these weights can be interpreted as the social
(learning) networks that the children have with the unrelated adults. These
networks are determined by different social interaction times, as well as by
differing pre–dispositions of the children for the social learning from the
unrelated adults. We obtain, ∀i ∈ N ,
φdNi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
σij(t)φ
d
j (t) ∈ con φ
d(X).
The weight that the DTI of the parent of a child of i ∈ N has in the
socialization process of the child will be called the parental socialization
success share, σˆi(t) ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to the cognitive impact of the
parental DTI relative to the cognitive impact of the representative DTI of
the child’s general social environment. Factors that determine this relative
cognitive impact could include the social(ization) interaction time of the
parent with its child, as well as the effort and devotion that the parent
spends to socialize its child to the chosen DTI.1
We assume that all individuals carry over the trait intensity that has
been formed in their child period into their adult period (and keep them in
1See e.g. Grusec [30] for an introductory overview of theories on determinants of parental
socialization success.
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an unchanged way). We hence obtain for every t ∈ N, for every i ∈ N
φi(t+ 1) = σˆi(t)φ
d
i (t) + (1− σˆi(t))φ
d
Ni
(t). (3.1)
Since the final adopted TI of an individual is by construction a convex com-
bination of all DTIs that it observes, the adoptef TIs of all individual adults
will be located in the convex hull of the set of possible DTIs, con φd(X) ⊆ R.
The adopted TIs of the adults can be interpreted to induce ‘filters’ un-
der which adults can compare and rank different choices of socio–economic
actions. This form of evaluation takes place in terms of comparing the DTIs
of the socio–economic actions to the adopted TIs.2 Specifically, we assume
that the adopted TIs induce complete and transitive preference relations
over choices of DTIs (respectively the underlying socio–economic actions).
Assumption 3.1 (DTI Utility). For every t ∈ N, for every i ∈ N ,
(a) the adopted trait intensities induce a DTI utility function u (· |φi(t)) :
con φd(X) 7→ R, u
(
φdi (t) |φi(t)
)
,
(b) u (· |φi(t)) is single–peaked with peak φi(t), i.e. strictly increasing /
decreasing ∀φdi (t) ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φdi (t) < / > φi(t).
Intuitively, the single–peakedness property means that we assume adults
to prefer choosing behaviors (DTIs) that are as close as possible in line with
their adopted TIs.
Example 3.2 (Utility from Articulated Opinions). In a continuation
of the first example, consider the adults’ choices of articulated opinions. If
these do not coincide with the adults’ adopted opinions, then the adults are
lying. Lying can cause dis–utilities in terms of cognitive dissonance (see
Festinger [23]) or in terms of the fear of being revealed. Intuitively, these
dis–utilities are strictly increasing in the ‘degree of the lies’.
1. Intergenerational Utility
In the previous chapter, we showed how to interconnect the socio–
economic action patterns that adults take in any period with the prefer-
ences over the very same action–patterns that next period’s adults have.
This interconnection is based on the children’s social learning from the role
models that the socio–economic choices constitute. It follows that any model
framework that determines the adults’ choices of socio–economic action pat-
terns (respectively those of the corresponding displayed trait intensities), the
parental socialization success shares, as well as the social (learning) network
structure equally endogenizes the preference formation process.
2This is in line with the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger [23].
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In this paper we introduce a framework that (partially) achieves this
endogeneization based on purposeful socialization decisions of the parents.
The basis for doing so is to clarify what motivation parents have to actively
engage in their children’s socialization process (the functioning of which we
assume them to be fully aware of), as represented by the trait intensity
formation rule (3.1). Basically, we let this motivation stem from the fact
that parents also obtain an inter–generational utility component. Thereby,
we let this be related to the adopted TI of their adult children.
Specifically, in the present paper, we assume that all parents perceive
their own adopted TI as the optimal trait intensity for their children to
adopt.3 Thus, the parents’ adopted TIs constitute their socialization tar-
gets. There are two basic motivations to consider this case. The first is that
parents simply have an intrinsic desire for their children to develop a per-
sonality (adopted TI) that is as similar as possible to their own personality.
The second motivation is based on a myopic form of parental altruism,
called imperfect empathy.4 Parents are altruistic and fully internalize the
utility resulting from their expectations of their adult child’s socio–economic
action patterns (respectively DTI). Nevertheless, parents can not perfectly
empathize with their child and can only evaluate their adult child’s util-
ity under their own (not the child’s) utility function — which attains its
maximum at the adopted TI of the parent.
As far as the expectations about their adult children’s DTIs are con-
cerned, parents are myopic: Although they obtain an inter–generational
utility component, which eventually induces them to choose a DTI that does
not coincide with their adopted TI (see below), we assume that they do not
realize that this form of behavior changing impact will also be present in their
adult children’s decision problems. Thus, in any given period t ∈ N, any par-
ent of i ∈ N expects its adult child to choose a DTI that is in the set of maxi-
mizers of its DTI utility function, argmaxφdi (t+1)∈φd(X)
u
(
φdi (t+ 1) |φi(t+ 1)
)
.
Under Assumption 3.2 below, φd(X) is convex and thus φd(X) = con φd(X).
This then guarantees by the single–peakedness of the utility functions that
argmaxφdi (t+1)∈φd(X)
u
(
φdi (t+ 1) |φi(t+ 1)
)
= φi(t + 1), ∀i ∈ N . Hence,
the parental expectations of their adult children’s DTIs coincide with their
adopted TIs.
Assumption 3.2 (Convexity). X is a convex and compact subset of a
finite dimensional Euclidean space, and φd is continuous. It follows that
φd(X) is non–empty, convex and compact.
3See Pichler [49, 48] for a more general representation of perceived optimal trait intensities.
4This concept has been introduced into the economics literature by Bisin and Verdier [7].
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Given the perception that the socialization targets of the parents coin-
cide with their adopted TIs, we assume further that parents perceive utility
losses for deviations of the adopted TIs of their children from the socializa-
tion targets. Specifically, as far as the strengths of these perceived utility
losses relative to the strength of the DTI utility losses are concerned, for
every i ∈ N , we introduce the parameter βi ∈ R+. Notably, we assume this
parameter to be invariantly passed over from one generation to the next,
thus we dropped the time indexes. We will call this parameter parent’s
inter–generational trait intensity. It will play a central role in the dynami-
cal analysis of chapter 2.
Assumption 3.3 (Inter–generational Utility Function). For every t ∈ N,
for every i ∈ N ,
(a) the inter–generational trait intensity and adopted trait intensity induce
an inter–generational utility function v (· |βi, φi(t)) : con φ
d(X) 7→ R,
v (φi(t+ 1) |βi, φi(t)), where
(b) ∀βi ∈ R++, v (· |βi, φi(t)) is single–peaked with peak φi(t), thus strictly
increasing / decreasing at all φi(t+1) ∈ con φ
d(X) such that φi(t+1) <
/ > φi(t).
CHAPTER 3
Choosing Behavior and the Evolution of Trait
Intensities
In the present chapter, we will show static and dynamic properties of the
model introduced above when parents can choose their behavior (displayed
trait intensity) in the context of a fixed social learning structure of their
children. This means that both the parental socialization success shares,
as well as the social learning networks of the children (with their unrelated
adults), are exogenously fixed in any given period. Such a setting can be
motivated with, e.g., a fixed local and social structure that determines the
adults’ and children’s social (learning) interactions.
1. Best Reply Problems and Nash Equilibrium
Given that we consider only the behavioral (DTI) choices of the parents,
in any period t ∈ N, the best reply problems of the parents i ∈ N are
max
φdi (t)∈φ
d(X)
u
(
φdi (t) |φi(t)
)
+ v (φi(t+ 1) |βi, φi(t)) (3.2)
s.t. φi(t+ 1) = σˆi(t)φ
d
i (t) + (1− σˆi(t))φ
d
Ni
(t).
The addition of the two types of utility functions embodies the trade off
between DTI utility losses (by choosing DTIs that deviate from the adopted
TIs) and eventual improvements in the location of the children’s adopted TI
relative to the optimal TI.
In choosing their best reply behavior, we assume that the parents do
not internalize (or are not aware of) the effect that this has on the behavior
decisions of the other parents. This bounded rationality assumption can be
justified since full rationality would mean that all parents are aware of the
best reply problems of all parents. This would imply that they know the
social learning structure of all children, as well as the set of adopted and
inter–generational TIs. This is without doubt more than we can expect from
agents in a general (large) society.
The best reply problems of the parents i ∈ N determine sets of best
reply DTIs against the representative DTIs (which are subject to the fixed
social learning structure of the children), subject to their fixed parental
socialization success share, as well as their adopted TIs (which are also
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their socialization targets), and their inter–generational trait intensities.
For every adult i ∈ N , we will thus denote any of the elements in its best
reply set as φdi (t)
(
φdNi(t), σˆi(t), φi(t), βi
)
, which we will abbreviate subse-
quently as φdi (t) (·). Furthermore, together with the representative DTI,
any such best reply DTI also determines a best reply location of the adult
children’s adopted TIs (through the TI formation rule, see (3.1)), φi(t +
1)
(
φdi (t)(·), σˆi(t), φ
d
Ni
(t)
)
.
The following assumption assures non-emptiness of the adults’ sets of
best reply DTIs. Furthermore, it will allow for a significant characteriza-
tion of these, as well as of the resulting best reply locations of the adults’
subsequent TIs.
Assumption 3.4 (Compactness, Continuity).
(a) X is compact. If m > 1, then φd is (additionally) concave.
(b) The functions u (· |a) and v (· |b, d) are continuous and differentiable at
their peaks.
Since both the utility and inter–generational utility function are single–
peaked, Assumption 3.4 (b) implies that both functions have zero slope at
their peaks. Thus, parents perceive no (inter–generational) utility losses for
marginal deviations of their chosen DTI from their adopted TI, respectively
of their adult child’s adopted TI from the optimal TI.
Proposition 3.1 (Characterization of Best Replies). Let Assumptions
3.1–3.4 hold. Then, ∀t ∈ N, ∀i ∈ N , the sets of best reply DTIs are non–
empty and satisfy the following characterization.
(a) If σˆi(t) = 0, then φ
d
i (t)(·) = φi(t), thus φi(t + 1)
(
φi(t), 0, φ
d
Ni
(t)
)
=
φdNi(t).
(b) If σˆi(t) = 1, then φ
d
i (t)(·) = φi(t), thus φi(t+1)
(
φi(t), 1, φ
d
Ni
(t)
)
= φi(t).
(c) Let σˆi(t) ∈ (0, 1). Then, it holds generically that sign
(
φdi (t) (·)− φi(t)
)
=
− sign
(
φdNi(t)− φi(t)
)
,1 while it always holds that
sign
(
φi(t+ 1)
(
φdi (t)(·), σˆi(t), φ
d
Ni
(t)
)
− φi(t)
)
= sign
(
φdNi(t)− φi(t)
)
.
Proof. Non–emptiness as well as parts (a) and (b) are trivial. Part
(c) follows as a straightforward corollary from the proof of Proposition 1 in
Pichler [49]. 
The (generic) results of Proposition 3.1 (c) are illustrated in Figure 3.1
below. In the left interval (both intervals correspond to the set of possible
1The non–generic case holds if the deviation of the best reply DTI from the adopted TI
into the ‘desired’ direction is not possible, i.e. if the adopted TI of an adult coincides with
(the relevant) one of the boundaries of φd(X). Then, the best reply DTI will coincide
with the adopted TI (i.e. with the boundary).
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DTIs) the context of the adult’s decision problem is depicted. In the right
interval a corresponding best reply choice is stylized. As can be seen both
from Proposition 3.1 (c) directly, as well as from the graphical illustration,
the results feature two dominant characteristics.
φi(t+ 1)
(
φdi (t)(·), σii, φ
d
Ni
(t)
)
φdNi(t)
φdi (t)(·)
φi(t) •
•
σii ∈ (0, 1)
•
•
•
•
Figure 3.1. Characterization of Best Replies
The first concerns the generic location of the best reply choices. If the
representative DTI does not coincide with the optimal TI, then parents
countervail the respective socialization influence on their children by choos-
ing DTI that deviates from their adopted TI.2 This deviation is always into
the opposite direction as the deviation of the representative DTI from the
optimal TI (if such a choice is available). That this holds for very small devi-
ations of the representative DTI from the optimal TI is due to the fact that
marginal investments into the socialization instruments are (utility) costless
(while as the resulting strictly positive decrease in the distance of the child’s
adopted TI from the optimal TI yields a strictly positive inter–generational
utility gain).
The second dominant characteristic concerns the location of the adult
children’s adopted TIs that would result out of the parental best reply
choices. Despite the parental countervailing in the case of suboptimal social-
ization influences of the general social environment, the behavioral deviation
from the utility peak would never be intense enough such as to guarantee
that their adult children’s adopted TIs would exactly coincide with the op-
timal TIs. Hence, there is always a strictly positive deviation of the adopted
2Obviously, if the representative DTI exactly coincides with the optimal TI, then parents
have no incentives to do so (since the adopted TI of an adult child will then anyhow
coincide with the optimal TI).
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TI of an adult child from the optimal TI. Thereby, the direction of this de-
viation always accords with the direction of deviation of the representative
DTI from the optimal DTI.
Again, this result holds for even very small deviations of the represen-
tative DTI from the socialization target. Analogously to before, this stems
from the fact that parents do not perceive inter–generational utility losses
for an only marginal deviation of the adult child’s adopted TI from the
socialization target (while at any strictly positive DTI–deviation from the
peak, the marginal cost of an increase in the deviation to further reduce the
distance between the adult child’s adopted TI and the socialization target
would be strictly positive).
Assumption 3.5 (Concavity). The functions u (· |a) and v (· |b, d) are
concave (in the second argument).3
Proposition 3.2 (Nash Equilibrium Existence). Let Assumptions 3.1—
3.5 hold. Then, for every t ∈ N, a Nash equilibrium in DTI choices exists.
Denote this Φd
∗
(t) :=
(
φd
∗
1 (t), . . . , φ
d∗
n (t)
)′
.
Proof. In Appendix C 1.1.
2. Evolution of Preferences
Given the static characterization of the previous section, we will now be
concerned with a characterization of the long–run evolution of the adopted
trait intensities of the dynasties. In particular, we will now (explicitly) as-
sume that both the parental socialization success shares, as well as the rel-
ative socialization weights are inter–generationally fixed. We will thus drop
the respective time–indexes of the social learning matrices below. More-
over, for every i ∈ N and for every j ∈ Ni we will denote the aggregate
relative social learning weights of the unrelated adults σˆij := (1− σˆi)σij ,
and consider the total social learning matrix Σˆ = [σˆij ] (with diagonal el-
ements (σˆ1, . . . , σˆn)). Note that Σˆ ∈ S(n), i.e. the social learning matrix
belongs to the set of row stochastic square matrices of dimension n.
We will then be concerned with deriving conditions on Σˆ ∈ S(n) and
the vector of inter–generational trait intensities β := (β1, . . . , βn)
′ ∈ Rn+,
under which the tuple of adopted TIs converges to a steady state. To begin
the analysis, we first introduce a characterization of the steady states of our
model.
For this and for the analysis to follow, we introduce some additional use-
ful terminology and notation related to any interaction matrix A ∈ S(n). We
3Note that under Assumptions 3.1 (b) and 3.3 (b), both utility functions are already
strictly quasi–concave.
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say that there exists a connection from i to j in A, denoted by i→ j, if there
exists a k ∈ {0, ..., n} such that Akij > 0. Two dynasties communicate, de-
noted by i ∼ j, if i→ j and j → i. A dynasty i is self-communcating if i→ i.
Trivially, ∼ defines an equivalence relation on the set of self-communicating
dynasties and, hence, this set can be partitioned into equivalence classes,
called self-communicating classes. Denoting each non self-communicating
dynasty as a single class, ∼ partitions the dynasty set into communica-
tion classes P(A) = {N1, ..., Np} such that for all L ∈ P(A), L is either a
self-communicating class or a non self-communicating dynasty. A communi-
cation class L ∈ P(A) is called essential if for all i ∈ L there does not exist
a j /∈ L such that i → j. A communication class is called inessential if it is
not essential.
Proposition 3.3 (Steady States). Let Assumptions 3.1–3.5 hold. Then,
in any steady state
(a) all adults behave as they are,
(b) all TIs of the dynasties in an essential communication class are identical,
and
(c) the TIs of the dynasties in inessential communication classes I ∈ P(Σˆ)
are convex combinations of the TIs of the communication classes J ∈
P(Σˆ) such that I → J .
Proof. In Appendix C 1.2.
To see that part (a) must hold, note that per definition, in any steady
state, the children adopt the same TIs as their parents have. From Propo-
sition 3.1, we know that such a constellation can only be subject to (Nash
equilibrium) individual best replies if the representative DTIs of all children
coincide with the parents’ adopted TIs. In such a case, all parents behave as
they are. Parts (b) and (c) of the Proposition are then straightforward. If
the TIs would differ within an essential communication class, then at least
one of the parents with maximal (respectively minimal) TIs is facing a rep-
resentative DTI that is lower (resp. larger) than its TI, contradicting the
steady state. An analogous consideration holds if one of the parents in an
inessential communication class has a TI that lies outside the interval of
the TIs of the communication classes to which their communication class is
connected. Note that within an inessential communication class the TIs of
the adults may differ in a steady state.
Given this steady state classification it now remains to derive conditions
under which the sequence of TIs actually converges to any such rest point.
The following example shows that in case of two connected dynasties, such
a condition is easy to obtain.
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Example 3.3 (Two Dynasties). Consider the simplest case of a non–
degenerate essential communication class, i.e. that of two parent–child pairs
in any given period. Assume also that for all i = 1, 2, σˆi ≥
1
2 — so that the
parents are the ‘primary socialization sources’ of their children.
Then, it must hold that the distance between the adopted TIs of the
adult members of both dynasties strictly declines over generations. Thus,
the adopted TIs converge to the same point.
To see that this is true, consider the possible Nash Equilibrium DTI
choices and the resulting locations of the children’s adopted TIs in any given
period. To do this, note first that under the primary parental socialization
assumption (σˆi ≥
1
2), the child of the parent who chooses the larger DTI
will also adopt the larger TI. Let us consider the case where the adopted
TIs of the adults are unequal, and assume (by way of contradiction) that
any child would be led to adopt a TI which is larger/lower than the max-
imum/minimum of the adopted TIs of the adults. Thus, this must (also)
hold for the child of the parent who chose the larger/lower DTI.
However, such a situation could never be subject to a best reply choice of
at least the adult with the strictly larger/lower adopted TI. This follows from
Proposition 3.1 since the DTI choice of this adult would have to be strictly
larger/lower than its adopted TI. Thus, an at least marginal relaxation of
its behavioral deviation would strictly increase its total utility.
Certainly, in the two dynasties case, the ‘primary parental socialization’
condition is stronger than necessary for obtaining convergence. However, if
the socialization success shares deviate too far from this condition, i.e. if
the unrelated adults have too large a socialization influence on the children,
then cycling behavior can well arise.
This holds since both parents do always countervail the socialization in-
fluence exerted by the other adult on the own child. This (typically) leads to a
situation where the adult with the lower/larger adopted TI chooses a strictly
lower/larger DTI (than the adopted TI) in the Nash equilibrium. With large
enough socialization success shares of the unrelated adults, it is possible that
one child adopts a TI that is strictly larger than the larger one of the cur-
rent adults’ adopted TIs, and vice versa. Even, the relative TI–positions
of the children would then be reversed compared to that of the parents. If
this constellation continues to realize in subsequent periods, then the evolu-
tion of the trait intensities will be characterized by a limit cycle, with the
relative positions of the adopted TIs changing between any two succeeding
generations.
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A sufficient and easy to derive condition for convergence in the two–
dynasties case is that the parents of both dynasties are the ‘primary social-
ization sources’ of their children. However, in general, i.e. for an arbitrary
number of connected dynasties, it was impossible for us to directly derive
(analogous) conditions that would ensure convergence. For being never-
theless able to obtain such conditions, we will below embed the non–linear
dynamical system into a tractable form.
Corollary 3.1 (Nash Equilibrium Map). Let Assumptions 3.1–3.5
hold. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium map E : φd(X)
n
×S(n)×Rn+ 7→
R
n
+, such that for every i ∈ N and for every t ∈ N, E
(
Φ(t), Σˆ, β
)
=
(e∗1(t), . . . , e
∗
n(t))
′ satisfies
φd
∗
i (t)− φi(t) = e
∗
i (t) (φi(t)− φ
∗
i (t+ 1))
where φ∗i (t+ 1) :=
∑
j∈N σˆijφ
d∗
j .
4 This map has the property that if for any
i ∈ N σˆiβi = 0, then e
∗
i (t) = 0, ∀t ∈ N, as well as that if φ
∗
i (t + 1) = φi(t)
then e∗i (t) = 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from the best reply characterization of
Proposition 3.1 and the Nash equilibrium existence of Proposition 3.2. 
The Nash equilibrium map simply represents the Nash equilibrium DTI
choices in terms of their deviations from the parent’s adopted TIs relative
to the deviation of the children’s adopted TIs from the socialization targets.
This representation can equivalently be written as φd
∗
i (t) + e
∗
i (t)ΣˆiΦ
d∗(t) =
(1+ e∗i (t))φi(t), for every i ∈ N . Defining B(t) := diag (e
∗
1(t), . . . , e
∗
n(t)), we
thus obtain5 (
I +B(t)Σˆ
)
Φd
∗
(t) = (I +B(t))Φ∗(t)
so that
Φd
∗
(t) =
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
(I +B(t))Φ∗(t)
and hence
Φ∗(t+ 1) = Σˆ
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
(I +B(t))Φ∗(t).
For this representation to be well defined, it is e.g. sufficient that either Σˆ is
diagonally dominant (since then I + B(t)Σˆ is strictly diagonally dominant,
thus invertible) or symmetric positive semidefinite (below, we will restrict
our glance to a class of matrices that even features symmetric positive defi-
niteness of Σˆ).6
4Actually, for all i ∈ N , e∗i (t) = e
∗
i
(
Φ(t), Σˆ, β
)
. We chose the representation in the text
for brevity.
5diag(y) denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries specified by y.
6To see the latter, note that under symmetry, we can rewrite I+B(t)Σˆ = I+B(t)
1
2 ΣˆB(t)
1
2 .
Now since Σˆ is positive semidefinite, it follows that x′Σˆx ≥ 0, for all x ∈ Rn, thus also
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Finally, denoting M(t) := Σˆ
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
(I +B(t)), it follows that
Φ∗(t) =M(t− 1) . . .M(0)Φ(0) =M(t− 1, 0)Φ(0), t ∈ N\{0} (3.3)
whereM(t, 0) denotes the backward accumulation of the sequence {M(t′)}tt′=0.
The beauty of this representation is that we transformed the non–linear
Nash Equilibrium solutions of our general model into an essentially linear
form. This significantly increases the analytical tractability since it allows
us to resort to linear algebra results on the convergence of left products of
matrices. Specifically, Lorenz [40, 41] provided convergence results for left
products of row stochastic matrices — while as (for our specific context)
not sufficient results are available on the left product convergence of more
general matrices (that have row sum one, but with possibly negative entries).
However, to guarantee that the individual M(t) are row stochastic in every
period t ∈ N, we have to endow the social learning matrix Σˆ with sufficient
structure (we will discuss this context in more detail below).
Definition 3.1 (Symmetric Ultrametric Matrix). Σˆ ∈ S(n) is a sym-
metric ultrametric matrix if
(i) Σˆ is symmetric,
(ii) σˆi ≥ max {σˆij : j ∈ Ni}, ∀i ∈ N ,
(iii) σˆij ≥ min {σˆik; σˆkj}, ∀i, j, k ∈ N .
To motivate the symmetry property in our context, remember the basic
determinants of the relative socialization successes that different unrelated
adults have with the children. These determinants consist of the relative so-
cial interaction time on the one hand, and potentially differing social learn-
ing pre–dispositions on the other hand. Thus, for any pair of children, the
required symmetry can be achieved by requiring the relative social interac-
tion time that any one of the two children has with the parent of the other
child to be identical, together with the assumption that all children have
identical social learning pre–dispositions. Property (ii) is the generalized
‘primary parental socialization’ condition. It simply means that among all
adults, the parents have the largest socialization influence on their children
(respectively, among all adults, they spend the largest time share with their
children). In general, the third property requires a sort of consistency of
the socialization patterns. It states that for any triple i, j, k ∈ N , if the
socialization influence of j on child i is strictly smaller than that of k on
child i, then it must not hold that k has a strictly larger socialization influ-
ence on child j than on child i (since σˆkj = σˆjk). This requirement can be
for x = B(t)
1
2 y, y ∈ Rn. It follows that I + B(t)Σˆ is (symmetric) positive definite, thus
invertible.
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interpreted as ruling out the existence of dynasties that have a too dominant
social learning influence on other dynasties.
Recall from Proposition 3.3 that we can only show convergence of trait
intensities within communication classes. In the case of symmetric ultra-
metric social learning matrices Σˆ, any communication class L ∈ P(Σ) is
essential due to the symmetry of Σˆ and for I, J ∈ P(Σˆ) such that I 6= J it
holds that i 6→ j for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J. For the following result, let PΣˆ(i) ⊆ N
be such that PΣˆ(i) ∈ P(Σˆ) and i ∈ PΣˆ(i) (the element of the partition
P
(
Σˆ
)
which i belongs to). For a matrix A ∈ S(n) and some J ⊆ N let
AJ denote the matrix A restricted to the set of dynasties J ⊆ N . Finally,
a consensus matrix is a row stochastic matrix where all rows are identical.
We now get the following convergence result.
Proposition 3.4 (Convergence I). Let Assumptions 3.1–3.5 hold, let the
map E be continuous and let Σˆ be symmetric ultrametric. Then, ∀β ∈ Rn+,
limt→∞M(t, 0) exists. Moreover, limt→∞M(t, 0)L = K(L) for all L ∈ P,
such that K(L) is a consensus matrix, and limt→∞M(t, 0)ij = 0 if and only
if j /∈ PΣˆ(i).
Proof. In Appendix C 1.3.
Endowing the the total social learning matrix with sufficient structure, we
thus arrive at a general result: In the long-run the communication classes
of a society (these are the components of the social network) will end up
with the same trait intensities. In the proof, we show first that each element
M(t) of the left product (3.3) is row stochastic. While it is straightforward
to show that the rows of each M(t) sum up to one (confer Lemma C.1),
we make use of a number of linear algebra results on inverses of symmet-
ric ultrametric matrices and inverse–positive matrices to show that M(t) is
positive.7 Second, we can show that the entries of M(t) corresponding to
strictly positive entries of Σˆ can be bounded away from zero. This is due
to the linearity of the determinants of the minors of M(t) in all individ-
ual e∗i (t)s, and the continuity and boundedness of E. In the last step, we
construct a sequence of sub-accumulations of M(ts+1, ts)s∈N such that for
each element the minimal strictly positive entry can be uniformly bounded
away from zero, which also implies type-symmetry and a strictly positive di-
agonal. For the sequence of sub-accumulations M(ts+1, ts)s∈N we can then
apply the convergence result by Lorenz [40], which implies that the adopted
TIs of each connected subset converge to the same point, respectively the
dynasties reach a consensus.
7For literature on inverses of symmetric ultrametric matrices refer to Nabben and Varga
[43, 44], Martinez et al. [42], and for results on inverse–positive matrices see e.g. Fujimoto
and Ranade [26].
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Note finally that the necessity to guarantee that all M(t) are row sto-
chastic significantly reduces the convergence path types that we can analyt-
ically address. Basically, we have to restrict our glance to dynamics that
are analogous to that obtained in the DeGroot–model. This follows since
M(t) row stochastic implies that sequence of adopted TIs is such that all
next–period adopted TIs lie in the interval formed by the minimum and
maximum adopted TIs of the current period. However, the structure of our
model is inherently more general — and also more general than existing
models of opinion dynamics, which do not incorporate strategic interac-
tion. In fact, the DeGroot model is a special case of our model (i.e. when
B(t) = diag(0, . . . , 0), ∀t), as well as of the example that we discuss next.
The example serves to underline the claim that convergence can be obtained
under more general conditions.
Example 3.4 (Explicit Functions and Unrestricted Optimization). Con-
sider the case where u (a′ |a) = − (a′ − a)2 and v (d′ |b, d) = −b (d′ − d)2.
Assume further (with loss of generality) that all parents can unrestrictedly
choose their displayed trait intensities, or in other words that the set of pos-
sible DTIs would be unbounded. Then, in every period t ∈ N the parents
i ∈ N would face the unrestricted optimization problems
min
φdi (t)
(
φdi (t)− φi(t)
)2
+ βi (φi(t+ 1)− φi(t))
2. (3.4)
From the first order conditions, it immediately follows that in this case
E
(
·, Σˆ, β
)
= (β1σˆ1, . . . , βnσˆn)
′. This has the consequence that ∀t ∈ N,
B(t) = B = diag (β1σˆ1, . . . , βnσˆn), thus M(t) = M = Σˆ
(
I +BΣˆ
)−1
(I +
B), and finally
Φ∗(t) =M tΦ(0).
Compared to our general representation, this form has a significant advan-
tage: It transforms the problem of the convergence of the left–product of
highly path–dependent matrices into one of the convergence of the powers
of a time–invariant matrix.
Proposition 3.5 (a) and (b) give a (generically) sufficient and necessary
condition on Σˆ to obtain convergence.
Proposition 3.5 (Convergence II). Let the parental optimization prob-
lems be as in (3.4). Then, the following results are satisfied.
(a) If Σˆ is symmetric positive definite (henceforth: “PD”), then for every
β ∈ Rn+ it holds that all eigenvalues of M are real and in the interval
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(0, 1] (with at least one eigenvalue equal to 1). Thus, generically the
sequence
{
Φ∗(t) =M tΦ(0)
}
t→∞
converges (for Φ(0) arbitrary).8
(b) Let Σˆ have a strictly positive diagonal. If for some eigenvalue λ of Σˆ we
have Re(λ) < |λ|2,9 then there is a β ∈ Rn+ such that the spectral radius
ofM is strictly larger than 1. Thus, the sequence
{
Φ∗(t) =M tΦ(0)
}
t→∞
does not converge (for Φ(0) arbitrary).
Proof. In Appendix C 1.4.
Proposition 3.5 (a) shows that PD is generically sufficient for conver-
gence. PD and row stochasticity of a matrix imply in particular that
Re(λ) ≥ |λ|2 for any eigenvalue λ of the matrix, i.e. the real part of each
eigenvalue is larger than the squared absolute value of this eigenvalue.10 Σˆ
having this property is shown to be necessary for convergence (subject to
any β) in part (b). In the proof of part (a) we show that if Σˆ PD then the
eigenvalue property carries over to M . Even more, Σˆ PD guarantees that
all eigenvalues of M are real and located in the interval (0, 1].
As has been mentioned above, the present special case of our general
model is basically a transformation of the DeGroot model. Given that con-
vergence is satisfied in the latter, it is intuitive that we also obtain con-
vergence if the transformation (as induced by the parental socialization in-
centives, which are embodied in β) is small enough. This is confirmed as
follows.
Proposition 3.6 (Convergence III). Let the parental optimization prob-
lems be as in (3.4). Then, for every irreducible Σˆ ∈ S(n) with strictly posi-
tive diagonal, there exists a nonempty neighborhood N
(
0
∣∣∣Σˆ) ⊂ Rn+,11 such
that ∀β ∈ N
(
0
∣∣∣Σˆ)∪0, the sequence {Φ∗(t) =M tΦ(0)}
t→∞
converges (for
Φ(0) arbitrary).
Proof. In Appendix C 1.5.
In the proof of this Proposition, we show first that if Σˆ is has a strictly
positive diagonal, then it has a simple Perron–Frobenius eigenvalue of 1
where the absolute value of all other eigenvalues is located in the interval
(0, 1). Now, the eigenvalues are continuous in the underlying matrices. Thus,
it must be possible to at least slightly perturb Σˆ such that the resulting
matrices M do also have a unique eigenvalue 1 with the absolute value of
8“Generically” applies to all cases where the geometric multiplicity of the 1–eigenvalue
equals its algebraic multiplicity; see also Lemma C.2.
9Re(λ) means the real part of eigenvalue λ.
10Indeed an eigenvalue λ of a symmetric positive definite matrice is real and positive such
that λ ∈ (0, 1] (because of row stochasticity), which implies that Re(λ) ≥ |λ|2.
11N
(
0
∣∣∣Σˆ
)
means that the size of the neighborhood around β = 0 depends on Σˆ.
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all other eigenvalues in the interval (0, 1). Hence, M t converges. Notably,
this does hold even though M is not necessarily positive.
Analytically, we can not pin down the precise sizes of the neighbor-
hoods that guarantee convergence. However, note that for n = 3/10/50 and
60, 000/160, 000/2, 700, 000 random draws of uniformly distributed Σˆ ∈ S(n)
and β, the eigenvalue conditions for convergence were satisfied whenever
β ≤ 6/16/270.12 Thus, the spread of socialization weights over a larger
number of adults favors convergence — since eventually ‘extreme’ behaviors
of individual adults tend to have a lower relative socialization weight, and
thus tend to be evened out. To further illustrate the analytical results of the
last Proposition 3.6, consider the following two examples of three dynasties.
The first example is
Σˆ =

 0.40 0.30 0.300.25 0.45 0.30
0.35 0.30 0.35

 , β =

 100200
400


with corresponding
M =

 +0.843 +0.041 +0.116−0.017 +0.961 +0.056
+0.060 +0.015 +0.925

 , Eig (M) =

 1.000.93
0.80

 ,
where Eig(M) stands for the eigenvalues of matrix M . The matrix Σˆ is
comparatively close to a symmetric ultrametric matrix. Given this structure,
although the β–vector is large and thus M is not positive (which would
have been required in our general representation), the power–sequence of
the resulting matrix M does converge (since the eigenvalue conditions are
satisfied). The corresponding convergence path is illustrated in the left graph
of Figure 3.2 below. In both graphs of the figure, the black/red/green paths
correspond to i = 1/2/3, and the initial TIs are Φ(0) = (0.0, 0.5, 1.0)′.
The second example is
Σˆ =

 0.10 0.00 0.900.90 0.10 0.00
0.00 0.90 0.10

 , β =

 0.80.9
1.0


with corresponding
M =

 +0.114 −0.086 +0.972+0.955 +0.114 −0.069
−0.077 +0.962 +0.115

 , Eig (M) =

 1.00−0.33 + 0.90i
−0.33− 0.90i

 .
12More precisely, we sequentially increased the upper bound for β by 1, starting with
upper bound 1, and did 10, 000 random draws per step. We stopped the iterations as soon
as the eigenvalue–conditions were not satisfied in a given step.
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As can be seen, even though the matrix Σˆ is ‘very far’ from a symmetric
ultrametric matrix (and also from a symmetric positive definite matrix), the
power series of the matrix M converges, since the β–vector is ‘small enough’
(and even though M is not positive).13 The resulting convergence path is
illustrated in the right graph of Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Adopted Preference Intensities
Obviously, the results for the unrestricted optimization problem of the ex-
ample above can only be considered an approximation to the results that
would be obtained in the restricted case. But note the following. First,
subject to convergence in the sense of inter–generationally shrinking lengths
of the intervals formed by the minimum and maximum adopted TIs of any
generation, restricting the set of possible DTI–choices would basically be
a binding matter for initial periods only (since ‘closer’ adopted TIs induce
mutually ‘closer’ DTI Nash equilibrium choices). Second, the class of qua-
dratic dis–utility functions obviously features the general properties that we
require from our utility functions, namely single–peakedness, concavity and
zero slopes at the peaks. Thus, the results obtained in the example can not
be expected to be non–generic. It us though still an open issue to extend
these to our general representation.
13The convergence result would not be sustained if one e.g. replaces the β–vector
above with β = (8, 15, 18)′. The resulting eigenvalues would be Eig(M) = (1.00, 1.07 +
1.37i, 1.07− 1.37i)′.
CHAPTER 4
Conclusions
This paper has incorporated a finite population social network structure
into the cultural formation of continuous cultural traits framework of Pichler
[49]. After introduction of the latter, we showed the static and dynamic
properties of the model when parents perceive their adopted trait intensity
as the ‘socialization target’, and when they are free to choose their behavior
subject to an inter–generationally fixed social network.
Thereby, we obtained a behaviorally induced transformation, respec-
tively generalization, of the DeGroot model. This has substantial implica-
tions for the evolution of the underlying continuous trait intensities (and
opinions). Different to the DeGroot model, our framework does in general
allow for the next–period adopted trait intensities to leave the frame that is
constituted by the minimum and maximum of the adopted trait intensities
of the contemporaneous period. However, to obtain a convergence result,
we had to endow the social learning network with sufficient structure. This
structure implies dynamics analogous to that in the DeGroot model. For ad-
dressing the more general convergence types of our model, we are limited by
the insufficient availability of results on the convergence of the left–product
of matrices that are not (in general) row–stochastic — and hope for more
research on this issue in the future.
Despite this sort of analytical restriction, there is however substantial
room for extensions and generalizations of our model. The first is to allow
the parents to influence both their socialization weight, as well as the social
learning network of their children. This is ongoing work of the authors, and
will constitute the future second major part of the present paper. Second,
the dynamic analysis could be extended to different types of what Pichler
[48] called ‘perception rules’ (these determine the parental ‘socialization tar-
gets’). Besides many other open issues in relation to the cultural formation
of continuous traits framework (as discussed in Pichler [49, 48]), we empha-
size that its logic could be fruitfully and straightforwardly extended to the
formation/adoption of traits during the life period of an individual.
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APPENDIX A
1. Proofs
1.1. Proof of Proposition 1.1. First note that since by Assump-
tion 1.4, the target functions of the parental optimization problems (1.2)
are continuous and since the choice sets are compact (Assumption 1.2), a
non–empty set of maximizers, i.e. parental best reply choices, must exist.
Consider below any a ∈ A.
Case φdAa 6= φˆa˜ (Ra): It will be sensible to start the proof of this case
by showing the second part first. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= − sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
. For this
to hold, it would necessarily have to hold that sign
(
φda (·)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
=
− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
together with σˆa (·) > 0. But this can never be sub-
ject to a best reply choice, since e.g. the choice of (the same) φda = φ
d
a (·) to-
gether with a σˆa < σˆa (·) such that sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa, φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= 0
would yield the same ‘own’ utility, but strictly larger inter–generational
utility as well as strictly lower socialization success share cost. Now assume
that sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= 0, for which to hold it would
be necessary that sign
(
φda (·)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
∈
{
0,− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)}
to-
gether with σˆa (·) > 0. In this case, the slope of the inter–generational
utility function is zero, while the slope of the socialization success share
cost function is strictly positive. From this, it follows that there is al-
ways an alternative choice pair where φda = φ
d
a (·) and σˆa < σˆa (·), thus
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa, φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, but for which
it holds that the resulting reduction in the socialization success share cost
strictly dominates the inter–generational utility loss. It thus must hold that
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
.
We will now show the first part of the proof for the present case. Assume,
again by way of contradiction, that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) ∈ [0, 1]. From above, we know that under the present assumption
sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
. It then follows
that there always exists an alternative choice pair where σˆa = σˆa (·), and
where sign
(
φda − φa
)
= sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
but
∣∣φda − φa∣∣ < ∣∣φda (·)− φa∣∣, and
90
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sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa (·) , φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣. Such
a choice yields (a) strictly larger ‘own’ utility, (b) larger inter–generational
utility and (c) less cost of achieving σˆa (·) given (a). Thus, the best replies
must satisfy sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
∈
{
0,− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)}
.
Assume next that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= − sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
and σˆa (·) =
0. But this can not be a best reply since the choice φda = φa and σˆa =
σˆa (·) = 0 would yield (a) strictly larger ‘own’ utility and (b) identical inter–
generational utility and identical socialization success share cost. Hence
sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈
{
(0, 0), (0,+1),
(
− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)}
.
Let us from now on consider the case where a choice pair that satis-
fies the third sign combination of above is available, i.e. the adopted TI
does not coincide with the relevant boundary of φd(X).1 We first rule out
that nevertheless sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
= (0,+1). To see that this can
never be a best reply note that at such a choice, the slope of the ‘own’
utility function is zero. It then follows that there always exists a choice
pair where σˆa = σˆa (·), and where sign
(
φda − φa
)
= − sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa (·) , φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣, such
that the resulting strictly positive gain in inter–generational utility strictly
dominates the combined loss in ‘own’ utility and the increase in the social-
ization success share cost.
Finally, consider the cases where φˆa˜ (Ra) ≥ φa and φ
d
Aa
/∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
or φˆa˜ (Ra) ≤ φa and φ
d
Aa
/∈
(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
.2 It rests to show that in these
cases sign
(
σˆa (·) , φ
d
a (·)− φa
)
= (0, 0) can not be subject to a best reply.3
To see this, note that at such a choice, both the slope of the socializa-
tion success share cost function and the slope of the ‘own’ utility func-
tion are zero. But this then again implies that there always exists an al-
ternative choice where sign
(
φda − φa, σˆa
)
=
(
− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)
,
sign
(
φa˜
(
φda, σˆa, φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= sign
(
φa˜
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φ
d
Aa
)
− φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,
but
∣∣∣φa˜ (φda, σˆa, φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣φa˜ (φda (·) , σˆa (·) , φdAa)− φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣, and
1In the other case, then the best replies satisfy sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈ {(0, 0), (0,+1)}.
To see that if φˆa˜ (Ra) ≥ φa and φ
d
Aa
/∈
(
φa, φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
, or φˆa˜ (Ra) ≤ φa and φ
d
Aa
/∈(
φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa
)
, then the best replies must satisfy the second sign combination follows
basically the same line of argumentation as in the rest of the proof below.
2In the other cases, no further restriction of the signs is possible, so that we have that
sign
(
φda (·)− φa, σˆa (·)
)
∈
{(
− sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
,+1
)
, (0, 0)
}
.
3Except for the special case φdAa = φˆa˜ (Ra) = φa, see below.
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such that the resulting strictly positive gain in inter–generational utility
strictly dominates the combined loss in ‘own’ utility and the increase in the
socialization success share cost.
Case φdAa = φˆa˜ (Ra): These best reply choices yield the maximum pos-
sible net life–time utility.
1.2. Proof of Proposition 1.2. Denote the Lagrangean of the opti-
mization problem (1.2) of an adult a ∈ A as L
(
φda, σˆa
∣∣∣φdAa , φˆa˜ (Ra) , φa, ia),
which we will abbreviate subsequently as L
(
φda, σˆa |·
)
. Any pair of best
replies,
(
φda (·) , σˆa (·)
)
must satisfy the first order conditions. Further, since
we assume that the optimization problem is strictly concave at this best re-
ply choice (so that the determinant of the Hessian matrix is strictly positive),
all conditions for the Implicit Function Theorem are satisfied.
We will now show that ∃ |ba| ∈ R++, such that if
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂|φda−φa| ∂ σˆa
> − |ba|
i.e. the two socialization instruments are ‘not too strong substitutes’ at the
parental best reply choice, then the desired signs of Proposition 1.2 hold.
To do this, we will transform the representation of the comparative stat-
ics matrix of Proposition 1.2 into a representation that involves only the sen-
sitivities of the best reply choices to the relevant parameters. For this, it will
be convenient to distinguish the cases where sign
(
φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
)
= +1/−1,
so that by Proposition 1.1, it generically holds that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
=
−1/+1 (the other, ‘non–generic’, cases are disregarded in Proposition 1.2).
Thus, for the results in the first row of the matrix in Proposition 1.2 to hold,
we require that
sign

 ∂ φda (·)
∂
∣∣∣φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣
∂ φda (·)
∂ ia

 = (−1/+ 1 − 1/+ 1) . (A.1)
Next, note that
∣∣∣φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)
∣∣∣ = sign(φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra))(φdAa − φˆa˜ (Ra)),
so that the entries of the first column of the matrix of Proposition 1.2 could
be decomposed accordingly. It is straightforward to show (by the Implicit
Function Theorem) that
sign
(
∂ φda (·)
∂ φˆa˜ (Ra)
,
∂ σˆa (·)
∂ φˆa˜ (Ra)
)′
= − sign
(
∂ φda (·)
∂ φdAa
,
∂ σˆa (·)
∂ φdAa
)′
and, thus, as far as the signs of the comparative statics are concerned, it is
irrelevant, how a marginal change in the absolute distance between φdAa and
φˆa˜ (Ra) is ‘composed’, and we can restrict our attention to marginal changes
of φdAa only. Thus, for (A.1) to hold, it is necessary that
sign

 ∂ φ
d
a
(·)
∂ φd
Aa
∂ φd
a
(·)
∂ ia
∂ σˆa(·)
∂ φd
Aa
∂ σˆa(·)
∂ ia

 =
(
−1/− 1 −1/+ 1
+1/− 1 +1/+ 1
)
. (A.2)
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We can now use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive a necessary condi-
tion for these signs to hold. First note that since the Lagrangean is strictly
concave at the best reply choice, the second partial derivatives with respect
to the two decision variables are strictly negative, while as the cross second
partial derivative
∂2 L
(
φda (·) , σˆa(·) |·
)
∂ φda ∂ σˆa
=
∂2 v
(
φa˜ (·)
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia)
∂ φ2a˜
σˆa(·)
(
φda (·)− φ
d
Aa
)
+
+
∂ v
(
φa˜ (·)
∣∣∣φˆa˜ (Ra) , ia)
∂ φa˜
−
∂ uφa
(
φda (·)
)
∂ φda
∂2 c
(
σˆa(·), ∂ u
(
φda (·) |φa
))
∂ u (φda (·) |φa ) ∂ σˆa
is ambiguous in sign. It is furthermore straightforward to show that
sign


∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ φd
a
∂ φd
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ φd
a
∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|· )
∂ σˆa ∂ ia

 =
(
−1/− 1 −1/+ 1
+1/− 1 +1/+ 1
)
.
Given these signs, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that (A.2)
is true if
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ σˆa
< / > ba ∈ R++ /R−− where
ba = min /max

∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆ2a
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ φ
d
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆ2a
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda
2
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ φ
d
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ φ
d
Aa
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda
2
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ σˆa ∂ ia
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂ φda ∂ ia


Remembering that sign
(
φda (·)− φa
)
= −1/+1, this condition is equivalent
to requiring that
∂2 L(φda(·),σˆa(·)|·)
∂|φda−φa| ∂ σˆa
> − |ba|. 
1.3. Proof of Proposition 1.3. We will show here that all conditions
to apply the Nash Equilibrium existence results of Rath [53] and Pichler [50]
are satisfied.
First, our player set A = [0, 1] is endowed with Lebesgue measure λ,
and {AJ}
K
J=1 is a measurable partition of A. Second, all players have an
identical compact (and convex) action space φd(X) × [0, 1] ⊂ R2. Further,
∀a ∈ A, P (·, · |Pa ) is defined on
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)K+1
=: Z,4 continuous since
u (· |φa ), v
(
·
∣∣∣φˆa˜(Ra), ia), c and φˆa˜ are continuous,5 and real valued. Since
they are also bounded (as the functions are continuous and defined on a
4This representation is in line with that of Rath [53] and Pichler [50] since they show that
the space where the average strategies of the player subsets can be located in coincides
with the convex hull of the individual action spaces.
5Remember that the latter might depend on the own strategies of the players or on the
average strategies of the player subsets.
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compact set), thus their sup norm is well defined, it follows that P (·, · |Pa ) ∈
UZ , where UZ denotes the set of all real valued continuous functions defined
on Z endowed with sup norm topology.
Now, note that
{Pa}a∈A : A 7→
(
conφd(X)× R+×
(
{a} ∪ A × C0
)
×∆K−1
)A
, 6 (A.3)
where ∆K−1 denotes the K − 1–dimensional unit simplex, and that
{P (·, · |Pa )}a∈A :
(
conφd(X)× R+×
(
{a} ∪ A × C0
)
×∆K−1
)A
7→ (UZ)
A .
It follows that we can (equivalently) represent the parametrized games
(ΓPa)a∈A =
(
A,
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)A
, {P (·, · |Pa )}a∈A
)
as they are denoted in the main text by a function g : A 7→ g(A) ⊂ (UZ)
A.
To see that g is measurable, consider the σ–algebra of Lebesgue measurable
sets of A, L(A), and the σ–algebra generated by g(A), σ (g(A)) (or any other
suitable σ–algebra over g(A)). Now since it must hold that ∀s ∈ σ (g(A))
g−1(s) ∈ L (A) it follows that the function g is Lebesgue–measurable. 
1.4. Proof of Proposition 1.4. First note that all conditions for
Proposition 1.3 to hold are satisfied. Second, let us denote the identical
representative DTI of the general social environment of all children as φdA.
Consider now any period and any {φa, ia}a∈A ∈
(
con φd(X)× R+
)A
.
Let am := {a ∈ A |φa = φ
m } and am := {a ∈ A |φa = φm } (confer Definition
1.3 (a)). Assume that φm−φm > 0 and that λ (A\a
m) > 0 and λ (A\am) > 0
(otherwise, we have the case of a symmetric TI point).
(a) 1. First, we will show that in Nash equilibrium φd
∗
A ∈ [φm, φ
m]. To
see this consider the parental best replies to φdA > φ
m. From Proposition
1.1 (a), it follows that in this case ∀a ∈ A, φda(·) < φ
m. Since in any Nash
equilibrium, almost all adults choose best reply strategies (see Definition
1.2), it follows that φd
∗
A ≤ φ
m must hold. Analogously, φd
∗
A ≥ φm must hold.
For the next step, let us denote with AN the set of adults that choose best
reply strategies in the Nash equilibrium of a given period (where λ
(
AN
)
=
1). Assume that φd
∗
A = φ
m. Again by Proposition 1.1 (a), it then fol-
lows that for every a ∈ am ∩ AN φa˜ (φ
m, 0, φm) = φm, and for every
a′ ∈ AN\am φa˜
(
φd
∗
a′ , σˆ
∗
a, φ
m
)
∈ (φa′ , φ
m). We can conclude that φm <
mina∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
m
)
< maxa∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
m
)
= φm. Analogously,
6Note that the notation in Rath [53] and Pichler [50] would here rather be {Pa}a∈A : A 7→
conφd(X)× R+×
(
{a} ∪ A × C0
)
×∆K−1. However, we will here and subsequently stick
to the notation analogous to the main text of the present paper.
1. PROOFS 95
if φd
∗
A = φm then φm = mina∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φm
)
< maxa∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φm
)
< φm.
Assume next that φd
∗
A ∈ (φm, φ
m). In this case it follows by Propo-
sition 1.1 (a) that for every a ∈ AN such that φa ∈
(
φd
∗
A , φ
m
]
it must
hold that φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
∈
(
φd
∗
A , φa
)
, and for every a ∈ AN such that
φa ∈
[
φm, φ
d∗
A
)
, we have φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
∈
(
φa, φ
d∗
A
)
. It follows that φm <
mina∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
< maxa∈AN φa˜
(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a, φ
d∗
A
)
< φm.
We can conclude that under the conditions of Proposition 1.4 (a), φm ≤
φ˜m < φ˜
m < φm or φm < φ˜m < φ˜
m ≤ φm almost surely.
(b) 1. If additionally the identical oblique socialization weights are
strictly positive for all subsets of adults, then it even holds that in Nash
equilibrium φd
∗
A ∈ (φm, φ
m). To see this consider the parental best replies
to φdA = φ
m. From Proposition 1.1 (a), it follows that in this case ∀a ∈ am,
φda(·) = φ
m and ∀a′ ∈ A\am, φd
a
′ (·) < φm. Since in any Nash equilibrium
almost all adults choose best reply strategies, and since λ (A\am) > 0, it
then follows that φd
∗
A < φ
m must hold. By the same logic, φd
∗
A > φm.
It follows (analogously to before) that φm < φ˜m < φ˜
m < φm almost
surely.
(a+b) 2. Since for any two succeeding periods the TIs (weakly) assim-
ilate almost surely for any tuple of pairs of (first period) TIs and inter–
generational TIs, it follows that for any tuple of initial TIs coupled with any
tuple of inter–generational TIs, the TIs converge to a symmetric TI point.
(a+b) 3. We will finally show that indeed any symmetric TI point is a
steady state. Consider any symmetric TI point and denote the according TI
as φ ∈ con φd(X). Denote the set of adults that have this TI as As, where
λ (As) = 1. We will show first that φd
∗
A = φ. To see this, simply note that
by Proposition 1.1 (a) the best replies to the cases where φdA <> φ must
satisfy that ∀a ∈ As, φda(·) >< φa = φ. Thus, only the case φ
d
A = φ can be
supported by best replies of the adults of As ∩ AN , since λ
(
As ∩AN
)
= 1.
Given φd
∗
A = φ it then follows from Proposition 1.1 (b) that ∀a ∈ A
s ∩ AN ,(
φd
∗
a , σˆ
∗
a
)
= (φ, 0) and φa˜ (φ, 0, φ) = φ. 
APPENDIX B
1. Proofs
Many parts of the proofs below follow straightforwardly from the gen-
eral characteristics of parental best reply choices shown in Proposition 1
in Pichler [49] (these characteristics must also hold for the individual best
reply choices in a SNE). For ease of reference, we replicate this proposi-
tion here, which requires the following additional notation. For any a ∈ A,
we will denote any pair of best reply choices (which are chosen against the
representative DTI and subject to the optimally perceived TI, adopted and
inter–generational TI) as(
φda(t)
(
φdAa(t), φˆa (Ra) , φa(t), ia
)
, σˆa(t)
(
φdAa(t), φˆa (Ra) , φa(t), ia
))
which we will abbreviate below as
(
φda(t) (·) , σˆa(t) (·)
)
. Furthermore, the
resulting best reply location of the adult child’s adopted TI will be denoted
φa(t+ 1)
(
φda(t) (·) , σˆa(t) (·) , φ
d
Aa
(t)
)
.
Proposition B.1 (Characterization of Best Replies). Let Assumptions
2.1–1.3 hold. Then, ∀t ∈ N, ∀a ∈ A, if
(a) φdAa(t) 6= φˆa (Ra), it holds generically that sign
(
φda(t) (·)− φa(t)
)
=
− sign
(
φdAa(t)− φˆa (Ra)
)
and σˆa(t) (·) > 0, while it always holds that
sign
(
φa(t+ 1)
(
φda(t) (·) , σˆa(t) (·) , φ
d
Aa
(t)
)
− φˆa (Ra)
)
=
sign
(
φdAa(t)− φˆa (Ra)
)
.1
(b) φdAa(t) = φˆa (Ra), it holds that φ
d
a(t) (·)−φa(t) = 0 and σˆa (·) = 0, hence
φa(t+ 1)
(
φa(t), 0, φˆa (Ra)
)
− φˆa (Ra) = 0.
Proof. Confer the proof of Proposition 1 in Pichler [49].
1.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1. First note that the sets of maxi-
mizers of the best reply problems (1.2) are nonempty and single–valued
by the Weierstrass Theorem (the choice sets are compact and the target
functions of the best reply problems are continuous) and strict concav-
ity. Denote φdA(t) = φ
d
A(t)
(
φdL(t), φ
d
H(t)
)
= (1 − qH)φ
d
L(t) + qHφ
d
H(t), and
σˆG(t) :=
1
qG
∫
g∈G σˆg(t) dλ(g), G = L,H (the average socialization success
96
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shares of the groups). Let us now represent the parental best reply problems
as those of choosing best replies against the tuple
{
φdG(t), σˆG(t)
}
G=L,H
∈(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
.2 Then, if in the given period t ∈ N, the adopted TIs of
the adults of the same group are identical, then the (unique) best reply pairs
against such a tuple are identical for all adults of the same group. We will
denote these identical pairs of best replies as{
φdG(t)
({
φdG′(t), σˆG′(t)
}
G′=L,H
)
, σˆG(t)
({
φdG′(t), σˆG′(t)
}
G′=L,H
)}
G=L,H
∈
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
.
We thus obtained a continuous function (upper hemicontinuity follows by
Berge’s Theorem of the Maximum, which implies continuity since the best
reply pairs are single valued) from a compact and convex set into itself,(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
7→
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
. Thus, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point The-
orem, a fixed point where for every G = L,H(
φdG(t)
({
φdG′(t), σˆG′(t)
}
G′=L,H
)
, σˆG(t)
({
φdG′(t), σˆG′(t)
}
G′=L,H
))
=
(
φdG(t), σˆG(t)
)
exists. This constitutes a SNE.
Now, since in the initial period, the adopted TIs of the members of the
same cultural group are assumed to be identical, a SNE exists in the initial
period. If all parents choose the SNE strategies, it follows immediately that
all children of the same cultural group adopt the same TIs (using the SNE
strategies for substitution in the TI formation rule (1.1)), i.e. the adults of
the same cultural group have identical adopted TIs in the second period.
Applying this process iteratedly, it follows that a path of SNEs exists.
1.2. Proof of Proposition 2.2. That Proposition 2.2 holds follows
as an immediate consequence of the Lemma below. This shows the range
of the phase vectors, (∆φL(t),∆φH(t)), where ∆φG(t) := φG(t + 1) −
φG(t), G = L,H, depicted in Figure 2.1. Notably, these results hold
∀
{
φd
∗
G (t), σˆ
∗
G (t)
}
G=L,H
∈ E(P (t)).
Lemma B.1 (Phase Vectors).
(a) If φH(t) ≥ eH and φH(t) ≥ φL(t) then ∆φH(t) < 0; and if φL(t) ≤ eL
and φL(t) ≤ φH(t) then ∆φL(t) > 0.
(b) If φL(t) ≥ φH(t) ≥ eH then ∆φL(t) < 0; and if eL ≥ φL(t) ≥ φH(t)
then ∆φH(t) > 0.
2The parental best reply problems are actually independent of the average socialization
success shares (thus, effectively ‘constant’ with respect to these).
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(c) If φL(t) ≥ eL, φL(t) ≥ φH(t) and φH(t) ≤ eH then ∆φH(t) > ∆φL(t).
Proof. Before we start this proof, note that in the notation of the
SNE quantities below, their dependence on P (t) is not indicated for brevity.
Also, we will denote with φdG(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
the identical (and unique) best reply
choices to the location of the average (SNE–)DTI of any individual member
of the cultural groups G ∈ {L,H} (again, the dependence on other param-
eters is not indicated). Note also that the indication (PB.1) will indicate
that all claims that follow directly from Proposition B.1.
(a) Let φH(t) ≥ eH and φH(t) ≥ φL(t). Then φ
d∗
A (t) < φH(t), thus
∆φH(t) < 0 (PB.1). Suppose, by ways of contradiction, that φ
d∗
A (t) ≥ φH(t).
In this case, φdH(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤ φH(t) (PB.1). Furthermore, φ
d
L(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤
φL(t) if φL(t) is larger than the lower bound of φ
d(X); and if φL(t) equals
that lower bound, then φH(t) > φ
d
L(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
= φL(t) (PB.1). This con-
tradicts φd
∗
A (t) ≥ φH(t) being supported by best reply choices.
The proof for the ‘opposite’ case of φL(t) ≤ eL and φL(t) ≤ φH(t) is
analogous.
(b) Let φL(t) ≥ φH(t) ≥ eH . Then φ
d∗
A (t) < φL(t), thus ∆φL(t) < 0
(PB.1). Suppose, again by ways of contradiction, that φd
∗
A (t) ≥ φL(t). In
this case, φdL(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
< φL(t) and φ
d
H(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤ φH(t) (PB.1). This
yields a contradiction again.
The proof for the ‘opposite’ case of eL ≥ φL(t) ≥ φH(t) is again analo-
gous.
(c) Let φL(t) ≥ eL, φL(t) ≥ φH(t) and φH(t) ≤ eH (note that at least
one inequality must be strict). Then, if φd
∗
A (t) ∈ [φH(t), φL(t)] it follows
immediately that ∆φH(t) ≥ 0 ≥ ∆φL(t), with at least one inequality strict
(PB.1). The case φd
∗
A (t) /∈ [φH(t), φL(t)] can only be supported by best re-
ply choices if φd
∗
L (t) < φ
d∗
A (t) < φ
d∗
H (t). This must be true since by (PB.1)
if φd
∗
A (t) < φH(t), then φ
d
H(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≥ φH(t); and if φ
d∗
A (t) > φL(t),
then φdL(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤ φL(t). Thus, φH(t + 1) > φL(t + 1) ⇒ ∆φH(t) >
∆φL(t). 
1.3. Proof of Proposition 2.3. First, we show that φd
∗
A (t) ∈ (eL, eH).
Suppose, by ways of contradiction, that φd
∗
A (t) ≥ eH . But then, φ
d
H(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤
φH(t) while φ
d
L(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
< φL(t). This contradicts φ
d∗
A (t) ≥ φH(t) being
supported by best reply choices. The analogous logic yields a contradiction
for the case of φd
∗
A (t) ≤ φL(t). Thus, by Proposition B.1, φ
d
H(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≥
φH(t), and φ
d
L(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤ φL(t). We show next that the inequalities
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must be strict. To see this, simply note that if φd
∗
A (t) < φH(t), then
φdH(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
> φH(t), while if φ
d∗
A (t) ≥ φH(t), then this can only hold
if φd
∗
H (t) > φH(t). The analogous logic yields the result that φ
d∗
L (t) <
φL(t). 
1.4. Proof of Proposition 2.4. Consider the case φH(t) > φL(t).
The first step of this proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 2 — only
that we replace the compact and convex set
(
φd(X)× [0, 1]
)2
by the set{
φdL(t) ∈ φ
d(X)
∣∣∣φdL(t) ≤ φL(t)}×{φdH(t) ∈ φd(X) ∣∣∣φdH(t) ≥ φH(t)}×[0, 1]2,
i.e. we show that a SNE must exist in this set. To see that a mapping from
this set into itself can be constructed (with the same properties as in the
proof of Proposition 2), assume that φdH(t) ≥ φH(t) > φL(t) ≥ φ
d
L(t), in
which case φdA(t) ∈
(
φdL(t), φ
d
H(t)
)
. From Proposition B.1 we know that the
best replies must then satisfy φdH(t)
({
φdG(t), σˆG(t)
}
G=L,H
)
≥ φH(t) and
φdL(t)
({
φdG(t), σˆG(t)
}
G=L,H
)
≤ φL(t) (given the present specification of the
perception rules).
From Proposition B.1, we know additionally that, under the conditions
above, whenever φH(t)/φL(t) is strictly smaller/larger than the upper/lower
bound of the set of possible DTIs, then the latter equalities must be strict (so
that these property must also hold in a SNE). That these SNE DTI choices
can only be coupled with σˆ∗G(t) > 0 and σˆ
∗
G(t) < 1 holds immediately by
Proposition B.1 (in the latter case since otherwise the adopted TIs of all
children would coincide with the parents’ optimal TIs). This finalizes the
proof of part (a) of Proposition 2.4, since the proof for the case φH(t) < φL(t)
is analogous.
To see part (b) simply note that if φH(t) = φL(t) = φ, then it must
hold that
(
φdG(t)
(
{φ, σˆG′(t)}G′=L,H
)
, σˆG(t)
(
{φ, σˆG′(t)}G′=L,H
))
= (φ, 0),
∀G = L,H. 
1.5. Proof of Proposition 2.5. Using the linearization of the phase
vectors at any steady state where (φL, φH) = (φ, φ), φ ∈ φ
d(X), subject
to any (iL, iH , qH) ∈ R
2
+×(0, 1) (we will drop these parameters below for
brevity), it follows that locally around such a steady state(
∆φL (φL, φH)
∆φH (φL, φH)
)
=
(
∂∆φL(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂∆φL(φ,φ)
∂ φH
∂∆φH(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂∆φH(φ,φ)
∂ φH
)(
φL − φ
φH − φ
)
.
Remember that we consider only relative position preserving SNE choices,
which by Proposition 2.4 (b) implies that φd
∗
L (φ, φ) = φ
d∗
H (φ, φ) = φ and
σˆ∗G(φ, φ) = 0, G = L,H. From equation (2.3), it follows that we obtain for
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G = L,H
∂ φ˙G (φ, φ)
∂ φG
=
∂ φd
∗
G (φ, φ)
∂ φG
−
(
∂ φd
∗
G (φ, φ)
∂ φG
−
∂ φd
∗
−G (φ, φ)
∂ φG
)
(1− qG)− 1
∂ φ˙G (φ, φ)
∂ φ−G
=
∂ φd
∗
G (φ, φ)
∂ φ−G
−
(
∂ φd
∗
G (φ, φ)
∂ φ−G
−
∂ φd
∗
−G (φ, φ)
∂ φ−G
)
(1− qG).
To obtain the necessary partial derivatives above, we will use the Implicit
Function Theorem as follows. First, the sets of SNE are implicitly described
by a system of four equations obtained by setting
(
φdg, σˆg
)
=
(
φdG, σˆG
)
,
G = L,H, in any of the (identical) individual first order conditions of the
best reply problems (1.2) of the parents of both groups. To relate this system
of equations to the originating FOCs of the individual parents, we denote
it
(
L
φdL
L (φL, φH) ,L
σˆL
L (φL, φH) ,L
φdH
H (φL, φH) ,L
σˆH
H (φL, φH)
)′
= (0, 0, 0, 0)′
(i.e. the first equation results from the partial derivative of the Lagrangeans
of the parents of group L with respect to their DTI choice, etc.). Remem-
bering that both utility functions have zero slopes at their peaks (and at
any of the steady states we consider, the children’s adopted TIs do indeed
coincide with the optimal TIs), we obtain at any (φ, φ) ∈ φd(X)2

∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
L
∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆL
∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
H
∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆH
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
L
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆL
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
H
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆH
∂ L
φdL
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
L
∂ L
φdL
H
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆL
∂ L
φdL
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
H
∂ L
φdL
H
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆH
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
L
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆL
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φd
H
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ σˆH


= diag


∂2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
L
2
−∂
2 c(0)
∂ σˆ2
L
∂2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
H
2
−∂
2 c(0)
∂ σˆ2
H


By the strict concavity of the own utility functions and the strict convexity
of the cost function, it follows that the determinant of the latter matrix is
strictly positive, and finally all conditions to apply the Implicit Function
Theorem are satisfied. To do so, we have to use

∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂ L
φdL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φH
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂ L
σˆL
L
(φ,φ)
∂ φH
∂ L
φdH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂ L
φdH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φH
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φL
∂ L
σˆH
H
(φ,φ)
∂ φH


=


∂2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
L
∂ φL
0
0 0
0 ∂
2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
H
∂ φH
0 0


Noting that for G = L,H, ∂
2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
G
∂ φG
= −∂
2 u(φ|φ )
∂ φd
G
2 , it follows from the Implicit
Function Theorem results that for G = L,H,
∂ φd
∗
G (φ,φ)
∂ φG
= 1 and
∂ φd
∗
G (φ,φ)
∂ φ−G
=
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0, so that(
∆φL (φL, φH)
∆φH (φL, φH)
)
=
(
−qH qH
1− qH qH − 1
)(
φL − φ
φH − φ
)
=
(
−qH
1− qH
)
(φL−φH).
Thus, locally around any point (φ, φ) ∈ φd(X)2, ∆φL (φL, φH)−∆φH (φL, φH) =
−(φL − φH), and there is an infinite speed of convergence to a(nother)
steady state (φ′, φ′) ∈ φd(X)2.3 In particular, this implies that for ev-
ery (iL, iH , qH) ∈ R
2
+×(0, 1) ∃∆(iL, iH , qH) ∈
(
0, | conφd(X)|
]
such that
∀0 < ∆φ(t) < ∆(iL, iH , qH), ∆
φ(t+ 1) < ∆φ(t). 
1.6. Proof of Proposition 2.6. This proof will be based on the con-
struction of sufficient properties of a SNE selection function in order to
guarantee convergence. To discuss these properties, we will focus our atten-
tion to the upper triangle of the state space (i.e. where φH ≥ φL). Note also
that our dynamical system is time–autonomous, and we will drop the time–
indexes. Furthermore, we consider below any (iL, iH , qH) ∈ R
2
+×(0, 1), but
will also drop these parameters for brevity.
Consider a point where the adopted TI of the members of group L
coincides with the lower bound of φd(X) =
[
φ, φ
]
. Denote this
(
φ, φ1H
)
, with
φ1H > φ. We know that at any such point φ
d∗
L
(
φ, φ1H
)
= φ, and the lower DTI
constraint is binding for the parents of group L. Then, there exists a SNE
selection function for which it holds that there is a non–empty and right–
open interval
[(
φ, φ1H
)
,
(
φ1L, φ
1
H
))
, where φ1L > φ, such that (a) the lower
DTI constraint stays binding for L; as well as that (b) for all points
(
φL, φ
1
H
)
in this interval, φd
∗
H
(
φL, φ
1
H
)
= φd
∗
H
(
φ, φ1H
)
and σˆ∗H
(
φL, φ
1
H
)
= σˆ∗H
(
φ, φ1H
)
.
Extending this sort of normalization to any point where φL = φ (and
which is not located on the main diagonal of the state space where φL = φH),
we obtain a continuum of right–open intervals on any of which it holds that
φ˙H (φL, φH) is constant.
Analogously, consider a point where φH = φ, and denote this point(
φ2L, φ
)
, with φ2L < φ. We know that at this point φ
d∗
H
(
φ2L, φ
)
= φ, and the
upper DTI constraint is binding for the parents of group H. Then, there
exists a SNE selection function for which it holds that there is a non–empty
and left–open interval
((
φ2L, φ
2
H
)
,
(
φ2L, φ
)]
, where φ2H < φ, such that (a) the
upper DTI constraint stays binding for H; as well as that (b) for all points(
φ2L, φH
)
in this interval, φd
∗
L
(
φ2L, φH
)
= φd
∗
L
(
φ2L, φ
)
and σˆ∗L
(
φ2L, φH
)
=
σˆ∗L
(
φ2L, φ
)
.
3This infinite speed of convergence is due to the fact that locally around any steady state
(φ, φ), the adopted TIs of the children of both groups will only marginally deviate from
the optimal TI. Since parents perceive zero disutility in such a case, they will not engage
in active socialization. Thus, all children of the society adopt the society’s average DTI,
φdA (φL, φH) = φLqH + φH(1− qH).
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Extending this sort of normalization to any point where φH = φ (and
which is not located on the main diagonal), we obtain a continuum of left–
open intervals on any of which it holds that φ˙L (φL, φH) is constant.
Consider now any pair of points that consists of a right–boundary point
of the first type of intervals and a left–boundary point of the second type of
intervals, which satisfies the following conditions: (a) At the first of these
points, the upper DTI constraint is not binding for group H, and at the
second of these points, the lower DTI constraint is not binding for group
L (but the DTI–choices coincide with the upper bound, respectively lower
bound of φd(X)), and (b) these two points are connected through a 45 ◦–
line–segment (in state space).
We will now impose a normalization on the SNE selection on these sorts
of 45 ◦–line–segments. To introduce this, the following definition will be
useful.
Definition B.1 (State–corrected SNE Choices). ∀ (φL, φH) ∈ conφ
d(X)2,
denote the tuple {
φd
∗
G (φL, φH)− φG, σˆ
∗
G (φL, φH)
}
G∈{L,H}
as state–corrected SNE choices.
We will now indeed require the SNE selection function to select identical
state–corrected SNE choices for every point on any of the above constructed
45 ◦–line–segments. Thus for all points on such 45 ◦–line–segments, both
φ˙L (φL, φH) and φ˙H (φL, φH) are constant (i.e. the 45
◦–line–segments are
isoclines).
We can now give the following summarizing characterization of the phase
vectors in the upper triangle of the state space. First, the main diagonal
consists of a continuum of steady states (Proposition 2.4 (b)). This is neigh-
bored by a continuum of line–segments consisting of a connection of (a) a
horizontal line in state space where φ˙H (φL, φH) is constant, with (b) a
45 ◦–isocline (which is eventually constituted by a single point), with (c) a
vertical line where φ˙L (φL, φH) is constant.
4 Notably, by construction, on all
45 ◦–isoclines φ˙L (φL, φH) is identical to that of the connected vertical lines;
and φ˙H (φL, φH) is identical to that of the connected horizontal lines.
4Eventually, these line–segments ‘melt down’ in a point (φm, φ
m) where(
φd
∗
L (φm, φ
m) ,
(
φd
∗
H (φm, φ
m)
))
=
(
φ, φ
)
, but where both DTI constraints are not
binding. Generically, the vertical and horizontal lines connected to this point would
constitute the borders of a rectangle in which it holds that the lower DTI constraint is
binding for group L and the upper DTI constraint is binding for group H. This rectangle
would thus be made of a continuum of horizontal lines with constant φ˙H (φL, φH) and a
continuum of vertical lines with constant φ˙L (φL, φH).
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We will show next that the connected line–segments can never be crossed
twice by a (TI–)trajectory. To do so, we will consider the case where a
trajectory crosses a connected line–segment from ‘above’ (respectively from
the ‘left’) — the case for a crossing from ‘below’ (respectively from the
‘right’) can be shown analogously. Obviously, no trajectory can cross any of
the three individual line–segments both from above and below.
Assume that a trajectory crosses a horizontal line–segment from above.
Now, any point on the (closure of) the horizontal line has strictly lower φL
and φH than any point on the connected (left–open) 45
◦–isocline and the
connected vertical line. This implies that, for the trajectory to ‘reach’ these
segments, it must (‘initially’) cross from above (respectively from the left)
a continuum of connected line–segments on which φ˙L (φL, φH) ≥ 0 on the
45 ◦–isocline and the connected vertical line. Now, these would have to be
crossed again from below (respectively from the right) by the trajectory in
order to actually ‘return’ to the original connected line–segment. But this
is obviously impossible. By the analogous logic, a trajectory that crosses a
45 ◦–isocline or a vertical line segment from above (respectively from the left)
can not also cross the same connected line segment from below (respectively
from the right).
Under this property, no cycles can exist in the upper triangle of the state
space and any trajectory must end up in a steady state therein. Extending
these properties (respectively the normalizations on the SNE selection func-
tion) to the lower triangle of the state space in an analogous way, we obtain
the convergence property for the whole state space. 
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iH
iL 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
2.0 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.8 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.6 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.4 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.2 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.0 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
0.8 •◦◦ •◦• •◦• •◦• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
0.6 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• •••
0.4 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.2 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
iH
iL 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
2.0 •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.8 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.6 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.4 •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.2 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
1.0 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
0.8 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• •••
0.6 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.4 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.2 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
iH
iL 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
2.0 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• ••• ••• •••
1.8 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ ••• •••
1.6 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
1.4 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
1.2 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
1.0 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.8 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.6 •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.4 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
0.2 •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦• •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦ •◦◦
1st/2nd/3rd entry: Convergence/Uniqueness/Stability Yes/No: •/◦
Figure B.1. Dynamics Statistics for qH = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
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2. Evolution under Imperfect Empathy
The central property of the evolution under global ‘imperfect empathy’
(respectively the first type of perception rule) is that if the oblique social-
ization is unbiased, then the TIs of (almost) all adults converge to the same
point (confer Proposition 4 in Pichler [49]). Since in the present paper, we
have assumed unbiased oblique socialization, this result must thus hold.
It rests to show the characterization of the SNE choices for the two
cultural groups case under global imperfect empathy.
Proposition B.2 (Characterization of SNE choices). Let Assumptions
2.1–1.4 hold. Then, the following properties are satisfied ∀{iL, iH , qH} ∈
(R++ \{∞})
2 × (0, 1), and ∀
{
φd
∗
G (t), σˆ
∗
G (t)
}
G=L,H
∈ E(P (t)).
1. Case φH(t) <> φL(t)
(a) φd
∗
H (t) <> φH(t) <> φH(t+ 1) <> φL(t+ 1) <> φL(t) <> φ
d∗
L (t)
5,
and
(b) σˆ∗G(t) ∈ (0, 1), ∀G ∈ {L,H}.
2. Case φH(t) = φL(t)
(a) φd
∗
G (t) = φG(t) = φG(t+ 1), ∀G ∈ {L,H}, and
(b) σˆ∗G(t) = 0, ∀G ∈ {L,H}.
Proof. Let φH(t) > φL(t). By Proposition B.1, it suffices to show that
φd
∗
A (t) ∈ (φL(t), φH(t)) (for all elements in the set of SNEs). Assume, by
ways of contradiction, that φd
∗
A (t) ≥ φH(t). In this case φH(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≤
φH(t) while even φL(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
< φH(t). This yields a contradiction. Anal-
ogously, we obtain a contradiction for φd
∗
A (t) ≤ φL(t). Also, the proof for
the case φH(t) > φL(t) is analogous.
Let φH(t) = φL(t), and assume that φ
d∗
A (t) <> φH(t) = φL(t). But then,
φG(t)
(
φd
∗
A (t)
)
≥≤ φH(t) = φL(t), ∀G ∈ {L,H}, which yields a contradiction
again. 
By the results of Proposition B.2, the cultural groups strictly assimilate
inter–generationally and hence the TIs of the groups converge to the same
point (confirming the result of Pichler [49]). This result can be interpreted
to correspond to the ‘melting pot’ theory of assimilation of cultural groups
(see e.g. Han [33]).
5Again, the outer inequalities would be strict if the respective adopted TI would coincide
with the relevant boundary of conφd(X). But this can only be the case in the initial
period, given the results of the present Proposition.
APPENDIX C
1. Proofs
1.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2. From equation (3.1), it follows that
∀i ∈ N , φi(t+1) are concave in φ
d
i (t), thus also all v (φi(t+ 1) |βi, φi(t)) are
concave in φdi (t) (by Assumption 3.5). This implies that the target functions
of the best reply problems of all parents are concave (and continuous). Since
also the DTI choice set is compact and convex, a non–empty, upper hemi-
continuous and convex set of DTI best replies exists for any parent (Berge’s
Theorem of the Maximum). Thus, a fixed point, i.e. a Nash equilibrium,
exists (Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem). 
1.2. Proof of Proposition 3.3. (a) That in any steady state, parents
choose their adopted TI as DTI is directly implied by Proposition 3.1 (c).
(b) Given (a), it follows that the set of steady states given Σˆ coincides with
the set
{
Φ ∈ φd(X)n
∣∣∣ΣˆΦ = Φ}. Hence, it is immediate that if the TIs of all
members of an essential communication class are identical, then ΣˆLΦL = ΦL,
where ΣˆL is the restriction of Σˆ to some essential communication class L,
and ΦL is its vector of adopted TIs. We proceed by showing that steady
state TIs cannot differ within an essential communication class. To show a
contradiction, suppose that for an essential communication class L ∈ P(Σˆ),
|L| ≥ 2, there exists i, j ∈ L with φi 6= φj . Denote by φ¯L := max{φi|i ∈ L}
the maximal TI in communication class L. Since L is a communication class
it follows that there exists an i ∈ {l ∈ L : φl = φ¯L} and a j ∈ {l ∈ L|φl 6= φ¯L}
such that σˆij > 0. Moreover, due to maximality of φ¯L and the fact that L
is essential, σˆik = 0 for all k ∈ N with φk > φ¯L. Thus, ΣˆiΦL 6= φi implying
that this cannot be a steady state.
(c) This is also straightforward. Suppose that for some inessential communi-
cation class I ∈ P(Σˆ) with connections to other dynasties J := {j ∈ N |i→
j, i ∈ I} the set of TIs ΦI is not included in conv(φj |j ∈ J). W.l.o.g.
we have φ¯I := max{φi|i ∈ I} > max{φj |j ∈ J}. Since I is a communica-
tion class and is inessential, with all outside connections being to dynasties
with TIs strictly less than φ¯I , we get (similarly to (b)) for some dynasty
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k ∈ {i ∈ I|φi = φ¯I} that there exists j ∈ N and φj < φ¯I such that σˆkj > 0.
Again, due to maximality of φ¯I and all other connections being to dynas-
ties with TIs strictly less than φ¯I , we get that ΣˆkΦI 6= φk, implying that
this cannot be a steady state. Hence, all TIs of the dynasties in inessential
communication classes I ∈ P(Σˆ) are convex combinations of the TIs of the
communication classes J ∈ P (Σˆ) such that I → J .
1.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4. This proof is organized in three essen-
tial steps. In the first step, we will show that if Σˆ is symmetric ultrametric,
then M(t) is row stochastic for every t ∈ N. In the second step we will show
that subject to any β ∈ Rn+ it holds that for every i, j ∈ N with σˆij > 0
there exists a δij > 0 such that for every t ∈ N, mij(t) ≥ δij . We use these
results to show in the third step that the backward accumulation matrices
are type symmetric and have a strictly positive diagonal. This allows us to
apply Theorem 2 of Lorenz [40] to conclude that the desired convergence
result holds. For the first step, we also need the following.
Lemma C.1 (Unit Eigenvectors). Let Σˆ be positive definite. Then, ∀x ∈
R
n, ∀t ∈ N, M(t)x = x iff Σˆx = x (i.e. x is a unit–eigenvector of M(t) if
and only if x is a unit–eigenvector of Σˆ).
Proof. Note that
M(t) = Σˆ
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
(I +B(t)) =
(
Σˆ−1 +B(t)
)−1
(I +B(t)).
That the latter representation is well defined if Σˆ is positive definite follows
since Σˆ is then invertible and also its inverse is positive definite. Thus, also
Σˆ−1 + B(t) is positive definite and invertible. Given this, both the ‘if’ and
the ‘only if’ direction of the proof can be directly seen from the following
sequence of transformations: Σˆx = x ⇔ x = Σˆ−1x ⇔ (B(t) + I)x =
(B(t) + Σˆ−1)x⇔M(t)x = (B(t) + Σˆ−1)−1(B(t) + I)x = x. 
1. In the first step of the (main) proof, we show that if Σˆ is symmetric
ultrametric, then M(t) is row stochastic for every t ∈ N. To do so, note
first that since Σˆ is symmetric ultrametric, it is also positive definite (see
below). Hence, by Lemma C.1 (and setting x = (1, 1, ..., 1)′) the row entries
of M(t) = [mij(t)] sum up to one since the same holds for Σˆ. Thus, M(t)
is row stochastic if and only if M(t) is positive (that is M(t) ≥ 0). Now,
since I + B(t) is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive entries, M(t) =
Σˆ
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
(I +B(t)) is positive if and only if
Σˆ
(
I +B(t)Σˆ
)−1
=
(
Σˆ−1 +B(t)
)−1
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is positive (that this representation is well defined if Σˆ is positive definite
has been discussed in the proof of Lemma C.1). In other words, we have to
check whether Σˆ−1 +B(t) is inverse–positive.
Now, since Σˆ is symmetric ultrametric, it follows that its inverse is a
diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix (see Nabben and Varga [43, 44], Mar-
tinez et al. [42]), i.e. a real symmetric positive definite matrix with positive
diagonal and negative off-diagonal entries. Thus, also Σˆ−1 +B(t) is a diag-
onally dominant Stieltjes matrix. In particular, it is an M–matrix, the class
of which is inverse–positive (on this issue, see e.g. Fujimoto and Ranade
[26]). Hence, M(t) is positive.
2. In the second step we show that subject to any β ∈ Rn+ it holds that
for every i, j ∈ N with σˆij > 0 there exists a δij > 0 such that for ev-
ery t ∈ N, mij(t) ≥ δij . Again, since I + B(t) is a diagonal matrix
with strictly positive entries, we can restrict our attention to the matrix(
Σˆ−1 +B(t)
)−1
=: B¯(t) =
[
b¯ij(t)
]
. Now, consider any i, j ∈ N such that
σˆij > 0. Since B¯(t) is positive, it follows that sign
(
b¯ij(t)
)
∈ {0, sign (σˆij)}.
Let us rule out the case sign
(
b¯ij(t)
)
= 0. To do so, let us compare
b¯ij(t) = (−1)
i+j
∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣
ij∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣ vs. (−1)
i+j
∣∣∣Σˆ−1∣∣∣
ij∣∣∣Σˆ−1∣∣∣ = σˆij
where |A|ij denotes the determinant of the ij adjoint matrix of a square
matrix A. Note next that since Σˆ is symmetric positive definite, the same
holds for its inverse and Σˆ−1+B(t). It follows that the determinants of the
matrices Σˆ−1 and Σˆ−1 + B(t) are strictly positive. Hence, it rests to show
that sign
(∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣
ij
)
= sign
(∣∣∣Σˆ−1∣∣∣
ij
)
6= 0.
To show this, note that for all i, j ∈ N ,
∣∣∣Σˆ−1 + diag (e∗1(t), . . . , e∗n(t))∣∣∣
ij
is linear in every individual element of {e∗1(t), . . . , e
∗
n(t)} (to verify this most
easily, consider the Leibniz formula). In the following, let abs(·) denote the
absolute value of a real number. It is then immediate that for all k ∈ N
∂ abs
(∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣
ij
)
∂ e∗k(t)
≥ 0
since in the other case, the sign of
∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣
ij
would switch compared to
the sign of
∣∣∣Σˆ−1∣∣∣
ij
for e∗k(t) large enough. But this is ruled out since Σˆ
−1 +
diag (x1, . . . , xn) is an M-Matrix for arbitrary (x1, . . . , xn)
′ ∈ Rn+ and hence(
Σˆ−1 + diag (x1, . . . , xn)
)−1
is positive for arbitrary (x1, . . . , xn)
′ ∈ Rn+.
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Hence, sign
(∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣
ij
)
= sign
(∣∣∣Σˆ−1∣∣∣
ij
)
, so that 0 6= sign
(
b¯ij(t)
)
=
sign (σˆij) = +1.
Note next that the image–space of E is bounded. This follows by con-
tinuity of E and the fact that if φ(t) − φ∗(t + 1) = 0 then e∗ = 0, see
Corollary 3.1. Moreover, E
(
Φd(X)n, Σˆ, β
)
is closed since E is continu-
ous in Φd and Φd(X)n is closed. Since (e∗1(t), . . . , e
∗
n(t))
′ is thus bounded
above and hence
∣∣∣Σˆ−1 +B(t)∣∣∣ is bounded above, it finally follows that
0 6= sign (mij(t)) = sign (σˆij) = +1. Next, interpret our matrices M(t)
as functions of the elements e ∈ E
(
Φd(X)n, Σˆ, β
)
, M(e) ∈ S(n), and note
that the set
{
M(e)
∣∣∣e ∈ E (Φd(X)n, Σˆ, β)} is compact. Thus, we can define
min
e∈E(Φd(X)n,Σˆ,β)mij(e) =: δij > 0, for every i, j ∈ N such that σˆij > 0.
It follows that for all i, j ∈ N such that σˆij > 0 and for all β ∈ R
n
+ there
exists a δ > 0 such that for all mij(t) ≥ δ, ∀t ∈ N.
3. In the last step, we show that given the above, the left product of the
matrices M(t)M(t− 1) . . .M(0) converges such that the adopted TIs of all
dynasties of a connected subset are identical (respectively, the communica-
tion classes in P(Σˆ) reach a consensus). Note that all communication classes
of Σˆ are essential by symmetry of Σˆ. By the definition of P
(
Σˆ
)
we have
that for all L ∈ P
(
Σˆ
)
and for all i, j ∈ L there exists a k ∈ {0, ..., |L|} such
that Σˆkij > 0. Note that P
(
Σˆ
)
= P(M(t)) for all t ∈ N since σˆij > 0 implies
mij(t) ≥ δ for all t ∈ N as shown above and, since every communication
class of Σˆ is essential, mij(t) = 0 if j /∈ PΣˆ(i).
1 Hence, for all L ∈ P
(
Σˆ
)
and for all i, j ∈ L there exists a k ∈ {0, ..., |L|} such that M(t+ k, t)ij > 0
for all t ∈ N.2
Now, consider a sequence of time steps (ts)s∈N such that t0 = 0 and
ts+1 = ts + L¯, where L¯ := max{|L| : L ∈ P (M)}, and consider the sequence
of accumulations
(
M(ts+1, ts)
)
s∈N
. By the rules of matrix multiplication,
we get that for any two A,B ∈ S(n) with a positive diagonal, (AB)ij > 0
if and only if Aij > 0 or Bij > 0. Hence, for any L ∈ P
(
Σˆ
)
and for all
i, j ∈ L, M(t+ |L|, t)ij > 0 for all t ∈ N since M(t) is row stochastic with a
positive diagonal. Moreover, M(t+ |L|, t)ij = 0 if j /∈ PΣˆ(i) since P
(
Σˆ
)
=
P(M(t)) for all t ∈ N. Thus, for the accumulations M(ts+1, ts) it holds
1Recall, PΣˆ(i) ⊆ N is such that PΣˆ(i) ∈ P
(
Σˆ
)
and i ∈ PΣˆ(i) (the element of the partition
P
(
Σˆ
)
which i belongs to).
2Recall that M(t′, t) denotes the accumulation M(t′, t) =M(t′)M(t′ − 1) . . .M(t).
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that M(ts+1, ts)ij > 0 if and only if j ∈ PΣˆ(i). In particular, M(ts+1, ts) is
type-symmetric for all s ∈ N.
For a non-negative matrix A let min+(A) denote the lowest positive
entry of A. We have shown above that there exists a δ > 0 such that σˆij > 0
implies mij(t) ≥ δ for all t ∈ N. Note that for any i, j ∈ L ∈ P
(
Σˆ
)
there
exists a k ≤ |L| and a sequence of dynasties (il)0≤l≤k with i0 = i and ik = j
such that σˆil,il+1 > 0, implyingM(t+k, t)ij ≥
∏k−1
l=0 mil,il+1(t+l) ≥ δ
k. Thus,
for the accumulationsM(ts+1, ts) it holds thatM(ts+1, ts)ij ≥ δ
ts+1−ts if j ∈
PΣˆ(i) and M(ts+1, ts)ij = 0 else. Hence, min
+
(
M(ts+1, ts)
)
≥ δts+1−ts =
δ|L¯|.
In summary, we have shown that the backward accumulation matri-
ces
(
M(ts+1, ts)
)
s∈N
have a uniform lower bound of the positive entries
min+
(
M(ts+1, ts)
)
≥ δ|L¯|, are type symmetric and have a strictly posi-
tive diagonal. By Lorenz [40], Theorem 2, we get the desired result for the
sequence
(
M(ts+1, ts)
)
s∈N
. Since limk→∞
∏k
s=0M(ts+1, ts) = limt→∞M(t),
we also establish the statement of the Proposition. 
1.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5. For both parts of the proposition, we
will apply the following Lemma (see e.g. Friedberg and Insel [24]).
Lemma C.2 (Convergence). Let A be a square matrix with complex or
real entries. Then, the sequence
{
At
}
t→∞
converges if and only if the fol-
lowing two conditions are satisfied.
(i) If λ is an eigenvalue of A, then either λ = 1 or λ lies in the open unit
disc of the complex plane, i.e. |λ| ∈ (−1, 1).
(ii) If 1 is an eigenvalue of A, then its algebraic multiplicity equals its
geometric multiplicity.
Let us denote by Eig(A), the set of eigenvalues of a matrix A and let
eig(A) ∈ Eig(A). Moreover, if z is a complex number, then we denote by
Re(z) the real part and by Im(z) the imaginary part of z.
Proof of part (a). We will show that condition (i) of Lemma C.2 is sat-
isfied. To see this, note first that by definition M = Σˆ(I +BΣˆ)−1(I +B) =
(B + Σˆ−1)−1(I +B),3 which implies that M−1 = (I +B)−1(B + Σˆ−1). Let
B˜ := (I + B)−1, i.e. for every i ∈ N , B˜ii =
1
1+σˆiβi
, hence B˜ is a diagonal
matrix with entries in (0, 1). Thus, B˜B = I− B˜, and M−1 = B˜(B+Σˆ−1) =
I − B˜ + B˜Σˆ−1 = I + B˜(Σˆ−1 − I).
Now let Σˆ be symmetric positive definite (henceforth: “PD”). Then
Σˆ−1 is also PD and the eigenvalues of both matrices are real and positive.
3That this representation is well defined if Σˆ is positive definite can be seen in the proof
of Lemma C.1.
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Since Σˆ is row stochastic, we have |eig(Σˆ)| ≤ 1 (here and in the rest of the
present proof of part (a), the properties shown for one eig(A) do hold for
every eig(A) ∈ Eig(A)), which implies that eig(Σˆ−1) ≥ 1. Thus, eig(Σˆ−1 −
I) ≥ 0 (subtraction of I decreases all eigenvalues by 1). Note that both
Σˆ−1 − I and B˜ are symmetric matrices with real non–negative eigenvalues.
As a consequence, the product B˜(Σˆ−1 − I) has also only real non–negative
eigenvalues.4 Thus, we get eig(B˜(Σˆ−1 − I)) ≥ 0, which implies eig(I +
B˜(Σˆ−1 − I)) ≥ 1, i.e. eig(M−1) ≥ 1, and hence all eigenvalues of M are
real and located in the interval (0, 1]. Furthermore, since M has row sum
one (see Lemma C.1, using x = (1, 1, ..., 1)′), at least one eigenvalue must
be equal to 1.
Proof of Part (b). Let Σˆ have a strictly positive diagonal and let there
be an eigenvalue λ that satisfies Re(λ) < |λ|2. The second condition is
equivalent to Re(λ−1) < 1.5 Note that λ−1 is an eigenvalue of Σˆ−1. Now
let for each i βi =
k
σˆi
, k ∈ R, so that B = kI. We show that if k is large
enough, then M has an eigenvalue with absolute value larger than 1 and
hence condition (i) of Lemma C.2 is violated.
To do so, we will use M−1 = (I + B)−1(B + Σˆ−1) = (I + kI)−1(kI +
Σˆ−1) = ((1+k)I)−1(kI+Σˆ−1) = 11+k (kI+Σˆ
−1). Now, since we have that we
have Re(λ−1) = Re(eig(Σˆ−1)) < 1, this implies Re(eig(kI + Σˆ−1)) < 1 + k,
because eig(kI + Σˆ−1) = k + eig(Σˆ−1). For k large enough, we must have
|eig(kI+Σˆ−1)| < 1+k.6 To see that this must hold, assume to the contrary
|eig(kI + Σˆ−1)| ≥ 1 + k. Thus, we would get√
Re2(eig(kI + Σˆ−1)) + Im2(eig(kI + Σˆ−1) ≥ 1 + k.
Denote ǫ := 1 − Re(λ−1) > 0. Re(λ−1) = 1 − ǫ implies that Re(eig(kI +
Σˆ−1)) = 1−ǫ+k. Since Re(eig(kI+Σˆ−1)) = k−ǫ+1 and Im(eig(kI+Σˆ−1) =
Im(λ−1), we have that
√
(1− ǫ+ k)2 + Im2(λ−1) ≥ 1+k, i.e. (1−ǫ+k)2+
Im2(λ−1) ≥ (1 + k)2. After simplifying, we have k ≤ Im
2(λ−1)−2ǫ+ǫ2
2ǫ . For k
large enough, this is not true because the right hand side is independent of
k. A contradiction. Thus, we get
1
1 + k
|(eig(kI + Σˆ−1))| =
∣∣∣∣eig
(
1
1 + k
(kI + Σˆ−1)
)∣∣∣∣ = |eig(M−1)| < 1
and hence |eig(M)| > 1 so that condition (i) of Lemma C.2 is violated. 
4To see that this is true define Σ−1 − I =: A and note first that since A is positive
semidefinite we have xTAx ≥ 0 for all vectors x. Next, let B˘ = B˜
1
2 , i.e. B˘ is the positive
semidefinite square root of B˜. Then xTAx ≥ 0 for all x implies that (yT B˘)A(B˘y) ≥ 0 for
any y. Thus eig(B˘AB˘) ≥ 0. Finally, by symmetry, note that B˘AB˘ = (B˘(B˘A))T = (B˜A)T
which has the same eigenvalues as B˜A.
5Simply because: λ−1 = Re(λ)
Re2(λ)+Im2(λ)
+ −Im(λ)
Re2(λ)+Im2(λ)
i and |λ|2 = Re2(λ) + Im2(λ).
6If λ−1 is a real number, then this holds trivially.
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1.5. Proof of Proposition 3.6. As by Lemma C.2 above, for the
convergence of the powers of a matrix A it is sufficient that 1 is exactly one
eigenvalue of A and all other eigenvalues are in the interval (−1, 1). To prove
the proposition, we will in a first step apply the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
(PFT) for a regular row–stochastic matrix A: (i) The spectral radius of A
is 1 (the largest eigenvalue in absolute value). (ii) For all other eigenvalues
λ it holds that |λ| < 1. (iii) The eigenvalue 1 is simple.
Consider any Σˆ ∈ S(n) such that Σˆ is irreducible with strictly positive
diagonal. This implies that Σˆ is regular, so that by the PFT for regular row
stochastic matrices, Σˆ has simple eigenvalue 1 and all other eigenvalues are
in (−1, 1).
Let us now consider the transformationsM = Σˆ
(
I +BΣˆ
)−1
(I+B). In
a first step, we have to guarantee that I+BΣˆ is invertible, so thatM exists.
Note that strict diagonal dominance would be sufficient for non–singularity.
For strict diagonal dominance, we require that 1 + βi
(
σˆi −
∑
j∈Ni
σˆij
)
> 0
holds for every i ∈ N . Since Σˆ has a strictly positive diagonal, this is always
satisfied if e.g. β ≤ 1.
Given above, it follows again by the continuity of the eigenvalues that
there does exist a non–empty neighborhood N
(
0
∣∣∣Σˆ) ⊂ Rn+ such that ∀β ∈
N
(
0
∣∣∣Σˆ)∪0 both I+BΣˆ is strictly diagonally dominant andM has exactly
one eigenvalue equal 1 and n − 1 eigenvalues in the interval (−1, 1). Thus,
M t converges. 
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